The

Pennsylvania

Scholars Series

Carroll C. Arnold

Published by The Speech Communication
Association of Pennsylvania

THE SPEECH COMMUNICATION ASSOCIATION
OF PENNSYLVANIA

FOUNDED 1939

SCAP is dedicated to the research in, ethical use of, and education for excellent oral communication in every human activity, especially those in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Specifically, its members seek to: (1) Encourage recognition of speech communication and its partner system listening as an inherent part of basic human skill; (2) Advocate education in competent speaking and listening through the adoption of at least one required course in speech communication in all Commonwealth school districts and institutions of higher learning; (3) Encourage competent oral communication and listening across the curriculum, in all class activities; (4) Encourage young people to participate in co-curricular activities that develop speaking and listening skills; (5) Recognize communication as an integral and on-going process in the business and organizational world; (6) Promote literacy in the performance in, and critique of, competent mass communication; (7) Further recognition of artistic merits and human growth potential of various performance settings that utilize oral communication; (8) Train all citizens in critical thinking and effective communication of their ideas; (9) Encourage scholarship in, and publication of, results that investigate various aspects of human interaction; (10) Communicate emerging of on-going concerns regarding speaking and listening in its various settings to decision-makers in government, organizations, business, and the arts.

-Article II By-Laws of the Association

OFFICERS

President
Janie Harden Fritz
Duquesne University

Vice President
John Chapin
Penn State Beaver

Past President
Sol W. Obotetukudo
Clarion University

Second Vice President
Grace A. Coleman
Penn State Beaver

Treasurer
Jim Tomlinson
Bloomsburg University

Editor, SCAP *Annual*
Calvin L. Troup
Duquesne University

Executive Secretary
Jean Ann Streiff
Oakland Catholic High School

Advertising Manager
Annamarie Wyant
Duquesne University

Member at Large
Richard J. Mills, Jr.
Seton Hill College

Member at Large
Terrie MacClellan
Penn State Beaver

Carroll C. Arnold

COPY DISTRIBUTION INFORMATION

COPYRIGHT INFORMATION

INTRODUCTION

In 1999, the Executive Committee of the Speech Communication Association of Pennsylvania decided to sponsor a series of publications honoring contributions to our understanding of human communication made by outstanding scholars who spend a significant portion of their careers researching and teaching in Pennsylvania. The publications were not to be primarily biographical, but rather to contain essays that featured the intellectual contributions of the scholar, either by dealing directly with the scholar's research or teaching, or by reflecting the scholar's attitudes, values, and perspective. Carroll Arnold was chosen as the first scholar to be honored.

In 1963, Carroll Arnold joined the faculty of Speech Communication at the Pennsylvania State University. He had already established himself as one of the premier scholar and teachers in the field. He began his career in South Dakota where at elementary, junior high, and high school levels he taught English, speech, and history. Following one year stints at the University of Akron and Chatham College and an interruption of career for military service in the Air Corps Intelligence, he became a faculty member at Cornell, where he rose to become Department Chairman before moving to Penn State. Penn State's successful recruiting of Arnold was a significant event. University President Eric Walker had just given monies to some departments of exceptional potential to hire stellar professors who would enhance quality and reputation immediately. Carroll Arnold's presence achieved that objective.

The breadth and depth of Dr. Arnold's interests in the nature and processes of human speaking and listening are revealed in his teaching, scholarship, publications, and editorial positions. His essays, chapters, and books include extensively used texts in public speaking, group discussion, the criticism of oral rhetoric, studies in British and American public address, philosophical perspectives on human communication, and the interrelationships of rhetoric and cognitive psychology. He was co-founder and associate editor of the journal, *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, editor of the distinguished series of books on rhetoric and speech communication published by the University of South Carolina Press, editor of *Speech Monographs*, and on the editorial boards of *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, *Speech Monographs*, *Today's Speech*, and *Southern Speech Communication Journal*. In 1969, he received the James A. Winans Award for Distinguished Scholarship in Rhetoric and Public Address.

Dr. Arnold also received awards for his teaching and service at the local, regional, and national levels. These awards reveal the many contributions he made across the field of speech communication, ranging from being one of the founders of two national conferences that strongly influenced the future directions of the field, to the fine teaching he did in his classes, to the advice and editorial assistance he gave so many individuals across a lifetime.

Carroll Arnold was noted for the common sense perspective that typified his thought and actions. He took great pride in being called a pragmatist, and his down to earth attitude coupled with his diverse interests enabled him to cut to the heart of problems and issues in ways that were fruitful and enriching. Over the course of his years, both formally and informally, Professor Arnold was a valuable teacher to students and colleagues alike. His influence at the local, state, regional, and national levels is evidence of the great resource Carroll Arnold was. At the same time, he was a humane person, genuinely respected and liked by all who knew him.

The four essays in this collection honor Professor Arnold in different ways. Ronald Arnett features major aspects of what we can refer to as Carroll Arnold's rhetorical attitude to illustrate how a rhetorical perspective can enrich contemporary public thought and discussion. Arnett argues that as we come to the end of an age of privatized communication, diversity demands that we reinvigorate public dialogue with an openness that encourages us to learn. Julia Wood, Alexandra Grasos, and Allison Howry examine the roles of counter publics in the debates over major issues that are held in the public arena. By doing so, they describe the kinds of concerns for the value of the public sphere that Carroll Arnold cared about. Dennis Gouran provides an illustrative study of the kinds of contributions Arnold made to the understanding of a staple and essential activity of democratic societies: group debate and discussion. Gouran's essay reveals the way Arnold applied his pragmatic perspective to the study of group communication. Richard Gregg's essay conducts a rhetorical analysis of a crisis situation in which the physicality of a rhetorical event played a role in avoiding further tragedy. The essay illustrates the kind of cognitive perspective that Arnold became interested in late in his career. Taken as a whole, the essays honor Carroll Arnold for the breadth of his intellectual contributions for the quality of his critical observations, the acuity of his ideas, and the openness of his perspectives and his mind.

Richard B. Gregg
The Pennsylvania State University, July 2000

WHEN WORDS BECOME DANCES

Richard B. Gregg

The Pennsylvania State University

Carroll Arnold always took pride in the fact that he was primarily a student of human rhetorical communication. He approached new ideas and directions with an open inquisitive attitude, always interested in trying to determine whether a new orientation or analytical method might be useful in his attempt to determine "what happens when A talks purposefully with B". This was the question that directed him to the study of oral communication, and that guided his thought throughout his career.

In the 1970's, Arnold became interested in the findings in the neuro and cognitive sciences with regard to the study of human symbolizing. In May of 1977, a major national conference of the cognitive sciences was held on the Penn State campus. Arnold delivered an invited paper at the conference dealing with the nature of listening as scholars of rhetoric understood that concept. He focused particularly on the need to conceptualize speaking and listening as an interactive, holistic experience.

Arnold's thrust was in keeping with new approaches then being developed in the cognitive sciences undermining the belief in dichotomies previously held about the human behavior. The myth of the mind-body distinction was such a dichotomy. With its demise came the need to develop new ways of viewing human behavior. Carroll and I became involved in an ongoing dialogue about implications of the new perspectives for the work of rhetorical critics. Following Carroll's repeated directive to critics to "do the work", this essay is an attempt to account for the rhetoric of mind-body interaction in a rhetorical situation compelled by the 1970 killing of four persons at Kent State University during the days of anti-Vietnam War protest.

WHEN WORDS BECOME DANCES

Armed with new methods for discovering, measuring and comprehending how our neurological systems operate, the neuro and cognitive sciences are steadily undermining basic assumptions that have guided our thoughts and actions about human symbolic behavior for a very long time. For example, the psycho-intellectual activity we have separated and labeled "emotion" and "reason" do not and cannot operate separately at all. They are interlocking processes that always operate jointly. Like it or not, one cannot engage in what we refer to as "reason" or "rationality" without the engagement of "emotion" (Damasio, 1994, 1999). In similar fashion, the general view that the processes of perception and conception refer to distinctly different activities, with the perceptual being primarily a physical phenomenon and the conceptual a mental one, is not supportable. The perceptual is always conceptualized and the conceptual is structured on the basis of perception (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). The two are joined in holistic interaction.

More fundamental is the evidence discovered in recent years that the mind/body distinction is a simplifying fiction that does not exist. In actuality, there is continuous activity of nerves and chemical impulses as they move back and forth between the brain and motor centers throughout the body. What we have termed physicality, emotionality, and intellectually all occur together, all the time, in various proportions equations, and intensities. The interaction forms a holistic phenomenon and the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Thus, the alteration of any one aspect will alter all the others, causing a new phenomenon to occur.

Human rhetorical interaction is just such an interactive, holistic enterprise, and must be understood in ways that comport with the findings of the cognitive sciences. In this spirit, I propose to examine a rhetorical situation in which reactions to a rhetorical act involve the holistic behavior of human response. Specifically, I shall be interested in the way physicality becomes a part of that response. I choose to make a point of providing some focus on the physical because in our discussions of human symbolizing, we have portrayed the act of symbolizing to be almost exclusively an "intellectual" action of the human mind. Such a restricted view of the symbolic is encouraged by our tendency to equate symbolizing with linguistic behavior, in spite of the fact that language and meaning are not identical, and that meanings transcend the limits of language as a matter of course (Donald, 1991, p. 930; Gregg, 1998, pp. 247, 249).

For instance, there are certain conceptual understandings that are comprehended by humans prior to language learning. There are processes and procedures better learned through the doing of them than through linguistic explanation. And there are feelings we refer to as ineffable when our language is unable to express them. To say that all of our meaning is symbolic <u>is not</u> to say that it is all linguistic. To say that all our meaning is symbolic <u>is</u> to include the meaningfulness of physicality. Because all human symbolizing is rhetorical (Gregg, 1984), the inducing qualities of physicality can be a <u>noticeable</u> part of rhetorical interactions. I propose to examine such an interaction.

My analysis will proceed as follows: I will briefly articulate a frame of reference that places mind/body interaction in a rhetorical perspective. Next I shall describe the historical situation in which the rhetorical event took place. I shall then turn to an explication of the rhetorical actions with an eye toward understanding the potential for bodily action as part of rhetorical meaning. I believe that an examination of the rhetorical context, and the multi-layered meanings of the message will suggest not only that physicality played its part in the holistic mix of meaning, but that it was essential to the outcome of the rhetorical interaction.

The Rhetorical Perspective

Kenneth Burke refers to the rhetorical perspective I shall adopt. We are, says Burke, the symbol making, symbol using, symbol misusing animal. We have long raised a ourselves high in the rank of living things by celebrating our symbolic abilities, just as birds celebrate themselves by sitting on fences and flapping their wings because they have wings to flap. In similar fashion, we celebrate our minds. But we have not yet given much attention to the other half of Burke's equation. Following Descartes's fundamental error of conceptualizing a mind/body dichotomy, and remaining wedded to it while descrying Descartes, we have neglected the role of the body in the mind, the materiality of thought. Burke warned against such neglect. In *Permanence and Change* he wrote:

Man being specifically a symbol-using animal, we take it that a terminology for the discussion of his social behavior must stress symbolism as a motive, if maximum scope and relevancy is required of the terminology. However, man being generally a biological organism, the ideal terminology must present his symbolic behav-

-ior as grounded in biological conditions. (p. 275)

Burke furthermore illustrates the holistic approach in his work. In *Counterstatement* (1959) he noted:

> Over and over again in the history of art, different material has been arranged to embody the principle of crescendo; and this must be so because we "think" in crescendo, because it parallels certain psychic and psychical processes which are at the roots of our experience. (p. 45)

In *Attitudes Toward History* (1961a), Burke points out that as an "economic enterprise", the body, through the increased secretion of adrenalin, prepares itself for the act of grasping, or takes part in the symbolic analogue of shaping the attitude of grasping that can be expressed in the pronunciations of speech (p. 339). In *The Rhetoric of Motives* (1969), Burke identifies the physiological ground from which rhetoric springs:

> In parturition begins the centrality of the nervous system. The different nervous systems, through language and the ways of production, erect various communities of interests and insights, social communities varying in nature and scope. And out of the division and community arises the universal rhetorical situation. (p. 146)

Finally, I turn to Burke's *Rhetoric of Religion* (1961b) where he explains that the neurological separateness of individuality, i.e., similar but separate, leads to the distinctions of MINE and YOURS which in turn leads to the commandment, "Thou shalt not take these things of mine, nor I of thine", and from these simple beginnings, "myriads of laws, deeds, contracts, precepts, prison sentences, educational policies, businesses, revolutions, religions, etc, etc. Will be erected" (p. 285).

Contemporary neurophysiology has at last arrived at the threshold of Burke's open door. Advances in such technology as PET scanning, and related measuring devices reveal that our brain functions pay close attention to our bodily activity, that body precedes mind, and that without this interaction our minds would not be what they are. In spiritualizing the working of the mind in our conceptualization of it, we have made fundamental errors. For example, the research of Hanna and Antonio Demasio demonstrates that without the activation of our emotions, so fundamentally imbedded in our physiolog-

-ical being, we cannot think in ways we have considered rational. As Antonio Demasio (1994) explains:

> There is a collection of systems on the brain consistently dedicated to the goal oriented thinking process we call reasoning, and to the response selection we call decision making, with special emphasis on the person and social domain. This same collection of systems is also involved in emotion and feeling, and is partly dedicated to processing body feelings. (p. 170)

Because of the order of things, Demasio concludes that emotions and feelings have a truly privileged status:

> Because of their inextricable ties to the body, they come first in development and retain a primacy that subtly pervades our mental life. Because the brain is the body's captive audience, feelings are winners among equals. And since what comes first constitutes a frame of reference for what comes after, feelings have a say on how the rest of the brain and cognition go about their business. Their influence is immense. (pp. 159, 160)

In sum, in his writings over the years, Kenneth Burke has encouraged us to realize and appreciate that our body's impetus and response is active in all the symbolizing that we do, and that at times our physical responses are commanding. Burke (1973) emphasizes that a symbolic act is the *dancing of an attitude*, and that in the attitudinizing of a poem, the whole body may become involved (p. 9). *Attitude*, he says, *is incipient action*, so that the body's involvement may be implicit in the verbalizing that occurs or it may be explicit as it carries the attitude to completion. Bodily posture, he says, can correlate with emotions such as fear and rage (pp. 10, 11).

In the analysis that follows I shall operate from a perspective that holds that our mind/body works together to shape symbolic strategies for coping with situations. All thought is driven by purpose, emotion, and attitude, and since attitude is incipient action, it can result in behavioral outcomes and consequences. The symbol systems that emanate from our fundamental symbolic capacities, i.e., language, mathematics, musical notation, dance, architecture, etc., constitute equipment for living. Because our symbolizing is reflective, selective, and therefore deflective, purposeful, and value laden, it is inherently rhetorical. The physicality of our being is not simply the housing

that protects the processes of our symbolizing, but is a fundamental and inherent part of its meaning.

The Rhetorical Situation

I must now describe the context in which the rhetorical act I shall examine occurred. It is important to see the immediate context as emerging from the larger scene of social turbulence, protest, and dissent that characterized the decade of the 1960s. In 1961 groups of individuals, among them many young students, boarded busses and rode the federal highways of some Southern states to try to force the racial integration of public facilities. In the same year, activists in high schools and colleges across the South formed the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee to engage in demonstrations and acts of protest to enforce integration. Events of this type rapidly spread to states in the North, so that national civil rights movements came into being. The numbers of protests, demonstrations, and rallies grew rapidly, and became more militant. By the middle of the decade, movements on behalf of broadening rights and opportunities for women joined to protest actions.

At the same time, growing numbers of Americans, many of them college and university students, began to engage in public marches, sit-ins, and demonstrations against American military involvement in the war in Vietnam. As the years of the 1960s moved toward the decade of the 70s, the anti-war movement came to the center of the public's attention, preventing President Lyndon Johnson from running for another term of office in 1968, and bringing Richard Nixon to power.

Nixon came to the presidency in 1968 promising a secret plan to end the Vietnam War. But in the months following Nixon's inauguration, there was no evidence that American involvement in the war would end soon. On April 30, 1970, President Nixon delivered a nationally televised address in which he announced that American and South Vietnamese forces were engaging in an "incursion" across the Vietnamese border into Cambodia. The purpose of the military operation, said Nixon, was not to enlarge the war but to destroy enemy supply bases and infiltration trails in order to protect American troops and shorten the war. Many Americans had heard such justificatory claiming for expanded military action before. Protest was inevitable. On May 2, students attending a Black Panther anti-war rally at Yale issued an appeal for a national student strike against the war and received the endorsement of the National Student Association. In the days that followed, nearly a

million and a half students responded by leaving classes. They took part in workshops, teach-ins, sit-ins, marches, rallies, blockades, and flag incidents. Clark Kerr, Chair of the Carnegie commission on Higher Education, wrote that "The variety of protest activities—both violent and nonviolent—seemed to exhaust the known repertoire of forms of dissent" (Quoted in Wells, 1994, p. 423). De Benedetti and Chatfield (1990, p. 280) described the amalgam of events as "easily the most massive and shattering protest in the history of American higher education."

These protests capped a period of months during which a growing number of students opposed United States involvement in Vietnam. Gallup Poll data show that the number of students who considered themselves "doves" doubled from the spring of 1967 to the fall of 1969 (cited in Lipset, 1972, p. 43). Similar data revealed that the percentage of students who believed American involvement was an act of imperialism rose from 16% in the spring of 1969 to 41% in April, 1970 (p. 49). Over roughly the same period of time, the American Council on Education reported 9,408 protest incidents; 731 of these involved arrests by police, 410 involved damage to ROTC buildings and other property, 230 involved violence to persons (Gitlin, 1987, p. 409). Across the country, many conservative and moderate students joined demonstrations for the first time following Nixon's speech. In a number of places, administrations and faculty joined in dissent; 531 campuses shut down immediately, 51 of them to remain closed for the remainder of the academic year. During the first week of May, fires or explosions in ROTC buildings occurred at a rate of more than four each day, with police and National Guard armed with bayonets and ammunition called out at over 100 schools (Wells, pp. 425-426).

On Monday, May 4th, a second shock occurred at Kent State University in Kent, Ohio, where a National Guard unit, mobilized and sent to the campus to quell disturbances, inexplicably fired on persons moving about on the campus. Many were students who had gathered to join a protest rally announced on the previous Friday, others had wandered by to check out whatever might be happening, and yet others were moving from one location to another as was typical of class break activity. Some townspeople and faculty were in the mix. The rapid volley unleashed by the Guard struck 13 students, mortally wounding four of them.

For many Americans, the dire action was wreathed with cataclysmic overtones. At Kent State, on an academic "village green", where the interac-

tion and exploration of conflicting ideas were to be encouraged, the National Guard, a symbol of national and state authority, applied the ultimate and deadly force of bullets to quash dissent. For some, the Guard action was perceived to be justified because unpatriotic, outlaw behavior had provoked the fatal response. For others, suppression of the voices of dissent by killing was horribly repugnant and unacceptable in the American tradition. From both points of view, fundamental tenets of American democracy were at stake: un-American actions and ideologies were seen to be involved in the actions of that day. In either case, motive and intention, accident and ambiguity had to be accounted for and located in the larger context. Matters like these beckoned for historical interpretation, but history was yet at a distance. The heat of the moment required a symbolizing act that could accommodate the exigencies of immediacy.

The President whose public speech ignited the turmoil on campuses did not rise to the situation, but exacerbated it. On May 1, the morning following his televised address on Cambodian incursion, Richard Nixon went to the Pentagon for a briefing. As he left the briefing surrounded by Pentagon employees and members of the press, Nixon referred to protesting college students as "bums" who were "blowing up campuses" and "burning up books" (Ambrose, p. 348). On the morning of May 4, 37 college and university presidents sent a letter urging Nixon to demonstrate his determination to end the war to ease the alienations of America's young people. He did nothing of the sort. Rather, later that same day, after the killings, Nixon had his Press Secretary, Ron Ziegler, issue a statement to the press reminding the public that the turning of dissent to violence "invites tragedy", and expressing his hope that administrators, students, and faculty would "stand firmly against violence." The statement expressed no sympathy or understanding for the families of the dead students, and made no mention of the dead and wounded students themselves. The press also quoted the father of Allison Krause, one of the dead students, who said his "child was not a bum" (pp. 350-351). Consequently, in the days that immediately followed, at a numerous locations, a variety of individuals found themselves in the position of needing to act in response to the Kent State affair.

One example of this phenomenon occurred on May 7, 1970, when, at about 12:30 P.M., James K. Sours, President of Southern Oregon College [now Southern Oregon State College] stood near a flagpole in front of Churchill Hall to address several hundred persons gathered there. Energies that had been building from feelings of anxiety, fear, outrage, and helpless-

ness since the Kent State incident three days earlier were focused on the demands of one student faction that the flag be lowered in memory of the Kent State dead and in protest of the continuing war in Vietnam. Another faction intended to see that the flag remained at full-mast to express support for the war effort, and against the ruptures of social protest. President Sours' decision promised to be provocative, no matter what he said or did.

I propose to undertake an examination of Sours' statement and the circumstances surrounding it. An obvious reason for such an examination is the fact that despite the threat of serious trouble existing on campus and the surrounding community of Ashland, Oregon, none occurred, and one wonders what role Sours' statement played in the vortex of tensions existing there. One might consider the happenings at Southern Oregon College to be of limited interest. It was a small institution of higher education situated in an out-of-the-way location, not a place that called its name into the larger public mind of the nation [Kent State was in the same category until the killings of May 4, 1970]. But the Kent State tragedy immediately created a climate of opinion in which it was feared that any occurrence on any college or university campus anywhere in the country might escalate into violent outbreaks of national proportion (Mitchner, 1971, pp. 439, 455). Suddenly, no college was out-of-the-way, and all campuses were watched with anxiety. On many of those campuses, students, administrators, and faculty struggled to cope with what had happened, and in doing so engaged in gesture, enactments, and interactive discursive exchanges that can be characterized as performative rhetoric. For the student of rhetorical interaction, any rhetorical act of that time beckons attention.

The Rhetorical Act

Students, faculty, and townspeople in and around Southern Oregon College were well aware of protest and related events in their general area. On May 1, the Ashland Daily Tidings (p. 1) reported student unrest to be at the top of the list of subjects discussed with officials of the Oregon State System of Higher Education at a public forum held in Medford. The focus there was on unrest occurring among students at the University of Oregon. The Oregonian (p. 13) reported on May 6 that various student groups at Reed College, Lewis and Clark College, Portland State University and the University of Oregon had issued the call for support of the National Student Association strike. On the next day the Oregonian's coverage extended to neighboring states in the northwest, including mention of explosions caused

11

by two sticks of dynamite thrown near the National Guard armory in Longview, Washington (1970, Thursday, May 7, p. 11). On Wednesday night, May 6, Governor Ronald Reagan of California ordered all of the state's universities, colleges, and junior colleges to shut down, and urged all private colleges and universities to do the same. In his 14 minute televised statement Reagan said, "I want to make it very clear that closing the campuses for this four-day period is not, in any way, giving in to those who preach and practice violence." As part of his justification for the shutdown, Reagan asserted that with peaceful students gone from campuses, the radicals "will not be able to fade away into the crowds of curious; they will not be able to hide behind the innocent" (Skelton, 1970, p. 7).

There was concern across the state of Oregon that a "Kent State tragedy" might happen again, and measures were taken and official statements issued to try to dampen growing anxiety. On May 5, Major General Donald N. Anderson, Commander of the Oregon National Guard said that if the Guard was called out to deal with civil disturbance, his troops would carry riot sticks and gas masks but no firearms. He pointed out that half of the 7,500 guardsmen were well trained for such occurrences, and no inexperienced troops would be mobilized (Tugmen, p. 11).

Southern Oregon College students, like students elsewhere, began to act in protest of the war and the Kent State tragedy. Student body president Mike Smith endorsed the national student strike, and an estimated 150 students and faculty demonstrated in front of the administration building, forming a large circle, humming songs, and listening to students urging them to work peace. On Tuesday morning, May 5, Smith announced that students had asked the College administration to lower campus flags to half-mast in memory of the four students killed at Kent State. He was told that action could not be taken without an order from the governor, and no such order had been given. On Tuesday evening, some 300 to 400 students gathered in Lithia Park, walked to campus and settled in front of Churchill Hall. They dispersed peacefully around 9:00 P.M., with a small group remaining for an all-night candlelight vigil. Some felt the aura of tension keenly. Psychology professor George Pierson wrote Mayor Charles McKeon the next day to praise the performance of the police department:

> As you know, last night several hundred students and at least one faculty member camped on the lawn in front of Churchill Hall. I can assure you that tempers were on edge at that time and the atmosphere

could be best described as dangerous. The Kent State atrocity was fresh in the minds of everybody. I am confident that if police officers had entered the campus with weapons that there would have been additional unnecessary bloodshed. (<u>Ashland Daily Tidings</u>, 5/7/1970. p. 3)

At various locations around the state, groups and individuals requested or demanded that American flags be lowered to half-mast. Governor Tom McCall refused to give an order that all flags be lowered, but said he regarded memorial services for the Kent State students to be within the realm of responsible individual reflection of compassion and concern (Olmos, 1970, p.13). President Sours, growing anxious about actions happening on his campus, departed early from a conference he was attending in Iowa City, Iowa, to return to Ashland. Meeting with his deans on Wednesday evening, he learned that the flag on campus had become the focus of unrest. On Thursday morning following a meeting with student leaders he walked to his home, wrote a statement, and returned to campus. There, moving to the flagpole and using a megaphone, he delivered his statement.

The Speech

The following is President Sours' text in full:

We are gathered here beneath the flag of this country. For most of us, this flag is invested with a high degree of symbolism. It symbolizes, for example, the freedom toward which hopefully we are continuing to move. It symbolizes the great and glorious moments of our national history. And it calls to mind the names of the millions of persons, great and small, who have served it and served it well.

But as a symbol of our <u>total</u> national life, it also reminds us of the hard work that remains before us if we are to achieve the freedom and the kind of life for <u>all</u> our people that constituted the dreams of our ancestors. It symbolizes, in other words, both our strengths and our weaknesses.

Above all, it symbolizes those who have died as Americans. More than 300,000 Americans have given their lives in twentieth century wars. The flag reminds us of their sacrifice. It also reminds us of the tragedy of our national domestic scene which only a few days ago

resulted in the deaths of the four students at Kent State University. By way of commemorating these losses, and to symbolize our determination to build a society that will give our flag its fullest meaning, I am directing that the flag be lowered to half-staff, until 5 p.m. Friday.

Several initial observations serve as prelude to my analysis. Sours' statement is extremely brief, consisting of twelve complete sentences; it took only a few minutes to deliver orally. A cursory reading of the statement shows that Sours felt the need to direct attention away from phenomena that were divisive at the moment by introducing phenomena that could invite or evoke a sense of common identification. He does so in several ways. The major explicit patterns of meaning in his statement evolve from a fundamental claim made in the second sentence that "this flag is invested with a high degree of symbolism." Sours then proceeds to exemplify such symbolicity in a series of subsidiary claims phrased at a high level of ambiguity. The flag, he says, symbolizes "the freedom toward which hopefully we are continuing to move"; "the great and glorious moments of our national history"; "our total national life"; "the kind of life for all of our people that constituted the dreams of our ancestors": "both our strengths and our weaknesses." Insofar as these phrasings operate to structure meanings in the minds of those who were present, they do so by evoking thoughts, memories, and experiences already held in individual cognitive repertoires. As Cooper and Nothstine (1992), who have ably dealt with this aspect of Sours' statement put it, "…Sours gave both student groups the opportunity to 'fill in the blanks' with particulars from their own experiences in harmony with their own values and beliefs" (p. 142). It is also worth noting that Sours' phrasings direct meanings more easily toward the past and the future than the present. He asserts that "freedom" in its fullest sense remains a goal to be achieved, that the glorious moments of our "national history" are worth recall, and that the dreams of ancestors shape the good life of the future. In addition to pointing away from the instant moment, Sours' chronological orientations backward and forward settle into a rhythmic flow that move mind and body, ideology and physiology, toward a transcendent and consubstantial plateau.

Omissions must be noted. There is no specific reference to the war in Vietnam. There is no mention of President Nixon's speech announcing the military expansion into Cambodia, nor to any other government activity related to military action or attempts to end the conflict and gain peace. There are no allusions to acts of protest and disruption occurring either around the country or on the Southern Oregon College campus. Acknowledgement of

any of these phenomena would be to pay notice to political issues, statements, events and memories pervading the moment, and perhaps heighten them, thus leading to the sharpening of differences among those present. In short, the political nature of the moment, and of any action taken in that moment would be dramatized. Sours attempts to avoid such politicization. By so doing, he opens the door to the possibility of reframing the situation another way. And in recasting it, in restructuring the phenomenological scene, he offers new grounds for participant identification.

Clues to the nature of the reframing occur in the beginning and at the ending of Sours' statement. His very first sentence seems primarily factual, acknowledging the location of those physically gathered and the presence of the flag. His second sentence releases the moorings of the flag's materiality by calling attention to the fecund, complex, and ambiguous meanings that humans can read into its being. Sours then proceeds to iterate a set of meanings in terms of abstractions. The sentence that concludes his statement, a long sentence, begins with the phrase "By way of commemorating those losses…". The term, "commemorating", catches our attention because it seems anomalous in light of the situation.

A commemoration, often marked by ceremony, is an occasion for remembering, for "fixing" in memory, persons and events and values deemed worthy of consecration. The scene in which Sours speaks and in which he will act is political however, laced with urgencies of action. It was called into being by actions, defined by actions, and demanding of actions. The urgencies are either directive towards actions that might be climactic or corrective, or toward actions to escape further tragedy. Ceremonial occasions, on the other hand, often feature a consummatory function, and actions entailed by appropriate procedures and rituals help to enact the meanings of the event. Sours comes to the flagpole for the purpose of taking action or refusing to take it, yet does not refer to such action until the end of his final long sentence. By that time he has structured a cognitive landscape that comports with his designation of the event as a commemorative one. He has worked to defuse the political aspects of scene and replace them with a tone consistent with ceremony and its attendant features. We have then, in Sours' statement, an attempt to rhetorically alter the accents of the situation. Thus, we are cued to think of commemorative and ceremonial events in a generic sense, and to abstract characteristics from such events that are present in the text and context on that day in Ashland, Oregon.

Sours' first sentence—"we are gathered here beneath the flag of this country"—might seem a mundane acknowledgment of the obvious, a verbal iteration of the physical reality of the moment. But in the full context of the situation, the statement is much more powerful. From a functional point of view it constitutes an action that begins quickly to demarcate the space within which the rhetorical act will occur. It is an action that draws meaning retrospectively from Sours' next assertion that the flag "is invested with a high degree of symbolism." He thus acknowledges the presence of anxieties, tensions, and expectations poised for actualization in a manner that suggests boundaries around them, constraining and hedging them in. Sours is a detaching a particular physical space from a phenomenological whole and marking it off as a cognitive space differing from others; he is "hallowing the ground" for special recognition and action, and by doing so, accomplishes at once a rhetorical heightening of the moment and an inducing of significance for the scene.

More is accomplished by Sours in his brief introduction. In two sentences, he joins the physical presence of the flag with its symbolizing potential; thus it can be said that in the act of verbal conjoining he "spiritualizes" the flag's materiality and "materializes its spirituality, creating cognitive ground for the movement of intellect and emotion. The union is rhetorically felicitous; it summons the instant concerns to the fore in all of their charged ambiguity, focusing precisely on the target for physical action, positioning it as the symbolic vessel to contain the directives that will follow. It is a move preparatory to constraining and shaping the attitudinal stances of those present.

Sours does much with little verbiage. The attention of those gathered is upon the demand for action with regard to the flag, action that is fraught with possible consequence. Sours does not engage in an opening preachment that could have further exaggerated tension. On the other hand, he does not immediately announce the action he will take, for to do so would have fore closed any possibility for achieving the kind of communal feeling that might avoid physical conflict. Rather, with statements of extravagant parsimony, he verbally emphasizes the "stakes" he uses to tether memories of the past, anxieties of the present, and hopes for the future, to the exigent tendencies toward action. His "stakes" are references to the flag and to its symbolic nature.

Sours' total statement contains 14 references to the flag. The term "flag" occurs five times and the referential pronoun "it" occurs nine times. While those gathered at the scene were not reading a text of Sours' remarks, they could not fail to hear the vocalized repetition of those terms. We get a sense for the rhythm of the repetition when we examine the written form of the message. Half of the references to the flag, seven of them, occur in the first paragraph, two references occur in the second paragraph, three references occur in the third paragraph, and two references occur in the last brief paragraph. In a similar fashion, references to "symbol" and "symbolizing", occur 11 times, four times in the first paragraph, three times each in paragraphs two and three, and one time in the last paragraph. These combined 25 references to the symbolic nature of the flag establish a vocalic periodicity punctuating the cognitive space that Sours created in is first two sentences. Because nearly half of them occur in the initial paragraph, their dense redundancy early heightens attention to the decreasing remainder by establishing a vigilant expectancy that echoes to the end, heightening polysemic connections that can be cognitively structured throughout. They help "tie down" the movement of concepts, ideas, values, and goals that he "calls to mind" as he directs the flow of thought and action.

A third linguistic redundancy functions to assert common identification. The direct use of personal pronouns, "we", "us", and "our" occur in nine of the twelve sentences spoken by Sours. The urgency of the situation, and the corresponding brevity of Sours' statement, removes the opportunity for an extended attempt to relate differing feelings, fears, and actional tendencies together, so Sours' pronouns simply assume and announce the relatedness of joint interests. "We" are gathered, the flag is invested for "most of us", "we" are hopefully moving toward freedom, "our" national history is symbolized, the flag symbolizes "our" total national life, the flag reminds "us" of hard work that remains before "us", if "we" are to achieve, for all of "our" people, the dreams of "our" ancestors, it symbolizes "our" strengths and "our" weaknesses, the flag reminds "us" of 300,000 Americans who sacrificed their lives in twentieth century wars and the four students killed at Kent State, "our" flag will be lowered to symbolize "our" determination, to give "our" flag its fullest meaning. The symbolic phenomena that induce commonality, with the exception of the war dead and the Kent State students, are highly abstract, and invite the concrescence of diverse meaning. Then, in his last sentence, on behalf of the "we" acknowledged in his first sentence, Sours announces, "I" am directing that the flag be lowered.

The ordering of the personal pronouns reveals one of three inversions that unfold in Sours' statement. With initial attention directed toward Sours as the individual officially bearing authoritative power, and with expectant focus on actions he is there to take, Sours immediately invokes the communal "we." He quickly diverts attention away from himself, moving it to the flag, then to the symbolic nature of the flag, and then to future goals and past efforts that exemplify symbolized constructs. Communal pronouns dominate to the end; not until he reaches the last half of the last sentence he will utter, does Sours refer to himself. By that time, he has subsumed his individuality under a collective community so that his verbal action, and the physical action he will order, issue from a collective will. By offering his listeners opportunities for personal identification through the use of ambiguous and abstract language, Sours renders himself and his action less personal than they were when he began to speak.

Sours' second inversion parallels his first. While he acknowledges the immediate moment, as he must, he swiftly expands the symbolic scene to encompass "glorious moments of our national history," and to identify those gathered around the flag with the "millions of persons, great and small, who have served it and served it well." Sours next invites those gathered to join forces with their ancestors to achieve historic dreams for freedom and the kind of life desired by "all of our people…" He begins the third paragraph by referring to the "more than 300,000 Americans…who sacrificed their lives in twentieth century wars." Then, in the last section of the paragraph, he mentions the tragic death of the four young people at Kent State, the action that led to the reason for the flag gathering on the Southern Oregon campus. In the ordering of his comments, Sours has re-contextualized the moment by enlarging it. He does not begin with references to the Kent State tragedy, but rather calls up dimensions of American ideology in abstract terms that allow multiple interpretations. He asserts that the flag brings to mind the goal of "freedom" that continually energizes the ongoing American quest, that it calls from memory "glorious moments" of national history that can be used to celebrate high grounds of achievement along the way, and invites the summoning of historic names whose efforts helped achieve those heights. Toward the end of his statement, Sours' depiction of the grounds alters the focus to highlight those "great and small" who "died as Americans," sacrificing their lives in "twentieth century wars." Finally, he narrows the concern to the four Kent State students tragically killed. By this time in his brief and fast moving statement, Sours has established the framework to place those students in a "national domestic scene" that is part of a larger cognitive collage of aspira-

tions, images, and emotions that comprise the American mythos. There is a sense in which one might say that by summoning to mind cognitive phenomena that reference American ideology prior to mentioning Kent State, Sours places the students in a position to be patriotically defined by the scene. Or, by way of reversing the focus, one might see the students to be a synechdotal representation of American ideology. In either case, the Kent State students, the flag, and all who gathered around to observe and participate in the action, transcend the moment. The third inversion Sours conducts is obvious. Rather than announcing his decision immediately, Sours waits until the end, allowing his statement to accomplish the work described above, so that his decision and the ensuing actions partake of the transcendent moment. Sours acts, then, on behalf of all who are gathered before him.

I turn now to a consideration of the underlying form that secures and constrains the meanings evoked by Sours' brief statement. Succinctly put, Sours' meanings reiterate significant themes in American mythology that urge actions of moving onward, or upward, so that progress can be maintained in the advancement towards goals to be achieved. In the first two paragraphs, Sours pronounces those goals to include freedom, and "the kind of life" dreamed of by our ancestors, thousands of whom sacrificed their lives so that we might inherit their dreams, and continue the onward march. There echoes in and around these pronouncements the great triad of the Declaration. The American characteristics required for the effort are exceptional and unique; they entail personal responsibilities and the joining of individual efforts so that calls may be answered, loads shouldered, burdens lifted, races won, and travails overcome. There are wars to be fought, against enemies of freedom, against poverty and disease, against inflation and recession, and on behalf of liberty and justice for all. The unique nature of the goals, and the exceptional effort needed to continue the actions toward achieving them require periodic self examination, a returning to the freshening "pools" of the Founders' ideas, and a recalling of national moments that signal progress on the great journey.

All of these elements of the American myth underlie Sours' statement, and are called forth by it. The forms of the American ideology emerge from it, and can be perceived to offer themselves as cognitive boundaries that shape meanings. They are boundaries both permeable and porous, allowing interpretations both individual and collective, to become active jointly in the space that Sours marked off.

At first glance it may not seem possible that the two collective voices that called forth the meeting at the flagpole, the one appearing to be patriotic in its support of its government in time of war, the other appearing to be unpatriotic in opposition to its government and to the war, could find common ground on which to stand. It may seem unlikely that such contradictory forces could move toward one another to achieve the kind of cognitive act that Burke called consubstantiality, by which he meant the joining together of "common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes, that make them consubstantial" so that humans can engage in a way of life that is an "acting together" (1969, p. 21). But we must remember that the cooperative act of signing the Declaration of Independence engaged in by the Founders was prefigured by the acts of protest, the gatherings of crowds, the bonfires, the hangings in effigy, the orderly processions, and the outbreaks of destruction, provoked by the Stamp Act of 1765 (Shaw, 1981; Wood, 1991). We must recall with Lipset (1996) that "the United States is distinguished by an emphasis on adversarial relations among groups, and by intense, morally based concepts about public policy, precisely because its people quarrel sharply about how to apply the basic principles of Americanism they purport to agree about" (p. 26). Lipset's point is superbly explicated by Bercovitch (1993) who examines the symbolic ways in which American ideology encourages protest and then absorbs it, uses it, nurtures it for social ends, allowing it to be accomplished through the rhetoric of dissent. Bodnar (1992) further illuminates the situation and messages we are examining by noting:

> In modern America no cultural expression contains the multivocal quality of public commemorations better than the idea of the nation-state and the language of patriotism. On a cultural level it serves as a symbol that "coerces" the discordant interest of diverse social groups and unities them into a "unitary conceptual framework" which connects the ideal with the real. (p. 16)

We now understand how the fundamental forms of the American ideology embodied in Sours' brief rhetorical statement placed the oppositions present at Southern Oregon College on common ground, both materially and symbolically, so they could be simultaneously but differently identified in the deep structures of American memories. Those wanting to protect the honor of the country by keeping the flag up were invited to identify with longstanding American goals and achievements. Those who wanted the flag lowered in protest could identify with American radicals like those who launched the original revolution, and other who undertook exhortative actions on

behalf of social, political, and cultural change throughout American history. The clusters of images induced by Sours can be located throughout the American memory where reside the encrusted murmurings of flag salutes, the renderings of the anthem in schools and arenas, the mythical shadows of Normandy and Suribachi, to the other end of the continuum where springs the radical impulse to burn the flag as an act rejecting the hypocrisy of institutional policies that give lie to the aspirations, values, and goals of the Founders. As far apart as the polar positions might seem, they are undergirded by a broad, but consubstantial ideological base.

I come now to the phenomena of physicality, which may be evoked by Sours' statement, and which take their place in the total symbolic mix of Sours' meanings. To be a bit more precise, I refer to the arousal of neurophysiological motor attributes that contribute their own unique emphases to the individual means structured by those gathered around the flag.

The context of the situation described earlier is crucial to our understanding of the significance of the need for action. The urges to respond behaviorally to the exigencies of the moment were strong on many campuses. The cognitive landscape was littered with images of action, some of them tragic, and action urged itself as a way to get beyond them. On the Southern Oregon campus, physical acts of gathering, marching, singing, communing and the facing off of factions took place. On the second day after the Kent State killings, attention became focused on demands for action regarding the symbolic posturing of the flag. Next morning, ignoring the rumors of weapon on campus, and the urging of his deans that he take a bodyguard, Sours went to the flagpole unescorted to announce the action he would take.

I pointed out earlier that neurological and cognitive research in recent years has established definitively that processes typically thought of separately as operations of the body and operations of the mind rather comprise an integrated holistic phenomenon. Very recent research allows us to become more specific when attempting to account for the success Sours experienced as he tried to avert serious trouble on his campus. Without imputing intention to him, my argument is that Sours delivered a brief speech that engaged physicality in ways that re-presented the nature of the situation and modified the felt need for action.

I began by referring to some of the theoretical and empirical foundations for the analytical observations I shall shortly make. I noted earlier that

21

meaning is not captured within the confines of language. In fact, concepts and categories always precede language, and often transcend it. Contemporary research shows that conceptualizing, perceiving, and motor control can come from the same neurological locus. From this perspective, our bodies play a central role in the structuring of our meaning. As Lakoff and Johnson put it in their recent book:

> Think of the properties of the human body that contribute to the peculiarities of our conceptual system. We have eyes and ears, arms and legs that work in certain very definite ways and not in others. We have a visual system, with topographic maps and orientation-sensitive cells, that provides structure for our ability to conceptualize spatial relations. Our abilities to move in the ways we do and to track the motion of others give motion a major role in our conceptual system. The fact that we have muscles and use them to apply force in certain ways leads to the structure of our system of casual concepts. (1999, pp. 18,19)

Neurological researchers operating from this point of view hypothesized that the neural processes of perceptualizing and those of bodily motions could also be responsible for conceptualizing and reason, and for language learning and use. "Indeed, in recent neural modeling research, models of perceptual mechanisms and motor schema can actually do conceptual work in language learning and in reasoning" (p. 38). For example, terminology in the English language (and other languages as well) develop words such as "in," "on," "over," "through," "under"; verbs that express concepts of bodily movement like "grasp," "pull," "life," "tap," and "punch"; terms that indicate the structure of actions or events like "starting," "stopping," "resuming," "continuing," and "finishing." Modeling research shows that "Our actual motor schemas and motor synergies are involved in what verbs of motor movement mean. And the form of motor control gives general form to all our actions and events we perceive" (p. 39).

One last finding has come to us through neural modeling research that is pertinent to my analysis. I indicated earlier that in situation of high tension laced with urgencies for action, Sours ordered that the flag be lowered. No trouble occurred. Sours so structured the accents of the moment through his rhetoric that his action became consumatory for the feelings and emotions of that moment. I argue that the evoking and shaping of phys-

icality by Sours' statement was essential ingredient for his success. But physically did not take an external form. No one marched, or charged, or clapped, or sang, or held hands. Research reveals that neurological systems for motor schema and motor synergies can operate *without the corresponding bodily musculature actually moving.* This can happen when we imagine we are moving, or reason about moving, or when we dream that our bodies are moving. Thus motor energies can be engaged to cathartic effect without overt physical engagement (p. 580). With this in mind, I turn to a final analytical trip through Sours' brief speech.

I noted earlier Sours' first sentence, "We are gathered here beneath the flag of this country," has several functions. It takes the form of a neutral, mundane statement about physical reality that serves as an introduction to his comments. But simultaneously, it functions to set off and hallow the ground, both physical and mental, for special meanings and actions. There is an additional sense in which the word, "gathered", can well describe the physical and mental tautness, the strain of mind and body in expectation of pending action, that was likely to be present. Thus a mental/behavioral vigilance is acknowledged, if not heightened. After his reference to the symbolically invested nature of the flag, Sours begins to orient attitudes, forward to hope for the future achievement of freedom, and then with a cognitive reversal back toward "the great and glorious moments 'of national history.'" For the reminder of his statement, Sours directs attitudinal stances backward into history and forward to the beckoning goals of the future, sweeping into the recesses of memory with allusion to dreams of ancestors, and the more immediately historic deaths of the Kent State four, casting ahead to pursuits of freedom and happiness and the successful building of a society. The backward and forward movement of cognitive attitude, from past through present to future, recreates a classic ritualistic action that is found in American Jeremiads and political ceremonials, inaugurals and the like. This formulation recalls past actions that resulted in significant accomplishment or achievement and exhorts audiences to strive for similar actions and accomplishments in the future. Running through the cognitive movements toward the future and the looping movements to the past is the form of the ever continuing trek forward, onward, that consumes energy both "weak and strong". It is precisely the phrasing employed by Sours that calls forth the mythic march through effort and change toward the future that can trigger appropriate motor activity in the brain and body. In the first paragraph, Sours asserts that the flag symbolizes the freedom "toward which hopefully we are continuing to move." In the second paragraph he says it "reminds us of the hard work that

remains before us if we are to achieve the freedom and the kind of life" dreamed of by our ancestors. In his final paragraph, Sours directs the lowering of the flag "to symbolize our determination to build a society that will give our flag its fullest meaning" (emphases are mine). Phrases such as "continuing to move", "work that remains before us", "to achieve" and "determination to build", evoke impulses to action, and are therefore cathartic in the situation. These exhortations to actions evoke the kinds of meaning that engage neurological processes in the anterior cingulate cortex describe by Damasio (1994) as the "particular region in the human brain where the systems concerned with emotion/feeling, attention, and working memory interacts so intimately that they constitute the source for the energy of both external action (movement) and internal action (thought animation, reasoning) (p.71). Consequently, with the phrases identified above, Sours engages attentive minds in the action of ritualistic movement in ways that correspond to his semantic meanings. It is further possible that Sours' references to historic actions of other play a role in supporting the arousal of incipient action in the minds of those present. Thus, the images of millions of persons who served the flag, and the 300,000 Americans who sacrifice their lives in wars can help sustain the momentum of actional tendencies. Hence, in his brief moments of presentation, Sours generates the actions needed to complete the interactive patterns of meaning in his statement. He directs the mental energies of those gathered at the flag toward broad gauged goals and aspirations that have their sheen of intensity continually burnished and refurbished through the rhetorical interpretation of historic events, through a variety if ceremonies and rituals, through acts of individual initiative and heroism, and collective efforts and achievements energized by mutual though not identical desire. He directs the energies of memory in general ways to recall stories read and heard, historic figures real and mythic, victories achieved and sacrifices made, to enable the contemporary moments of quest to be continues. He marches the human collective before him forward to join the slight pause required to lower the flag, before resuming the journey to reach toward the goals of American's mythic quest. At several key points in his ritualized statement, Sours' terminology of action engages relevant motor centers in the bodies of his audience so that in nascent, incipient ways, his hearers may be behaviorally consubstantial. *Words,* then *become dances, and the participants danced together, separately, to perform a restorative experience* that left the integrity of their feelings, thoughts, and judgments intact.

Conclusion

On May 7, James Sours found himself compelled to respond to a specific demand in a situation of ambiguity and uncertainty. His response was a conservative one. Employing language evoking images that re-presented fundamental tenets of American democratic ideology, Sours engaged minds and bodies in mimetic interaction. The physical action of bodies was incipient but with emotions leaning toward actions, Sours' brief speech could arouse "motor attitudes" so that bodies were "used" to express feelings in disciplined ways. Thus, those standing at the flagpole became participants, joining together, separately, in the uttering of Sours' command and in the lowering of the flag that followed.

Sours orchestrated a cultural performance that encouraged the joining of emotion and intellect and physiological action in a collective effort to express meanings in ways that protected the integrity of the individuals and their lives. It was a performance, directed and constrained by words, animated by the embodied rhetoric of implicit physical action, that allowed differing interpretations to exist in truly polysemous ritualized form. It was a moment when words became dances, when Sours' statement transformed and represented the event, and a community transcended an impending crisis to move on.

References

Richard B. Gregg was a Professor of Speech Communication at The Pennsylvania State University.

The text of James K. Sours' speech was given to me by his son, David, with permission to print. It was reprinted in the *Ashland Daily Tidings,* Friday, May 8, 1970, p. 3. The text may also be found in Cooper and Nothstine (see References), p. 141.

Ambrose, S. (1989). *Nixon: The triumph of a politician 1962-1972.* New York: Simon and Schuster.

Bercovitch, S. (1993). *The rites of assent: Transformations in the symbolic construction of America.* New York: Routledge.

Bodnar, J. (1992). *Remaking America: Public memory, commemoration, and patriotism in the twentieth century.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Burke, K. (1957). *Counter-Statement.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Burke, K. (1961a). *Attitudes toward history.* Boston: Beacon Press.

Burke, K. (1961b). *The rhetoric of religion.* Boston: Beacon Press.

Burke, K. (1965). *Permanence and change.* New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company.

Cooper, M. D., & Nothstine, W.L. (1992). *Power persuasion.* Greenwood, IN: The Educational Video Group.

Damasio, A. (1994). *Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain.* New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.

Damasio, A. (1999). *The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of consciousness.* New York: Harcourt Brace.

DeBenedetti, C., & Chatfield, C. (1990). *An American ordeal: The antiwar movement of the Vietnam era.* New York: Syracuse University Press.

Despair, outrage, dismay emphasized in N.W. college demonstrations (1970, May 7). *The Oregoniann,* p. 11.

Donald, M. (1991). *Origins of the modern mind.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Edelman, G.M. (1992). *Bright air, brilliant fire: On the matter of the mind.* New York: Basic Books.

Gitlin, T. (1987). *The sixties: Years of hope, days of rage.* New York: Bantam Books, 409.

Gregg, R. (1984). *Symbolic inducement and knowing: A study in the foundations of rhetoric.* Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Gregg, R. (1998). The Mind's I, the mind's we, the mind's they: A cognitive approach to the rhetorical analysis of public discourse. In Judith Trent (Ed.), *Communication: Views from the helm in the 21st century,* (pp. 244, 249). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). *Philosophy in the flesh.* New York: Basic Books.

Lipset, S.M. (1972). *Rebellion in the university.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Michner, J.A. (1971). *Kent State: What happened and why.* New York: Random House.

Olmos, R. (1970, May 6). Colleges plan class boycotts, memorial services to honor students killed at Kent. *The Oregonian,* p. 13.

Pierson, G. (1970, May 7). Professor lauds city police. *Ashland Daily Tidings,* p. 3.

Shaw, P. (1981). *American patriots and the rituals of revolution.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Skelton, G. (1970, May 7). Reagan appeal to students: "review lives." *The Oregonian,* p. 7.

Students unrest aired. (1970, May 1). *Ashland Daily Tidings,* p. 1.

Tugmen, P. (1970, May 6). Oregon national guardsmen forbidden to use rifles in event of riot on campus. *The Oregonian,* p. 11.

Wells, T. (1994). *The war within.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wood, G.S. (1993). *The radicalism of the American revolution.* New York: Random House.

RETHINKING THE MAKING OF COMMON NARRATIVES

Julia T. Wood, Alexandra Grasos, Allison L. Howry

The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Teach for America

As a doctoral student in the 1970s I had the good fortune to study with Carroll Arnold. He was an extraordinary teacher, both wise and generous. Beyond the specific content that he taught (at the time, we read and discussed works by St. Augustine, Aristotle, and Perleman and Olbrechts-Tyteca), Carroll taught his students to understand that rhetoric, broadly conceived, is a cornerstone of civic life. He believed deeply that rhetoric plays a central, if not the central, if not the central, role in forming and continuously reforming the polis.

Although my teaching and research have not focused on rhetorical theory and criticism, the lessons I learned from Carroll have stayed with and infused my work in other areas of the discipline. I believe Carroll would agree that the content of the essay that follows reflects his respect for rhetoric's role in civil life and extends what he taught me. I am sure that he would agree that the authorship reflects his commitment to working with students and learning from them. After I had written a first draft of this essay, Alex Grasos and Allison Howry engaged me in extended discussions that led to significant changes in what has become a collaborative work.

--Julia T. Wood

RETHINKING THE MAKING OF COMMON NARRATIVES

"The new cultural politics of difference consists of creative responses to the precise circumstances of our present moment – especially those of marginalized First World agents who shun degraded self-representations."

Cornel West (1992, p. 577-78)

"We must avoid buying into the neuter, 'generic human' thesis that covers the West's racism and androcentrism with a blindfold."

Linda Alcoff (1988, p. 436)

In this essay we explore relationships between identifying with collective society and identifying with specific social-political groups. The relationships are not only complex, but also controversial. Jacoby (1987, 1999), for instance, denounces progressive politics for devolving into mere multiculturalism, and Gitlin (1995) argues that identification with particular groups undermines the conditions necessary for civic society. Yet others argue that groups defined by race-ethnicity, class, sec, sexual orientation and so forth invigorate civic life and cultural structures and practices. Alcoff (1988), for example, insists that "identity politics provides a decisive rejoinder to the generic human thesis… of Western political theory" (pp. 432-433).

In this essay we will argue that groups that emphasize particular aspects of identity are capable not only of strengthening those who have been marginalized and devalued by mainstream culture, but also of contributing productively to the continuous process of constituting collective life and its practices. We take this position despite its admitted limits and with some sympathy with arguments against it. Our essay proceeds by interrogating alternative arguments advanced in response to key issues within the controversy. We close the essay by sketching an alternative way to frame the relationship between specific social-political groups and collective life by hinting at pragmatic ways to cultivate the progressive possibilities of groups outside of the cultural mainstream and to theorize their communicative practices.

Lessons from History

Our reading and thinking over several years leads us to conclude that social-political groups outside of the culture's mainstream are integral to dominate culture, most notably in their capacity to re-form it in important ways. What today many refer to as "our national identity" or "the collective narrative" exists only because individuals came together in groups to define issues and strategize ways to alter what were dominant understandings at particular moments in American's history. The ideological and material character of American culture today is deeply indebted to social-political groups that have transformed and continue to transform what counts as public and what is recognized as part of and important to collective life.

History demonstrates that groups outside of the mainstream have challenged and changed institutions, practices, and ideologies in the United States. Before the Civil Rights movement, Americans widely assumed that "separate but equal education" (and bathrooms) was appropriate and Blacks were entitled to fewer rights that Whites. In the 1960s Blacks began to affirm their ethnicity by wearing afros while also insisting on control of local economies, schools, and other institutions in their communities. The Civil Rights Movement and successor initiatives names institutional racism and diaspora into public awareness and have progressively diminished them. Before the first wave of feminism in America, few questioned the fact that women were the property of fathers and then husbands, and few questioned laws that forbade women to hold property or vote. The Seneca Falls Convention, held in 1848, marked the formal beginning of the Women's Rights Movement, which led to women's enfranchisement some 72 years later. In the 1960s women across America met in consciousness-raising groups and discovered that "the personal is political," and made that phrase one of the primary rhetorical markers of the second wave of American feminism. Participation in consciousness-raising groups led women to political activism that insinuated into public discourse terms, and recognition of social realities, such as sexual harassment, and date, acquaintance, and martial rape (Wood, 1992).

Prior to the gay rights movement, discrimination against gays and lesbians in lending, employment, and other sites was presumed reasonable.

Disdain and even abominable public aspersions also were widely regarded as permissible. Working in groups sequestered from the mainstream, lesbians and gays rejected mainstream culture's definitions of them as deviant, cultivated pride in their identities, and issued calls for gay rights. After affirming their identities with each other, gays and lesbians named homophobia into cultural consciousness and strategized means to achieve political and social change.

These examples demonstrate the power of marginalized groups to provoke rethinking of taken-for-granted assumptions and social practices of mainstream culture. By extension, the examples document the ability of non-mainstream groups to influence substantively what mainstream ideology is and how it is manifest in material practices. Yet not everyone agrees that marginalized groups contribute productively to mainstream culture, and not everyone applauds the tendency of some individuals to identify with specific groups. Given this, it is worthwhile to interrogate key issues in the controversy and the arguments marshaled in response to them.

Groups Outside of the Cultural Mainstream Are Best Labeled Counterpublics

Because values inhere in language, how groups that operate outside of the cultural mainstream at any particular moment in history are named reflects and shapes perceptions of their character and value. The tendency of some individuals to identify strongly, even exclusively, with only a certain group is what the political right refers to as "identity politics" and disparages for denying transcendent ideals of national character.

West (1992) more sympathetically writes of the "cultural politics of difference," which allow subordinate groups to define themselves and their issues outside of the terminology imposed by the dominate culture and then to seek the dominate culture's recognition of their self-defined identities and issues. Fraser (1992) uses the term "counterpublics" to signal that there is no single public, but multiple publics that affect collective life. Fraser argues that a single public sphere provides no arena in which members of subordinate groups can find their voices by deliberating among themselves about issues, goals, needs, and strategies. For Fraser, counterpublics are spheres of discourse and action that arises to contest exclusionary norms of the bourgeois public and to articulate alternative forms of public, political discourse. She insists that counterpublics participate vigorously and constructively in the life

of the culture. Persuaded by Fraser's argument that it is neither productive nor accurate to speak of a single public, we refer to groups outside of mainstream culture as counterpublics.

Claims of Difference Are Legitimate

Despite many individuals' identification with counterpublics designated by, for example, race-ethnicity, sexual orientation, economic class, and sex, the validity of group boundaries is controversial. One challenge to the legitimacy of distinct groups is the inherent variability within every social group. Anthropologist Cohen (1998a) makes this point well when he writes, "the distinctions among human populations are generally graded, not abrupt. In other words, skin color comes in a spectrum from dark to light, not just in black or white; noses come in a range of shapes, not just broad or narrow" (p. B4). If a group to which people tie their identities is not homogeneous, but in fact remarkably heterogeneous, then what can be the essential commonality that sets it so decisively apart from other, equally heterogeneous groups?

Characteristics generally associated with race are determined by a meager 4 to 10 of the approximately 100,000 genes that make up each human. Thus, the racial-ethnic difference among Europeans, Africans, and Chinese is determined by less than one tenth of 1% of their genes (Cohen, 1998a). Further, the diversity within socially constructed groups often exceeds that between them. Thus, to identify as Black is to be within a range of economic circumstances and sexual orientations, and so forth. Biologically, then, to identify with any group is to identify with variation, not singularity. Categorizing people as women, lesbians, and Blacks disregards substantial differences within each group in favor of what is highlighted as common to it.

Echoing this view, Wiesltier insists that "many things are possible in America, but the singleness of identity is not one of them" (1994, p. 30). The reasonableness of identifying with any particular group is challenged by the fact that each person belongs to multiple groups. Further, each group to which an individual belongs intersects with all other group memberships. Thus, gender shapes race and race shapes gender; sexual orientation affects gender and is sculpted by race; economic class affects the meaning of race and gender.

The forgoing arguments notwithstanding, we think there are compelling reasons why many individuals identify with some groups more than others. Fraser (1992) clearly suggests this when she notes that counterpublics emerge in response to exclusion and devaluation by dominant publics. It is exclusion from a legitimate place in the dominate culture that impels people to form alternative publics in which they can name themselves and their issues as a prerequisite to participation in the dominate culture that has marginalized them. Precisely because the dominant culture categorizes people by race, sex, sexual orientation, and economic standing, these aspects of identities become salient and invite identification with specific counterpublics.

Biological arguments against social groupings are suspect for another reason. However scant may be the biological basis of groupings, it is undeniable that there are major differences in the material conditions, opportunities, self-esteem, and power of socially constructed groups. West (1992) recognizes that Blacks and Whites are alike in important respects "Yet," he insists, "the common humanity they share is jettisoned when the claim is cast in an assimilationist manner that subordinates Black particularity to a false universalism" (585). Blacks, he argues, should not have to gain legitimacy in dominant culture by proving they are like Whites. Similarly, women should not have to rest their claim to equality on demonstrating that they can think, act, talk, and do business like men; and gays and lesbians acceptance should not be predicted on their ability to emulate heterosexuals.

Counterpublics Strengthen Members

In his account of America's efforts to achieve social justice, Rorty (1998) notes that in the 60s the Left was markedly successful in heightening awareness of and concern for oppressed groups. Expressing some sympathy with this move, Rorty writes that "to take pride in being black or gay is an entirely reasonable response to the sadistic humiliation to which one has been subjected" (100). The emphasis on and celebration of differences heightened – or, perhaps, even created – self-respect that had long been repressed by widely held social attitudes, as well as laws and institutional practices.

As members of subordinated groups deliberate among themselves to identify their issues, goals, needs, and strategies, they begin to find, or fashion, *their own* voices. Fraser (1992) notes that counterpublics serve as discursive spaces that allowed historically subordinate groups to "undertake communicative processes that were not, as it were, under the supervision of domi-

nate groups" (p. 123). A primary outcome of communication within a counterpublic sphere is finding, or fashioning, a voice other than that imposed by dominate groups. As hooks (1995) states, "beloved community is formed not by the eradication of difference, but by its affirmation, by each of us claiming the identities and cultural legacies that shape who we are and how we live in the world" (p. 265).

According to Darsey's chronology of the American gay/lesbian movement, gays and lesbians first came together in the homophile movement of the 1950s and gradually evolved into the assimilationist movement of the 1960s. Yet both of these early movements were infused by the dominant culture's devaluation of homosexuality and by many gays' and lesbians' internalization of the devaluation. Only with the Stonewall rebellion of 1969 did gays and lesbians create a resilient counterpublic that did not define gay and lesbian identity strictly as acceptance of or response to the views of dominant culture. And only within this uncontaminated discursive space did gays and lesbians develop a firm, self-defined basis of self-worth.

Within a discursive space not inhabited by dominate groups, counterpublics are free to engage in critical and often heated internal debates that eventuate in definitions and redefinitions of group identity and goals. The clashing visions of Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X and Stokley Carmichael would most likely not have occurred had African Americans deliberated about their identity and political strategies under the mainstream gaze. Currently the gay and lesbian counterpublic is deeply divided about queer theorists' claim that bifurcating sexuality into straight and gay/lesbian is problematic because it reinscribes polarized, dichotomized gender identities assigned by and useful to hegemonic interests (Gamson, 1996). Likewise, the feminist movement is characterized by ongoing debate about goals and strategies. The debates that routinely occur within counterpublics' discursive space shed light on why counterpublics are not necessarily stable or rigid in their identities, aspirations, or strategies.

Counterpublics Enrich Collective Life

Perhaps the impact of counterpublics on collective life generates the most extensive and heated debate. Some (Gitlin, 1995) claim counterpublics use difference to erect rigid boundaries of identity that undermine members' identification with the dominant public. Those who disparage counterpublics claim that too strong an identification with specific groups will fragment

America and move citizens away from allegiance to a collective heritage and identity. In *The Twilight of Common Dreams*, fro instance, Gitlin indicts education for defining learning about oneself in terms of self-selected groups, which asserts cultivate "a rapture of marginality" (1995, p.149). According to Gitlin, in the 1980s and 1990s "academic cultres of separation began to harden into fortified enclaves" (1995, p.145). Continuing, Gitlin laments that "initial claims for inclusion were transformed into rigid boundaries of separation" (pp.147-48) as embodied in programs such as Women's Studies, African American Studies, and Gay and Lesbian Studies.

Gitlin's view is not the only one expressed in response to the question of how counterpublics affect collective life. Those who have been marginalized by boundaries not of their own making might regard Gitlin as unmindful of how the boundaries arose and at whose initiative. It was not Blacks, women, the poor, or lesbians and gays who excluded themselves from dominant culture and who foisted on themselves degraded identities. Should those who have been marginalized be criticized for contesting the identities imposed on them by the dominant culture?

Regardless of how and by whom differences are constructed, identification with difference is often denounced with the argument that identity groups undermines commitment to collective life and common culture. Jacoby (1987, 1999) worries that embrace of particularity leads to abandonment of universality. Gitlin (1995) exemplifies the call to (re)embrace a collective narrative and identity in his brooding question, "Why insist on differences with such rigidity, rancor, and blindness, t othe exclusion of the possibility of coon knowledge and common dreams?" (p. 32).

Yet others argue that the voices that emerge from counterpublics enlarge the civic resources of a society. Fraser, for example, contends that a multiplicity of publics is preferable to any single public because multiple publics <u>expand</u> the discursive space in a society. Developing this point, hooks (1995) rejects the idea that people should live with and identify with only their own cultural groups. Instead, hooks favors "a progressive politics of solidarity that embraces both a broad-baded identiy politics, which acknowledges specific cultural and ethnic legacies, histories, etc. as it imultaneously promotes a recognition of overlapping cultural traditions and values as well as an inclusive understanding of what is gained when people of color unite to resist white supremacy" (p. 203). If counterpublics do expand and enrich the civic sphere, doubt is cast on the claim that the politics of cultural

difference eviscerate the possibility of collective interests and narratives. The identities adnd voices that are shaped by and that emerge from counterpublics can alter the dominant sphere and contribute in important ways to what "the common" is understood to mean in its historically specific make-up. Thus, argues Schudson (1998), if inclusion in political like is the criterion used to measure civic health, then Americans are better off today than at any prior moment in the country's history.

The salutary impact of counterpublics on collective life is illuminated by standpoint theory (Collins, 1986, 1998; Haraway, 1998; Harding, 1991, 1998; Ruddick, 1989; Wood, 1993). The first inklings of standpoint theory can be found in the writing of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1807). Hegel noted that although both masters and slaves participated in the institution of slavery, that institution was perceived quite differently, depending on whether one's position was that of slave or master. The slave and the master's distinct views of slavery were shaped by their different social locations.

As developed since Hegel's time, standpoint theory argues not only that there are different political and material positions within a society, but that distinct social locations have epistemological consequences, including knowledge of unequal value. Harding (1991) and Lugones and Spelman (1983) insist that, although all perspectives are limited, some are more limited than others. Specifically, members of the dominant or privileged group are claimed to have less full, less accurate understandings than members of subordinate groups. This claim rests on two assumptions. First, members of dominant groups have the privilege of not having to understand the lives and perspectives of subordinate groups. Because the converse is not true, members of subordinate groups – often as a matter of survival – learn to understand both their own perspectives and lives and those of the dominant group. Second, those in positions of power and privilege have a distorted view of social institutions because they have a vested interest in preserving their privileged place in the existing social hierarchy.

Those who enjoy status in the dominant culture often do not recognize – or if they do, do not care to change – the ways in which it privileges them. Those for whom participation in public life is a given are unlikely to be critical of normative practices that simultaneously enable their participation and disable participation by members of subordinate groups whose way of speaking and experiences are not legitimized by the dominate public. In short, those who are located within the dominant culture can afford not to

notice that it does not include or allow participation by members of some groups.

The impact of social location on knowledge, as well as on material life and opportunities, is not limited to members of counterpublics. The highlighting of social location invites all persons – including those who fit comfortably in the mainstream – to acknowledge how cultural attitudes and definitions shape their identities and, thus, the perspectives, possibilities and communication practices that comprise their lives. In turn, recognizing that mainstream, as well as marginal, identity is socially constructed encourages critical reflection on the ways in which groups are constituted and their values and rights designated.

By heightening awareness of the constructedness of social locations and generating useful correctives to mainstream thinking, counterpublics prompt social and political progress. "Without social movements or political pressure from outside these [mainstream/malestream] institutions," writes West (1992), "transformation degenerates into mere accommodation or sheer stagnation" (p.578). As historically marginalized groups banded together and advanced critiques of dominate culture, they expanded understanding of America to include not only the struggles and accomplishments of Horatio Alger and Henry Ford, but also those of working class citizens, women, peoples of color, and gays and lesbians.

America's "Common History" Has Not Been Inclusive

Tobias, Gitlin, and others who urge renewed identification with what they deem the common culture seem inattentive to who has been and still is included and excluded from what some call "our common culture." Gitlin's entreaties for a commitment to what we have in common invites the question: Who is the "we" of whom Gitlin speaks? It is a we that has excluded, marginalized, and devalued peoples of color, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, women, members of the working class, and persons with disabilities. It is a we that has been willing to include others only if they blend into a melting pot that is controlled by interests, foals, and representations of history embraced by a useful to the dominate culture. It is a we that historically has assumed, and benefited by assuming, that a single public is the ideal and that alternative publics move us away from, rather than toward the good life. It is a we that can comfortably and conveniently assume a generic human thesis and theories that presume a veil of ignorance operates. As Alcoff (1998)

reminds, "the best political theory will not be one ascertained through a veil of ignorance, a veil that is impossible to construct" (p. 433).

With some apparent recognition of America's multiplicity, Rorty suggests Americans should think not of history, but of histories; not of reason in public life, but of historically constructed and accepted views of rationality; not of political voice, but of multiple voices that speak in distinct ways and about different issues. Perhaps this is why Woody Guthrie did not sing about "our land;" instead, he sang "this land is your land, this land is my land; this land is made for you and me."

Counterpublics Have the Potential for Political Effectiveness

Some critics of counterpublics assert that a focus on differences among groups that have been marginalized undermines collective organizing by disadvantaged groups that is at the heart of social change. This argument holds the fracturing the collective character of those who are marginalized eviscerates the possibility of broadly-based political organizing. Grossberg (1996) insists that "by focusing on the construction sense of power and oppression" (p. 377). Similarly, Gitlin (1995) contends that, "if one is definitively limited by minority status, there is nothing better to do than secede – or to draw fast the wagons and get yours," resulting in "a cacophony without much listening or the sympathy needed to keep up a common conversation" (p. 35).

Gitlin's (1995) dismissal of narrowly defined subject positions is further evident in his claim that "The question is not whether we start with perspectives – of course we do – but where we go with (and from) them" (p. 205). Even more ascerbically, Tobias (1997), who was a feminist activist in the 1960s and 1970s, disparages what she labels identity politics as exclusionary, excessive and paralyzing in their emphasis on division (p. 255). Yet, inherent in division is connection to something from which a group is divided. By extension, am emphasis on division can be precursor to association if division allows redefinition of the separated group and/or the larger society. In other words, fragmentation is often temporary, and it may lead to new views of both specific groups and an overall culture. In this sense, it may be argued that division has the potential not to disable, but rather to transform collective life in beneficial ways.

Exemplifying the argument that highlighting differences threatens any sense of common history, Rorty (1998) warns that it is politically disastrous if pride in a particular aspect of identity "prevents someone from also taking pride in being an American citizen" (p. 100). Taking a more extreme position, Gitlin (1995) grieves for what is lost when "there is no people, only peoples" (p. 165). Gitlin, Rorty, and Jacoby (1999) maintain that what they consider an excessive focus on particular group identities renders the Left unable to mount powerful challenges to oppressive cultural structures. According to Rorty, the Left's agenda rests firmly on the belief that "the system and not just the laws must be changed… [and] the concern to do what the Sixties called 'naming the system' takes precedence over reforming the laws" (p. 78). Within this assumptive framework, theorizing differences and naming the system are perceived as diversions from the Left's current "principle enemy is a mind-set, rather than a set of economic arrangements" (p. 70), which has rendered it ineffectual in instigating real social change.

Rorty's argument seems to assume that social change must be immediately visible. Yet many, perhaps most, profound changes in America's character have evolved gradually, incrementally. The first Women's Rights Convention was held 72 years before women won the right to vote. Rosa Parks' courageous challenge of racial discrimination lay the foundation for Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which eventuated decades later. The Stonewall rebellion, although a break from the homophile and assimilationists movements, was also shaped by them. And three decades later after Stonewall laws are still being passed to ensure progressively greater political rights for gays and lesbians. Even groups that fall apart achieve political impact if their work and even their demise provide direction to successor groups. These examples suggest that it may be naïve to rely on a short-term time horizon to judge the political effectiveness of counterpublics.

It may also be misguided to base judgments of political efficacy on criteria resonant with an outdated modernist mindset. To be effective in postmodern times, political organizing may be less uniform, less centralized, and less enduring than in prior eras. Tobias (1997) suggests precisely this when she writes about the flowering of site-specific feminist organizing—activist work that s situated in particular temporal, physical , material, and social locations. This kind of local organizing ad activism may be a viable model for political efficacy suited to the current era.

Recasting the Issue

Rather than seeing counterpublics and collective identity as antagonistic, the two can be understood to exist in a productive, dialectical tension that is always unfinished. Differences arise because of—and cannot arise without—something from which they are different. The dominant culture defines what is considered different. In turn, what is considered different—counterpublics—respond creatively to dominant culture by redefining themselves on their own terms. In so doing, they recalibrate common consciousness. Viewed as dialectically imbricated, the distinct positions and identities od social groups may be appreciated as formative—not fragmenting—of what is or comes to be understood as common.

We are <u>not</u> proposing a vacuous, if polite, agreement to allow identification with specific groups as long as it is accompanied by embracing collective identity. Instead, we suggest that it may be both philosophically and politically productive to recognize that difference and commonalities are dialectically imbricated so that each continuously redefines the other in ways that promote incremental and not always unified forms of change and progress.

Visionary Pragmatism

Also dialectically related are the ideals and pragmatic activities and accomplishments of particular groups. Introducing the concept of *visionary pragmatism*, Patricia Hill Collins (1998) explains that is grows out of a generative tension between what is theoretically possible and what can be pragmatically achieved in a given historical moment. Visionary pragmatism focuses on engaging in concrete oppositions in everyday life as one means of incrementally achieved in a given historical moment. Visionary pragmatism focuses on engaging in concrete oppositions in everyday life as one means of incrementally challenging broad structures and practices of oppression. Rather than a broad-based, sweeping activist work such as that in the 1960s and 1970s, visionary pragmatism relies on situated actions at specific sites of change. Rather than reflecting a unified and centralizes political organization, political activism grows out of what may appear to be fragmented, situation-specific activist work. Because it is pragmatic, visionary pragmatism is unlikely to propel change that is radical or abrupt; because it is visionary, it has the potential to produce fundamental changes over time.

Exemplifying visionary pragmatism are efforts to weave diverse concerns, struggles, and identities into an understanding of America's history and

character. In his struggle to honor both group identities and collective political and moral identity, Rorty (1998) suggests that "it would be a big help to American efforts for social justice if each new generation were able to think of itself as participating in a movement which has lasted for more than a century and has served human liberty well" (p. 51). The gradual rewriting of America's story to acknowledge those outside of the mainstream over time transforms that story and who is part of it.

Anyone who lays claim to American citizenship should know about foremothers and forefathers such as Ernest Hemingway and Harriet Beecher Stowe, Paul Revere and Sojourner Truth, W.E.B. DuBois and Albert Einstein, Mother Jones and Martin Luther King Jr., George Washington and Elizabeth Cady Stanton. Likewise, all citizens should know about pivotal events that have shaped America such as the Seneca Falls Convention, the fight for child labor laws, union organizing to protect workers, the march from Selma, the Pullman strike, Stonewall, and the movement for environmental justice. By grievous inequities in American society, these people and events have shaped what today is recognized as America's identity and have affected all who claim membership in America. It is perhaps no coincidence that many profound changes in America's identity emerged from counterpublics—the very groups that some claim destroy the common narrative. For this reason, counterpublics are vital to, even definitional of, a democratic ideology that insists differences should be voiced and engaged in the ongoing conversation about who we are and will be.

Recently Kammen (1998), professor of American history and culture at Cornell University, remarked that our society "has become more inclusive, accessible, and populist—but that process has not been linear. It's been more like the stock market—frequent ups and downs" (p. B4). In a similar manner, the effects of counterpublics have not always ben uniformly progressive. Writing in 1998, Collins notes that identifying with marginality invites the commodification of otherness, which may benefit oppressed individuals but does little to improve the conditions common to members of devalued groups. The concentration on individual identity—its difference, or otherness—can obscure the systemic nature of oppression and allow otherness to be absorbed into the dominant discourse and therefor rendered ineffectual in challenging that discourse.

Collins' argument is persuasive only if we accept extreme versions of both postmodernity and identification with difference. In practice, counter-

publics' attention to difference does not inevitably lead to neglect of institutionalized means and forms of oppression. For instance, bell hooks (1995) highlights issues that oppress African American women, yet she also insists that any specific kind of oppression (e.g., racism) must be understood as part of interlocking systems of oppression. Thus, a keen awareness of a specific site and target of marginality need not make individuals or groups unheedful of other, typically interlocking, sites and targets of oppression. In other words, differences are located within, and consistent with, common principles and a common vision.

Concluding Comments

The progress in achieving a more equitable society would not have been possible if groups that were politically voiceless had not periodically withdrawn from collective life to define themselves and their grievances. Following that, these groups articulated their identities and interests beyond group boundaries in ways that re-formed collective understandings of who Americans have been, who we are in this moment, and who we want to become. The sense of group identity that was born in the safe space of counterpublic consciousness raising informed what is today regarded as "the collective narrative."

What our common narrative is understood to be at any moment in history reflects the voices of counterpublics that challenge and change prevailing understandings of our identity and history. As Darsey (1997) reminds us, the "fate of democracy…is at least to engage periodically in serious acts of redefinition." It is In radical engagement and opposition that "we (re)invent those principles that define us as people" (p. x). Groups that temporarily distance themselves from the dominant culture to explore and define their particularity re part of the larger social and political processes that allow America to reinvent herself continuously.

The radical redefinitions that are deeply woven into and creative of collective narratives (note the plural) ultimately allow all citizens to reconstruct ourselves as peoples and as a people. Such efforts to reconstruct ourselves are most likely to succeed when they grow out of an appreciation of the constructive, reciprocally formative tension between difference and commonality and out of a realization that differences need not auger permanent divisions. We find reason to be hopeful that the human ability to reconstitute social life is one of the best hopes for continuous renewal and invigoration

of civic life. The ongoing process of reinventing America is most likely to prosper when we realize that understandings of what w have in common or can have in common grow out of exploring and incorporating, not erasing, differences.

Notes

1 An earlier version of this essay was presented by the senior author at the 1999 New York State Communication Convention and subsequently published in *The New York Communication Annual*.

2 We recognize that standpoint theory has been criticized for its tendencies to essentialize, and we agree with the thrust of these criticisms. Work since standpoint theory was introduced, however, has substantially relaxed its essentialist inclinations. For instance, Linda Alcoff (1988) argues persuasively that woman is a useful category of identity that need not lapse into essentialism if we recognize that the identity of women is constituted positionally and that neither position not the context if it are set. Viewed this way, identity (as a woman, lesbian, etc.) is not an absolute, but rather a point of departure for theorizing, as well as political action. West (1992) and Fraser (1992) recognize that difference is less defined by features such as skin color or genitalia than by the particularities—social, symbolic, and material—of lived and historically contextualized experience.

References

Julia T. Wood is Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Alex Grasos is an M.A. student at that university. After receiving her M.A. from that university, Allison Howry joined Teach for America and currently works in that program in San Francisco.

Alcoff, L. (1988). Cultural feminism versus post-structuralism: The identity crisis in feminist theory. *Signs, 13,* 405-436.

Call to civil society. (May, 1998). Institute for American Values. Available from 1841 Broadway, Suite 211, New York, 10023.

Cohan, M. (1998a, April 17). Culture, not race, explains human diversity. *Chronicle of Higher Education*, pp. B4-B5.

Cohen, M. (1998b). *Culture of intolerance: Chauvinism, class, and racism in the United States.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Collins, P.H. (1986). Learning from the outsider within. *Social Problems, 33,* 514-532.

Collins, P.H. (1998). *Fighting Words: Black women and the search for justice.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Darsey, J. (1997). *The prophetic tradition and radical rhetoric in America.* New York: NYU Press.

Eberly, D. (1994). *Building a community of citizens.* University Press of America.

Fraser, N. (1992). Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy, In C. Calhoun (Ed)., *Habermas and the public sphere* (pp. 109-142). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gamson, J. (1996). Must identity movements self-destruct? A queer dilemma. In S. Seidman (Ed), *Queer Theory/sociology* (pp. 395-420). UK: Basil Blackwood.

Gitlin, T. (1995). *The twilight of common dreams.* New York: Metropolitan Books.

Grossberg, L. (1996). *We gotta get out of here.* London: Routledge.

Haraway, D. (1998). Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective. *Signs, 14,* 575-599.

Harding, S. (1991). *Whose science? Whose knowledge? Thinking from women's lives.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Harding, S. (1998). *Is science multicultural?* Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Hegel, G.W.F. (1807). *Phenomenology of mind* (J. B. Baillie, Trans.). Germany: Wurzburg & Bamburg.

Hooks, B. (1995). *Killing rage: Ending racism in America.* New York: Henry Holt.

Jacoby, R. (1999). *The end of utopia: Politics and culture in an age of apathy.* New York: Basic Books

Kammen, M. (1998, July 3). The study of popular culture has acquired legitimacy, but still lacks cohesion. *Chronicle of Higher Education*, pp. B4-B5.

Lugones, M., & Spelman, E. (1983). Have we got a theory for you! Feminist theory, cultural imperialism, and the demand for "the woman's voice." *Women's Studies International Forum, 6,* 573-581.

Rorty, R. (1998). *Achieving our country.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ruddick, S. (1989). *Maternal thinking: Towards a politics of peace.* Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Schneider, A. (1998, June 5). Colleges urged to promote "civil society" by stressing values of liberal education. *Chronicle of Higher Education,* p. A12

Schudson, M. (1998). *The good citizen: A history of American civic life.* New York: Free Press.

Tobias, S. (1997). *The faces of feminism.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

West, C. (1993). The new cultural politics of difference, In C. Lemert (Ed.), *Social theory: The multicultural and classic readings* (pp. 577-589). San Francisco: Westview.

Wieseltier, L. (1994, November 28). Against identity. *The New Republic,* p. 30.

Wood, J. T. (1992). Telling our stories: Narratives as a basis for theorizing sexual harassment. *Journal of Applied Communication Research, 4,* 349-363.

Wood, J. T. (1993). From woman's nature to standpoint epistemology: Gilligan and the debate over essentializing in feminist scholarship. *Women's Studies in Communication, 15,* 1-24.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF CARROLL C. ARNOLD
TO THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION IN GROUPS

Dennis G. Gouran

The Pennsylvania State University

Although Carroll C. Arnold is not primarily, or even generally, identified with the study of communication in groups, throughout his career, he maintained a strong interest in the subject and actively supported the discipline's efforts to assure its viability. I first became aware of Professor Arnold's continuing commitment to Group Communication when he approached the late B. Aubrey Fisher and me in the late 1970s about the prospect of preparing a chapter dealing with group communication for a volume entitled the *Handbook of Rhetorical and Communication Theory* (1984) that he and John Waite Bowers had agreed to develop and edit for Allyn and Bacon. What I did not know at the times was that Professor Arnold was the co-editor who would be working with us and that he had requested to do so.

When my co-author and I learned that Professor Arnold was to be the co-editor with whom we would be working on our chapter, both of us were somewhat surprised. John Bowers had co-directed my dissertation, he was well known for doing quantitatively orientated research, both Professor Fisher and I had a decidedly social scientific bent in our work, and the bulk of the material appropriate to the chapter was in that vein. As it turned out, however we discovered that Professor Arnold was very well read in the relevant literature, as well as conversant in the strengths and weaknesses of the inquiries that underlay that subject matter. We also learned of his disdain for viewing methodological approaches to the investigation of substantive communication issues as the basis for understanding and determining what qualifies as legitimate knowledge. What began, then, as a project about which Professor Fisher and I had some trepidation turned out to be an extraordinarily positive learning experience.

In retrospect, we should not have been surprised by the discovery of Professor Arnold's interest in Group Communication. After all, he had been a student of A. Craig Baird, who was instrumental in bringing attention to group discussion as an area with which the profession, in his judgment, needed to be vitally concerned (see Baird, 1927, 1937, 1943). Professor Arnold and Russell Wagner (1950) even acknowledged their indebtedness to

Professor Baird in the first edition of their *Handbook of Group Discussion* (p. 3).

Aside from the example above, there are many evidences of Professor Arnold's interest in and commitment to promoting the study of communication in groups. The purpose of this essay is to examine some of them. Accordingly, I focus on three: Professor Arnold's activism in support of the reaching and study of group communication, his pedagogical contributions, and his additions to scholarly literature in the area.

Professor Arnold's Activism in Promoting Interest in the Study of Communication in Groups and Participation in Them

Professor Arnold's championing of the study of communication in groups and his sustained efforts to bring about more active participation in them is evident in a number of different respects. He was, for instance, one of the original members of the Speech Association of America Committee on Discussion and Group Methods (the name of which Ernest Bormann [1969], in part, appropriated for the title of an influential and widely use textbook) and remained active in it for a large number of years. The Committee did much to advance scholarly and related pedagogical activity that ultimately would eventuate in the creation of the Speech Communication Association's Division of Interpersonal and Small Group Interaction and later the National Communication Association's Division of Group Communication.

While a member of Committee on Discussion and Group Methods, Professor Arnold did not restrict his activism to individuals in the discipline. In an article entitled "Teaching Discussion for the Development of Democratic Behavior" (1954), he made a strong case to members of the National Association of Secondary Principals for providing "systematic instruction in the art of group discussion" (p. 84). Because such instruction contributes to group thinking, it can, he contended, help people at an early age establish the habits and perspectives on social problems that enable them to function in ways that are consistent with the most cherished ideals of democratic participation. Professor Arnold's observations concerning the importance and value of "group thinking" were entirely consistent with his leaning toward McDougall's (1920) thoughts concerning the reality of group communication and his insistence that group communication can be maintained as a distinct area of study and teaching.

Another way in which Professor Arnold contributed to advancement in Group Communication as an area of study was in his insistence that it be treated as a separate topic in *The Handbook of Rhetorical and Communication Theory*. At the time he and Professor Bowers were developing the proposal for the collection and identifying prospective contributors, communication scholars were increasingly moving toward the view that Group Communication was indistinguishable from Interpersonal Communication as an area of scholarly inquiry and emphasis. Groups, they seemed to feel, were merely settings in which interpersonal communicative exchanges occur 00a position reminiscent of Floyd Allportt's (1924) and the debate it provoked with followers of William McDougall (1908, 1920), and which Donald T. Campbell (1958) attempted to adjudicate in his introduction of the notion of the "entitativity," or the process of an object of perception's becoming an entity. Professor Arnold believed that collapsing interpersonal and group processes represented an unduly narrow view of what he had spent a good part of his professional life teaching about as the aspects of communication in groups, and which he and John Keltner (1956) had demonstrated in an article in which they considered the variety of ways in which the study of groups in the field of Speech Communication was unique. His resistance to subordinating the area of study presaged some of the later developments in how scholarship evolved among those concerned with communication in groups.

In addition to defending the disciplinary identity, integrity, and value of Group Communication as an area of scholarly interest, inquiry, and teaching, Professor Arnold further contributed in his writing to what was to become an emerging focus on communicative acts, what gives rise to them, how they relate to one another, and how they influence the outcomes groups achieve. This contribution had its beginnings in the *Quarterly Journal of Speech* piece that he and John Keltner (1956) co-authored. Most of the article focused on two surveys the Speech Association of America Committee on Discussion and Group Methods had conducted four years apart (1949-50 and 1953-54) and that revealed a shift in the teaching of discussion as formal presentations by groups to a much more highly interactive style of communicating by members. Professor Arnold and his co-author applauded this shift as much more characteristic of what actually occurs in groups, especially decision-making and problem-solving groups, and encouraged others in the field to follow suit in adopting such a perspective.

That view was one Professor Arnold (1969) still had clearly in mind as a participant in the New Orleans Conference on the future of the field. In

his piece, "Implications of the Recommendations of the New Orleans Conference from the Perspective of Critical Scholarship," in the published proceedings, he came out in strong support of the importance of studying speech as an interactive, ongoing process, which is nowhere more evident than in group discussion. In taking the position he did, Professor Arnold, as early as 1956, anticipated critiques by established scholars in Group Communication that were later to appear in print in the early 1970s (see, for instance, Bormann, 1970; Fouran, 1970; Mortensen, 1970) and that contributed to the sort of shift in focus that led to much more positive assessments near century's end (Gouran, 1994, 1999; Poole, 1994).

Professor Arnold's Contributions to Teaching and Learning in Group Communication

Distinguishing between Professor Arnold's activism in supporting the study of Group Communication and his pedagogical contributions, not to mention his additions to the scholarly literature involving groups, is somewhat difficult. Were he to acknowledge that he had made contributions to the area, which, from knowing him for many years, I suspect he might have denied, he probably would have seen all of them as pedagogical in nature. Professor Arnold firmly believed that everything he did professionally was in one way or another a product of his indefatigable desire to teach. I think that it is possible, however, for purposes of this essay, to separate what appear to be contributions to teaching and learning from those in the other two categories while, at the same time, recognizing that the lines of division are altogether clear.

Aside from promoting a view of group discussion that emphasized its dynamic processual nature in the articles mentioned above (see Arnold, 1969; Keltner & Arnold, 1956), and carrying through the theme of communication as functional in all of the chapters of the Handbook of Rhetorical and Communication Theory (see Arnold & Bowers, 1984), including the chapter by Gouran and Fisher (1984), Professor Arnold embodied the very perspective he promulgated in his own teaching. As a ember of the faculty at both Cornell University and Penn State University, he regularly taught courses in group discussion—courses in which he made every effort to have students interact spontaneously while trying to arrive at appropriate decisions and develop effective solutions to problems. I am told that he even went so far as to confer about his methods of evaluation with one of Cornell's athletic coaches on the grounds that team performance, of necessity, is highly dynam-

ic and strongly influenced by the social and environmental milieu in which it occurs. Hence, he felt that he could learn something that would enable him to prepare better, appropriate, and more meaningful assessments of the students to whom he was providing instruction in group discussion.

Professor Arnold was, in addition to being frequent teacher of such courses, the architect of a structure for Speech Communication 100: Effective Speech at Penn State that remains in place today. This course has three versions: one that emphasizes speaking in public, another that emphasizes communicating in groups, and yet another that emphasizes criticism, or message analysis. Regardless of the emphasis, all students have assignments requiring attention to each of the others. Hence, no student taking the course can complete it successfully without having participated in at least one problem-solving or decision-making discussion.

During the period that Professor Arnold was on the faculty at Penn State, he taught all three versions and was a strong proponent of the view that all members of the faculty regularly teach the course as well. This, I believe, shows evidence of his commitment to preparing students to participate in the sorts of discussions they are likely to encounter in professional and social life and a willingness to assist them in becoming skilled in what he liked to refer to as the "art of discussion" (see Arnold, 1954). In short, he practiced what he preached.

Perhaps the most conspicuous evidence of Professor Arnold's contributions to the teaching of Group Communication resides in the two editions of his Handbook of Group Discussion (1950, 1965), which he co-authored with Russell Wagner. Although it is sometimes difficult to sort out individual responsibilities for components of co-authored publications, in Professor Arnold's case, this proved not to be problematic. Knowing what kind of editor he was, I had little difficulty seeing his imprimatur running throughout the textbook in both of its two editions.

I should also point out before turning to the specific content of the Handbook of Group Discussion that is pedagogical in its orientation that substantial portions of the volume have a strong theoretical flavor—certainly for the time at which it first came into print. As a result, I will have occasion to return to the volume in the next section of this essay, which deals with Professor Arnold's additions to the scholarly literature on communication in groups. The seamlessness of his writing complicates drawing distinctions

between what is pedagogical in nature and what is more theoretical in its implications, but the categories on which the essay focuses required that I at least make the effort.

I might begin by noting that the Handbook of Group Discussion has numerous features that should have enabled instructors who adopted it to teach much more easily. With the exception of the two introductory chapters and the final chapter, all of the remaining ones have exercises at the end designed to test readers' mastery of the content. In every case, the exercises deal with meaningful issues and are placed in the context of current events. The appendices also contain material that complements the content of the individual chapters. Appendix A in the 1950 edition, for instance, presents partial selections from essays on the nature of, and bases for, belief. Appendix B has examples of different types of discussions to which an instructor could refer in making clear how the more abstract aspects of discussion covered in various chapter are manifested in actual communicative behavior. The reproduction of actual exchanges is most helpful. The rest of the appendices include a fully worked-out example of the sort of outline participants are well advised to develop, cases from real life for students to discuss, rules of formal procedure, and source materials for leaders and other group members designed to enlarge their understanding of different issues central to group discussion and its practice.

The teacher- and user-friendly structure of the volume, while highly valuable, is not the only way in which it contributed to teaching and learning. One need not move very far into the *Handbook of Group Discussion* before discovering that Professor Arnold, consistent with his views concerning the interactive, dynamic nature of group decision-making and problem-solving processes, believed strongly in having learners address problems with which they are equipped to deal. In describing discussion as "purposeful talk," Professor Arnold and his co-author Russell Wagner (1950) characterized group discussion as a form of conversation—more specifically, a "*conversation about problems or difficulties which require solution or easement*" (p. 2). This kind of conversation, moreover, is "*usually carried on through oral discourse under the guidance of a leader, aiming at the co-operative solution of a problem through reflective thinking*" (p. 3). Provoking such activity are felt difficulties individuals have in common and for which they or others in a position to do so form groups to seek remedy. Going beyond one's expertise and level of competence, in Professor Arnold's view, however, renders group discussion as a less than satisfactory instrument for making appropriate decisions and generating effective solu-

tions to problems.

The emphasis on dealing with the sort of issues, for which groups typically form or are created, and as appropriate to the knowledge and competence of their members, carries through the entire volume. The authors make the point explicitly in their observation that, "*The problem should be suited to the group*" (p. 41). Virtually all of the illustrations involve the work of actual groups at various levels of social strata. Since the *Handbook of Group Discussion's* primary audience was college students, suggested topics for discussion are all ones to which that audience could easily relate. As noted above, even the sample discussions in the appendices are transcripts from actual discussions.

The view that Professor Arnold held in respect to the expertise and abilities of the members of decision-making and problem-solving groups was especially important for learners to understand. He and Wagner based much of their approach concerning group discussion on John Dewey's (1910) so-called "method of reflective thinking." They were keenly aware, however, that methods per se are insufficient to produce desired outcomes. Those who utilize them, they contended, must also be appropriately equipped with relevant knowledge and corresponding competencies.

These notions were late to find their way into the list of assumptions that underlie Gouran and Hirokawa's (1997) formalization of The Functional Theory of Communication in Decision-Making and Problem-Solving Groups, a perspective considerably in tune with, and influenced by, the reflective thinking model. Assumptions 5 and 6 are germane: "Relevant information is available to the members or can be acquired," and "The task is within the intellectual capabilities of the members to perform" (p. 57).

Encouraging learners to deal with "real" problems was a far cry from approach to teaching about group process characterisitic of other disciplines of the day such as Sociology and Social Psychology, in which students were exposed to principles of group processes derived from studies involving highly contrived and artificial tasks. A quick perusal of Cartwright and Zander's (1953) classic anthology on group dynamics provides abundant evidence of the sorts of tasks to which I am referring.

Professor Arnold and his co-author's endorsement of leaning about group process by dealing with the sorts of problems that people encounter in

everyday life has continued to be a source of influence in current scholarly thought, not only about what constitutes meaningful instruction, but also what properly are the types of groups about which we should be attempting to learn. This theme surfaced strongly in the 1990s in the writing of such prominent contributors to the literature on group process as Lawrence Frey (1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1995a, 1995b), Joann Keyton (1994), and Linda Putnam and Cynthia Stohl (see, for example, Putnam, 1994; Putnam & Stohl, 1990, 1994, 1996; Stohl, 1995).

In addition to his encouragement of students to deal with the sorts of issues groups regularly confront and their instructors to keep them thus focused, Professor Arnold was concerned about the tools necessary for doing so. Consequently, he and Wagner dealt with such matters as topic selection, preparation for discussion, logic, and how to participate, and how to frame and present ideas. Although one finds attention to most of these topics in current textbooks dealing with group communication and discussion, two that seem to have dropped by the wayside for the most part are preparation and logic, both of which Professor Arnold and his co-author place in the context of "the reflective purpose and rationality of group discussion" (Wagner & Arnold, 1950, p. 26).

It seems odd that preparation and logic have largely ceases to be topics of interest in current discussion pedagogy, especially in light of the fact that group scholars for years have been linking ineffective decision making and problem solving to deficiencies in the sorts of information groups employ, their failure to examine it critically, and their inclinations to act on the basis of faulty inferences (see, for example, Beach, 1997; Gouran, 1976, 1984; Gouran, Hirokawa, & Martz, 1986; Hirokawa, Gouran, & Martz, 1986; Hirokawa, Gouran, & Martz, 1988; Janis, 1972, 1982, 1989). It may be the case that what Professor Arnold saw as intuitively obvious concerning the importance of being knowledgeable, having sufficient, well analyzed information, and being able to draw appropriate inferences from it lacked the empirical foundation that his successors presumed necessary to treat these matters as important aspects of the preparation and training of students to participate in decision-making and problem-solving group discussions. Now that such evidence has accumulated, the current trend may begin to reverse itself. Whatever the case, Professor Arnold appears to have been ahead of his time in dealing with the aspects of teaching group discussion noted.

Finally, I think it's worth calling to attention to the fact that although Professor Arnold and his co-author's treatment of leadership was as formal role carrying pre-set responsibilities, they actually dealt with its more fluid, less role-constrained features and its shared nature in their discussion of participation, particularly in respect to such matters as how to stimulate discussion, how to criticize when necessary, how to monitor interaction, and how to respond to problematic group members. Much later, I attempted to deal with these dimensions of leadership—very important ones I might add—under the rubric of "counteractive influence" (Gouran, 1982, p. 147). In returning to Professor Arnold's pedagogy in the preparation of this essay, once again I discovered that he had been very forward-looking in acquainting his readers with and attuning them to the realities of group life.

Professor Arnold's Scholarly Additions to the Literature in Group Communication

Not only did Professor Arnold actively promote the study of communication in groups and contribute substantially to how the subject was taught to undergraduate students enrolling for courses in group discussion, he produced publications that advanced the rather small body of discipline-based scholarly work that had accumulated at the time he was writing. In this section of my essay, I examine three particular contributions.

In the Handbook of Group Discussion, Wagner and Arnold (1950, 1963) exhibit an excellent grasp of a variety of theoretical issues in communication, in general, and in group communication, in particular. In their discussion of speech and language, for example, they consider the ways in which properties of each relate to the induction of and changes in belief, the formation and alteration of attitudes, and overt behavior. To these ends, they emphasize the importance of developing habits of speech and the uses of language by which learners evince the relevant properties and characteristics. Unlike others writing about group discussion at the time (e.g., Ewbank & Auer, 1951; McBurney & Hance, 1950), Professor Arnold and his co-author were not merely prescriptive concerning communicative behavior in groups. Rather, they made clear how the behavior of interest influences, or otherwise enables group members to achieve, desired outcomes.

Treating behavior as instrumental to the achievement of desired outcomes and specifying the characteristics most directly implicated in a way that separated Wagner and Arnold (1950, 1963) from their contemporaries is

Probably a consequence of their more sophisticated grasp of the concept of "process." To others, process appeared to represent merely a sequence of steps or series of activities enacted in a specified order, as in common dictionary definitions of the term. Professor Arnold and his colleague, in part, subscribed to such a view, but they also recognized the necessity for members of groups to be fluid. In so doing, they promoted a perspective on process more in line with the one articulated by practicing scientists than by those thinking primarily in terms of static, routine sequences of activities and related communicative practices.

In the first edition of the *Handbook of Group Discussion,* they pay considerable attention to sources of disruption and the sorts of necessary adjustments they entail if a group is to be successful in attaining its goals. This more expansive, scientifically based view of process in the study of communication was later to take firmer hold with the publication by David K. Berlo (1960) of *The Process of Communication,* a work that was to have notable impact on how communication scholars, in general, would conduct research thereafter. Those interested in group communication were no exception.

Although rudimentary to be sure, a good deal of what Professor Arnold had to say about the fluid and dynamic nature of interaction in decision-making and problem-solving groups was consistent with more current views of group process, especially those embodied in structuration theory. The foremost exponent of structuration theory as applied to group communication, is Marshall Scott Poole (see Poole, 1999). The theory, according to Poole, "addresses the issue of how group activities are constituted through members' action" (p. 48). Central to this theoretical perspective is the premise that interaction in groups is continually in flux and that the decisions groups reach evolve as a function of members' acts, transitions, and both the endogenous and exogenous influences present. In those sections of the *Handbook of Group Discussion* relating to the situations requiring adjustments in leaders and other members' behavior to the ever-changing and continuously evolving events in the life of a group, one finds a strong intellectual kinship to the assumptions and principles underlying Structuration Theory and Poole and his associates' application of it to the study of communication in groups.

Professor Arnold was among the first individuals writing about group discussion to disavow the belief that leaders are born, not made (see Wagner & Arnold, 1950, p. 89). Social psychologist had been questioning this per-

spective on leadership for some time (see Stogdill [1974] for a review of critiques that began to accumulate in the late 1940s), and those writing textbooks dealing with group discussion, such as Ewbank and Auer (1951) and McBurney and Hance (1950), implicitly repudiated this long-held understanding of leadership by virtue of their discussing the roles and responsibilities of group leaders; however, Wagner and Arnold emphasized functions of leadership that others ignored, such as contributing to the progressive development of group thinking, promoting evenness of participation, maintaining relevance, and doing what is necessary to prevent confusion, non-productive disagreements, and hostility, not as planned measures, but rather as reactive responses to the emergence and presence of such conditions in their incipient stages.

As with the treatment of leadership, much of what Professor Arnold and his collaborator had to say about participation of group members, in general, also went well beyond the more static views of other textbook writers of the day. This is perhaps most evident in their treatment of group member effectiveness in the chapter dealing with participation. Wagner and Arnold identify six "requisites" of effective participation, many of which are reactive in nature, such as striving to narrow the scope of disagreement among group members, identifying and reducing the impact of extraneous sources of influence on interaction, and recognizing when minority positions and opinions have received a fair enough hearing.

In every respect noted above, Professor Arnold advanced positions concerning the conduct of group discussions that raised empirical issues and required, at the very least, some sort of theoretical explication if one were to require, at the very least, some sort of theoretical explication if one were to expect others to agree with them. He himself did not do the empirical work his positions suggested, but he and Professor Wagner, by and large did succeed very well in articulating the logical and implicit theoretical bases for them, not to mention illustrating them in concrete, practical terms.

Another contribution, albeit somewhat indirect, to the scholarly literature concerning communication in groups is a brief article entitles "What's Reasonable?" that Professor Arnold (1971) published *Today's Speech*. In it, he advances an Aristotelian conception of what can be taken as reasonable: "the valuable kinds of stuff audiences **will** controllably shape into syllogisms and inductions as communicators throw out the **hints** that Aristotle gave the 'new' names, enthymeme and example" (p. 23). Further, what is reasonable, according to Professor Arnold, "is what Stephen Toulmin suggested: **any**

statement taken seriously as **meant** – with or without all possible data, warrants, and the like that **could** be attached: (p. 23). Finally, what is reasonable "is assertion that **has** to be tentative" (p. 23) because one does not make assertions if there is not the possibility for those to whom the assertions direct such statements to deny them.

In developing this view of reasonableness, Professor Arnold was attempting to grapple with how reason and argument actually function in human discourse, as opposed to how one might presume that they ought to function, but in a way that does not give one complete license to ignore issues and matters of truth. What he succeeds in doing in this essay and with the position he develops is to create a meaningful separation of reason and its companion of argument as sources of influence, that is, as rhetorical in nature, from their more traditional and philosophically grounded conception as instruments for discovering and affirming the truth.

Considered from the perspective Professor Arnold enunciated, effective discussion is as much a matter of producing claims in support of positions on issues that have credibility among the members as it is a process of discovering the best possible position to take in some completely objective sense of the term. Traditional notions of rationally have assumed the latter but, of late, have become objectives of increasing criticism (see, for example, Beach, 1977; Simon, 1979). Professor Arnold's attempt to negotiate the narrow straits between the rhetorically pragmatic and the philosophically pure forms of reason is compatible with several aspects of relatively new perspective on decision making called Image Theory (Beach, 1997), which posits that decision makers typically screen alternatives and reject most on the basis of their compatibility with existing beliefs and values and only later examine the survivors with the sort of intellectual rigor that more conventional understandings of rational choice entail.

The third and final, as well as perhaps the most direct, scholarly contribution to the literature on group process, and to which I now turn, is Professor Arnold's article, "The Senate Committee of Thirteen, December 6-31, 1860," which appeared in *Antislavery and Disunion, 1858-1861: Studies in the Rhetoric of Compromise and Conflict* edited by J. Jeffrey Auer (1963). The Committee of Thirteen was created in December of 1860 as the result of a resolution introduced in the Senate to consider a last-ditch effort by Senator Crittenden to achieve a compromise that aimed to keep Southern states from seceding from the union. Between the time the committee was appointed and

December 31, the members met on five occasions. Much of the first part of Professor Arnold's essay is a reconstruction of the chronology of events, a discussion of the characteristics of the members, and an identification of the roles that various ones of them played. It is the section in which he analyzes the dynamics of the meetings of the committee and its failure to reach a conclusion that could have had the desired consequences, however, that has the most relevance for this essay.

In his examination of the first discussion, Professor Arnold noted as reasons for the failure of the committee to make progress (1) the introduction of few, if any, topics that had not already been aired (2) debate focuses on "packaged" proposals rather than concerted efforts to search for possible areas of agreement, and (3) the adoption of a pattern of formalized discussion, which shifted attention away from matters of substance. These factors represented a confluence that clearly mitigated against possibilities for meaningful discussion. In short, the committee did not conduct itself in a spirit of inquiry and discovery.

The second meeting focused on Crittenden's proposed compromise. Instead of interacting, however, members of the committee devoted a great deal of their available time to making speeches for or against various provisions of the proposal. They were not action-oriented in this sense. Further contributing to a lack of demonstrable progress in this meeting, according to Professor Arnold, was the intrusion of values and attitudes, what he quoted Crittenden as later characterizing as "a mixing up of these questions [those involving the compromise] with religion and politics" (p. 323). In the language of Fisher and Ury (1981), the parties involved became caught up in defending positions rather than exploring potentially non-conflicting interests.

The third meeting, Professor Arnold observed, began with a "spirit of gloom" (p. 324). In this meeting, the members of the committee once again resorted to a formalized pattern of discussion, in which the accent was on rules of procedure, not substantive issues. This pattern carried into the fourth meeting as well. The primary difference in the fourth meeting was that possibilities for at least one new point of agreement emerged; however, the members failed to take advantage of them.

The final meeting of the committee began in an atmosphere of tension and confusion. For a short time, it appeared as if the rejection of two proposals contributing to the tension increased the likelihood that one more

hospitable to the competing interests represented among the members might gain acceptance. Those representing Southern interests, however, stiffened in their resistance, and in the end, the committee passed a motion "to report its inability to agree and ask to be discharged" (p. 328). In so doing, it sacrificed any remaining chance that the conflict and conflagration known as the War Between States soon to come could be avoided to a spirit of fatalism.

In his analysis of what contributed to the failure of The Committee of Thirteen to achieve compromise, let alone one that would be workable, Professor Arnold identified and carefully examined several sources of influence. Among these was the clash of perceived rights by Sotherners and their Northern Democratic sympathizers, such as Stephen A. Douglas, and moral scruples to which those representing Northern interests tenaciously clung. According to Professor Arnold, communication "could break the deadlock only by demonstrsating that sectional rights and political integrity would be better served through compromise than through action in defense of rights and scruples" (p. 329). In the lexicon and parlance of late Twentieth- and the early Twenty-First-Century scholarly discussions of conflict communication, "integrative," approach to its managements (Folger, Poole, & Stutman, 1997, p. 54). Or, in the terms of Fisher and Ury (1981), the disputants attempted to negotiate positions rather than interests.

Further limiting the possibilities for reaching an agreement was an almost slavish adherence to parliamentary rules, which, according to Professor Arnold, "stifled exploratory impulses" and led to treating "suggestion, resolutions, and plans" as "'bills' to be adopted or rejected by recorded votes," but not to be "informally examined, compared, combined, and expanded" (p. 329). Putnam (1979) has warned about the possibilities for being a source of negative influence that excessive enforcement of procedural order can have in group deliberations, and Professor Arnold's observations in this case nicely illustrate her point.

Rigid observance of parliamentary procedure can be beneficial in promoting a climate in which advocacy flourishes. In the context of negotiation and the management of conflict, however, a little advocacy can go a long way toward frustrating parties' receptivity to opposing ideas. To the extent that advocacy contributes to reaching mutually agreeable settlements of differences, it appears to be best if kept at a minimum and is followed by problem-solving (Van de Vliert, Nauta, Euwema, & Janssen, 1997). Formal

rules of procedure mitigate against this possibility. Professor Arnold, in his assessment of the role that a preoccupation with formal procedure played in the discussion process, seems to have had an excellent intuitive grasp of what only relative recently has found empirical confirmation.

In discussing the final influence on the failure of The Committee of Thirteen to succeed it its task, Professor Arnold adopted a more general perspective. Pointing out that the resolution of conflict requires "methods calculated to reveal and expand the grounds of potential agreement," he referred to the clear evidence that "neither the arguments of debate nor the methods of decision-making in December, 1860, allowed a full, fair test of the case for compromise" (p. 330).

The arguments in which the disputants engage were not central to the issues in need of resolution and, as a result, as Professor Arnold concluded, "it is difficult to see how success could have come in the face of such inefficacies" (p. 330). His observations, in this respect, is consistent with those inefficacies" (p. 330). His observations, in this respect, is consistent with those of Lipshitz (1993), whose Model of Argument Driven Action portrays argument that has consequences for reaching decisions as taking the form, "Do A because, R," where A is an action, and R is the reason for taking it. This was demonstrably not the model in evidence in the case of The Committee of Thirteen, whose arguments in the final analysis contributed only to inaction because they centered on whose views were the more righteous and, hence, from that perspective the more defensible and acceptable.

Conclusion

I began this essay with the observation that Professor Arnold was not especially well identified with Group Communication as an area of study. As a result of the exploration of his promotion of the area, his involvement in and contributions to teaching and learning, and his additions to the scholarly literature, I hope that I have demonstrated that, despite the lack of recognition, his work nonetheless has had an appreciable impact. Worthy of special distinction is how forward-looking he was in every respect mentioned and reviewed. As a promoter of the study of group discussion, he embraced a view of it as processual and dynamic that continues to flourish to this day. As a teacher, he saw the practical value of discussion as an instrument of decision-making and problem solving, but only to the extent that the associated practices were grounded in good reasons – what today we might think of as theory—as well as accompanied by relevant knowledge and necessary skills.

Finally, although he was not a specialist in research dealing with groups, he, nevertheless, made a number of scholarly contributions that reveal rather sophisticated insights into the aspects of groups and the interactions of their members that determine both their successes and their failures.

In these respects, current practicing scholars and teachers in Group Communication are probably far more indebted to Carroll C. Arnold than they may ever know. If this essay has served to make that even just a bit more apparent, from my perspective, it will have been a highly worthwhile investment of my time.

Dennis S. Gouran is Professor of Speech Communication and Labor Studies and Industrial Relations at The Pennsylvania State University

Allport, F. H. (1924). *Social psychology.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Arnold, C. C. (1954). Teaching discussion for the development of democratic behavior. *Bulletin of the National Association of Secondary School Principals, 38(1),* 83-86.

Arnold, C. C. (1963). The senate committee of thirteen, December 6-31, 1860. In J. J. Auer (Ed.), *Antislavery and disunion, 1858-1861: Studies in the rhetoric of compromise and conflict* (pp. 310-330). New York: Harper & Row.

Arnold, C. C. (1969). Implications of the recommendations of New Orleans Conference from the perspective of critical scholarship. In R. J. Kilbler & L. L. Barker (Eds.), *Conceptual frontiers in speech-communication* (pp. 185-189). New York: Speech Association of America.

Arnold, C. C. (1971). What's reasonable? *Today's Speech, 19(3),* 19-23.

Arnold, C. C., & Bowers, J. W. (Eds.). (1984). *Handbook of rhetorical and communication theory.* Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Beach, L. R. (1997). *The psychology of decision making: People in organizations.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Baird, A. C. (1927). *Public discussion and debate.* Boston: Ginn.

Baird, A. C. (1937). *Public discussion and debate.* Boston: Ginn.

Baird, A. C. (1943). *Discussion: Principle and types.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Berlo, D.K. (1960). *The process of communication.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Bormann, E.G. (1969). *Discussion and group methods: Theory and Practice.* New York: Harper & Row.

Bormann, E.G. (1970). The paradox and promise of small group research. *Speech Monographs, 37,* 211-217.

Campbell, D. T. (1958). Common fate, similarity, and other indices of aggregates of persons as social entities. *Behavioral Science, 3,* 14-25.

Cartwright, D., & Zander, A. (1953). *Group dynamics: Research and theory.* New York: Harper & Row.

Dewey, J. (1910). *How we think.* Boston: D.C. Heath.

Ewbank, H.L., & Auer, J. J. (1951). *Discussion and debate: Tools of a democracy* (2nd ed.). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Fisher, R., & Ury, W. (1981). *Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Folger, J. P., Poole, M. S., & Stutman, R. K. (1997). *Working through conflict: Strategies for relationships, groups, and organizations* (3rd ed.). New York: Longman.

Frey, L. R. (1994a). Call and response: The challenge of conducting research on communication in natural groups. In L. R. Frey (Ed.), *Group communication in context: Studies of natural groups* (pp. 293-304). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Frey, L. R. (Ed.). (1994b). *Group communication in context: Studies of natural groups.* Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Frey, L. R. (1994c). The naturalistic paradigm: Studying small groups in the postmodern era. *Small Group Research, 25,* 551-577.

Frey, L. R. (1995a). Applied communication research on group facilitation in natural settings. In L. R. Frey (Ed.), *Innovations in group facilitation: Applications in natural settings* (pp. 1-23). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Frey, L. R. (Ed.). (1995b). *Innovations in group facilitation: Applications in natural settings.* Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Gouran, D. S. (1970). Response to "The paradox and promise of small group research." *Speech Monographs, 37,* 218-219.

Gouran, D. S. (1976). The Watergate coverup: Its dynamics and its implications. *Communication Monographs, 43,* 176-186.

Gouran, D. S. (1982). *Making decisions in groups: Choices and consequences.* Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.

Gouran, D. S. (1984). Communicative influences on decisions related to the Watergate coverup: The failure of collective judgment. *Central States Speech Journal, 35*, 260-268.

Gouran, D. S. (1994). The future of small group communication research: Revitalization or continued good health? *Communication Studies, 45,* 29-39.

Gouran, D. S. (1999). Communication in groups: The emergence and evolution of a field study. In L. R. Frey, D. S. Gouran, & M. S. Poole (Eds.), *The handbook of group communication theory and research* (pp. 3-36). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Gouran, D. S., & Fisher, B. A. (1984). The functions of communication in the formation, maintance, and performance of small groups. In C. C. Arnold & J. W. Bowers (Eds.), *Handbook of rhetorical and communication theory* (pp. 622-658). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Gouran, D. S. & Hirokawa, R. Y. (1997). Functional theory and communication in decision-making and problem-solving groups: An expanded view. In R. Y. Hirokawa & M. S. Poole (Eds.), *Communication and group decision making* (2nd ed., pp. 55-80). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Gouran, D. S., Hirokawa, R. Y., & Martz, A. E. (1986). A critical analysis of factors related to decisional processes involved in the *Challenger* disaster. *Central States Speech Journal, 37,* 119-135.

Hirokawa, R. Y., Gouran, D. S., & Martz, A. E. (1988). Understanding the sources of faulty group decision making: A lesson from the *Challenger* disaster. *Small Group Behavior*; *19,* 411-433.

Janis, I. L. (1972). *Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign policy decisions and fiascoes.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Janis, I. L. (1972). *Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign policy decisions and fiascoes.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Janis, I. L. (1982), *Groupthink: Psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes* (2nd ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Janis, I. L. (1989). *Critical decisions: Leadership in policymaking and crisis management.* New York: Free Press.

Keltner, J., & Arnold, C. C. (1956). Discussion in American colleges and universities. *Quarterly Journal of Speech, 42,* 250-256.

Keyton, J. (1994). Going forward in group communication research may mean going back: Studying the groups of children. *Communication Studies, 45,* 40-51.

Lipshitz, R. (1993). Decision making as argument-driven action. In G. A. Klein, J. Orasnu, R. Calderwood, & C. E. Zsambok (Eds.), *Decision making in action: Models and methods* (pp. 172-181). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

McBurney, J. H., & Hance, K. G. (1950). *Discussion in human affairs* (2nd ed.). New York: Harper & Brothers.

McDougall, W. (1908). *Introduction to social psychology.* London: Metheun.

McDougall, W. (1920). *The group mind.* New York: Putnam.

Mortensen, C. D. (1970). The status of small group research. *Quarterly Journal of Speech, 56,* 304-309.

Poole, M. S. (1994). Breaking the isolation of small group communication studies. *Communication Studies, 45,* 20-28.

Poole, M. S. (1999). *Group communication theory.* In L. R. Frey, D. S. Gouran, & M. S. Poole (Eds.), *Handbook of group communication theory and research* (pp. 37-70). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Putnam, L. L. (1979). Preference for procedural order in task-oriented small groups. *Communication Monographs, 46,* 193-218.

Putnam, L. L. (1994). Revitalizing small group communication: Lessons learned from a bona fide group perspective. *Communication Studies, 45,* 97-102.

Putnam, L. L., & Stohl, C. (1990). Bona fide groups: A reconceptualization of group in context. *Communication Studies, 41,* 248-265.

Putnam, L. L., & Stohl, C. (1994). Group communication in context: Implications for the study of bona fide groups. In L. R. Frey (Ed.), *Group communication in context: Studies of natural groups* (pp. 284-292). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Putnam, L. L., & Stohl, C. (1996). Bona fide groups: An alternative perspective for communication and small group decision making. In R. Y. Hirokawa & M. S. Poole (Eds.), *Communication and group decision making* (2nd ed., pp. 147-178). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Simon, H. A. (1979). Rational decision making in business organizations. *American Economic Review, 69,* 493-513.

Stogdill, R. M. (1974). *Handbook of leadership: A survey of theory and research.* New York: Free Press.

Stohl, C. (1995). Facilitating bona fide groups: Practice and paradox. In L. R. Frey (Ed.), *Innovations in group facilitation: Applications in natural settings* (pp. 325-332). Creskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Van de Vliert, E., Nauta, A., Euwema, & Janssen, O. (1997). The effectiveness of mixing problem-solving and forcing. In C. De Dreu & E. Van De Vliert (Eds.), *Using conflict in organizations* (pp. 38-52). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Wagner, R. H., & Arnold, C. C. (1950). *Handbook of group discussion.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Wagner, R. H., & Arnold, C. C. (1965). *Handbook of group discussion* (2nd ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

"EDUCATIONAL RHETORIC" IN A PUBLIC AGE

Ronald C. Arnett

Duquesne University

This essay celebrates the scholarship of Carroll Arnold by revealing its contemporary relevance. Rhetoric is outlines as the needed communicative style for a twenty-first century culture of diversity. This essay situates "educational rhetoric" as an interactive learning model that negotiates difference in the public domain. Contrasting views of higher education, represented by a questioning public and an academy seeking to protect freedom of inquiry, are examined within a communicative framework of educational rhetoric.

"EDUCATIONAL RHETORIC" IN A PUBLIC AGE

The twenty-first century is the era of public discourse. The twentieth century revealed a failed experiment; privatized communication cannot replace rhetoric in the public domain. An era of diversity necessitates public rhetorical negotiation of temporal solutions. Public answers are not found in privatized discourse. The twenty-first century requires rhetoric as we negotiate differences in the public domain. Carroll Arnold's rhetorical insights have contemporary currency for negotiating differences in the public arena.

This essay, in honor of Carroll Arnold, emphasizes four interrelated points: 1) This century of rhetoric moves us to the public domain, from privatized discourse; 2) The public domain is the rhetorical arena of competing social goods; 3) Educational rhetoric invites mutual learning as we negotiate contrasting standpoints; 4) Communication between the academy and a questioning public requires educational rhetoric in the public arena.

This essay frames an "educational rhetoric" that meets the demands of the historical moment by discerning the possible within the limits of public stories. The rhetorical demands upon higher education today offer an opportunity for "educational rhetoric" that connects a public story about academic freedom and the historical demands of questioning public. Educational rhetoric rejects idealism, finding temporal answers in the encounter of a public story and historical need. Educational rhetoric discovers creative insight in the possible. Rhetorical creativity and novel ideas emerge from meeting the demands of the historical moment situated within a public story of conviction.

From the Privatized to the Public Domain

This essay, in the spirit of Carroll Arnold's pragmatic rhetoric, moves us from privatized discourse to reclaiming the public domain, as we resist the impulse to psychologize our opposition. Take, for example, an academic who constantly looks for motives beneath actions, suggesting the "real" reasons for behavior and ideas. As the Department hires more faculty from varied cultural assumptions, such psychological readings are less accurate. The colleague's analysis assumes a privatized bias that is attributed to the other. This colleague needs to enter the public domain of the twenty-first century where differences are worked out rhetorically by understanding the demands of the

historical moment, foregoing the certainty of privatized perspectves, understanding variability in standpoint and interpretation and seeking temporal solutions. Our communicative response to diversity requires us to admit difference and then rhetorically discern points of temporal agreement.

Diversity of persons, backgrounds and virtue structures require u to recomsider assumptions inherited from a phsycological or therapeutic age. Therapeutic or psychologized communication looks for privatized aswers "in me." This communicative effort is considered a "moral cul de sac" (Arnett, 1997). A psychological key will *not* open the door to participation in the twenty-first century. Carroll Arnold's rhetorical insights are needed as we forego the temptation to offer privatized readings of communicative complexities. Public admission of differing socio-cultural perspectives is missed when privatized standpoints are unreflectively offered as standards of evaluation and certainty. Rhetoric in the public domain is situated in what Carroll Arnold called the "possible" and the "probable" (1974, p. 15), or what this essay terms temporal answers grounded in the needs of a given historical moment.

This essay does not reject psychology—only the everyday use of a therapeutic vocabulary in the public arena is called into question. Philip Rieff (1987) described the twentieth century as *The Triumph of the Therapeutic*. Christopher Lasch (1979) referred to this era as the *Culture of Narcissism*. Richard Sennett (1976) traced the *Fall of Public Man*. The twentieth century was the pathway for therapeutic communication, a road that brought private conviction or what Macintyre has deemed "emotivism" (1984, pp. 11–14) into decision-making in the public domain. Victor Frankly warned against a form of emotivistic decision-making that places undue confidence in privatized perspectives. Such action can result in "unmasking" (1978, p. 14) or deconstructing actions and perspectives of others different from oneself.

Carroll Arnold understood the temptation to psychologize an audience. He reminded us that:

When thinking about situations in which speech occurs, our critic's concern is not to employ polling organizations or teams of psychiatrists to tell him about audiences; his initial step is to find some reasonable way of *conceptualizing* what an "audience" is and under what conditions it responds to speech. (1974, p. 28).

The audience is a public construction shaped by the public rhetorical situation, not private disposition.

Competing Social Goods

Higher education is not exempt from the need to re-visit the public rhetorical domain of the possible and the probable. Both the academy and the public must resist the temptation to psychologize away differences by attributing privatized motives to questioners who ask, "What is the value of the academy?" or, on the other hand, "Why is the campus of concern to them?" In an era of diversity, questions about competing virtue structures between the academy and a questioning public call us to discern temporal points of agreement between positions of difference in the public domain.

Higher education is prodded by a central question in this historical moment: "To whom and to what is the academy accountable?" The answer to this question is dependent upon the standpoint of the constituency seeing the answer. Those in the academy who desire accountability to the story of academic freedom, central to scholarship and teaching, offer one answer. A "questioning public" offers another answer as it requires accountability for resources used by the academy. A "questioning public" concerned about resource allocation and used is in tension with the tradition of academic freedom that seeks to function unimpeded by financial questions. The rhetoric of competing social goods propels conversation about higher education. We are akin to a family business whose stock is now available in the public market. Quarterly reports of publicly traded companies require an organization to acknowledge the power of the public domain, comprised of investors and analysts. A public company answers questions about internal operations.

Increased public accountability is reshaping higher education. When I began teaching in 1977, I argue that Higher Education is not a business, but a non-profit agency with a sacred mission. To make this argument today invites a perception of idealism likely to be ignored in most administrative conversations. The comment misses the rhetorical demands of this historical moment. This historical moment is framed by market and resource demands.

This materialistic era, called by Fukuyama (1990) "The End of History," requires additional rhetorical engagement with the spirit of John Henry Newman (1996). For Newman, the campus was a sacred place set aside from the rest of the material culture a place where ideas are taken seriously

with time provided to read and discuss intellectual differences. One might rhetorically reframe this current moment in higher education as an era in which business and a sense of soul, genuine commitment to ideas and persons, (Arnett, 1992, pp. 122-123) must walk together on the campus. We must work within our resources and keep alive the love of learning the inquiry for students, faculty, and the administration. John Henry Newman (1996) refutes a pure business model as he reminds us of our sacred trust, a public story about the soul of higher education.

Rhetoric begins with the historical moment and then connects ideas that offer the possibility of transformation. The University as a business with a soul acknowledges this materialistic historical moment while reminding us that we are shaping the character of our collective future. Rhetoric in the public domain seeks to frame the possible.

Engagement in the public domain requires taking comments of one's interlocutors so seriously that they can reshape one's own position. Twenty-first century campuses that keep the dialectic of business and soul in constant conversation lessen opportunities for pure "for profit" places of learning to challenge our ability to shape the character of education. We must financially wise or we will lose our ability to offer a sense of soul, insight into ideas and care for persons beyond the financial bottom line.

Just as we cannot ignore the challenge of the "for-profit" sector, we cannot ignore other voices that question us. If we fail to listen to our interlocutors, we empower those with a much narrower view of higher education. We can no longer assume that protection of academic freedom for research and discussion of controversial ideas in the classroom is a fundamental social good that all embrace. We must rhetorically defend a public story about importance of freedom of inquiry in the academy while listening to other notions of what makes higher education a social good. We must listen to and learn from those who question the academy; ignoring opposition provides a rationale for an unhappy public to give credence to alternative forms of "educating." Whether we like it or not, higher education in this historical moment is tied to a market culture; the landscape of higher education can be changed as the public ceases to "buy" our certain goods or perspectives and goes to other suppliers or educational providers. We cannot presuppose that the value, sense of soul, or significance of higher education is supportable without a willingness to engage a skeptical audience interested in the bottom line.

It is tempting to psychologize questions when we encounter accusations about our work offered by individuals such as Charles Skyes in *ProfScam* (1988). Skyes's work is a decade old, but, unfortunately, his ideas are now part of a longer public conversation about "what is going on in the academy." Skyes does not applaud higher education's creativity and innovation; he questions the use of time and resources on the campus. Such questioning, even when unfair, represents the hope of the public to hold us accountable to "something." This discontent is carried forth by regional and national accrediting agencies who increasingly call for accountability in the academy.

If we are content to psychologize and call into question the motives of those asking about our work, we continue to privatize conversation, engaging only those in agreement with our presuppositions. Appropriately, many of us in the academy worry about acts of intrusion propelled by narrow ideological perspectives with the actions of Senator Joseph McCarthy and the "Committee on Un-American Affairs" being the historical reminder. However, despite such legitimate fears, we should not take refuge in psychologized readings of our questioners. Psychologized readings seek limited, agreeable audiences and result in polarizing positions of difference. The rhetorical test is whether or not we are willing to listen to and engage questions about academic life.

Public questioning of life within the "ivory tower walls" of the University provides an opportunity to counter the impulse to offer a negative psychological assessment of questioners. Psychologizing the opposition is not a rationale for lack of engagement with a concerned interlocutor. The academy is situated in a rhetorical testing ground. As a diverse public offers critique of our work, we have an opportunity to meet our interlocutors in conversation in the public arena.

Publicly engaged rhetoric is needed in an era of competing social goods. Perhaps a term appropriate for such rhetoric is *educational rhetoric – rhetoric* that seeks to discern by stating a position, listening to the other's standpoint, and learning from the exchange. As Arnold repeatedly suggested, rhetoric requires the public sorting and evaluating of conflicting demands. These conflicting demands offer an opportunity for learning, an opportunity for educational rhetoric.

Rhetoric permits competing voices to meet and to be heard in the public domain. Our first impulse is to protect academic life from outside

intervention, and questions. Yet, the pragmatic rhetoric of Carroll Arnold encourages understanding and learning more about our own position as we defend it and learn from alternative positions. We learn by constructing positions that can withstand public questioning and as we modify positions after listening to ideas other than our own. Carroll Arnold's rhetoric reminds us that rhetoric engages contrary ideas in the public square, the home for diversity, engagement and learning.

Engagement in the public domain of rhetoric requires us to learn as we listen, speak and respond to questions. Engaged rhetoric requires a commitment to learning. As Carroll Arnold suggests, our key must be to learn from "…intellectual *problems,* not intellectual *territory*" (1985, p. 70). Rhetoric, as understood by Arnold, does not begin with intellectual territory to be defended, but with intellectual problems that return us to the public domain, the heart of rhetorical learning. The academic community must go beyond talking to itself, rejecting the impulse to ignore contrary voices.

Educational Rhetoric

Educational rhetoric invites the interplay of ideas in hopes of discerning a reconfigured and temporal sense of clarity. Educational rhetoric, which is connected to the public domain, diversity, and learning is more akin to education than proclamation. In an age of diversity, learning from the other before one speaks is rhetorically pragmatic.

Educational rhetoric is learning centered; it begins with listening, not expression. Emmanuel Levinas's rejection of expression rhetoric that seeks to protect "me" and "my" position, and is unwilling to learning from the other (Manning, 1993, pp. 1 15-124) is appropriate in this historical moment. Educational rhetoric works to learn from differences and seeks temporal public agreement, resisting the impulse to use "my privatized perspective" as a public standard.

Diversity is the "face" of the 21st century. The screen of "my privatized perspective" blurs the "face" of a diverse Other. Rhetoric sensitive to diversity begins with learning, followed by articulation of a perspective, and once again learning as one attends to responses and questions. Rhetoric in the public domain of diversity assumes a learning, not a just telling, framework.

Communicators interested in educational rhetoric listen, consider contrary positions, and test standpoints in the public square. Rhetoric is the vehicle for learning and testing ideas in public action. Carroll Arnold would have enjoyed watching a postmodern culture of virtue disagreement usher in a new rhetorical era. Educational rhetoric sorts through conceptual confusion; it assists in the search for clarity and direction within given temporal and historical demands. In a previous era of metanarrative agreement, educational rhetoric situated in learning was no as essential. Expressive strategies situated in assurance of a taken-for-granted perspective called for implementation; such a communicative style is sufficient in times of metanarrative stability. However, when we are unsure what constitutes a *Good Society,* (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler & Tipton, 1991) an educational rhetoric is a pragmatic learning necessity as we sort through varying paradigmatic options and directions.

The enthusiasm for rhetoric displayed by Robert Bellah (1991) would warm the heart of Isocrates, Vico, and, of course, Carroll Arnold. Bellah and his co-authors are sociologists who recognize that in an era of confusion three rhetorical questions are essential in the public domain: What can we learn?, What public evidence supporters the proposed ideas?, and What is the eventual judgment of history on our public learning and our public evidence? Educational rhetoric is identified by listening to contrary positions, rejecting the temptation to confuse "my" ideas with the best temporal solutions in a given historical moment and affirming the importance of engaging others in the public domain.

The learning focus of educational rhetoric rejects extreme dogmatic positions that lessen our ability to listen to an Other. Bellah frames an understanding of rhetoric that learns from diversity, responds to the needs of the historical moment and is grounded in the clarity of public evidence. Bellah quotes Reinhold Niebuhr's *Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic* (1960), reminding us that educational rhetoric protects us from the tyranny of extremes. The significance of Niebuhr's remarks is situated in the historical moment of his writing, 1929. Within the next decade the world would be in upheaval. Great rhetoric would be needed to counter the extremes of the Third Reich. Those called to fight extreme ideologies would require powerful public reasons for sacrifice:

If we choose between types of fanaticism, is there any particular reason why we should prefer the fanatics who destroy a vital culture in the name of freedom and reason to those who try to strangle a new culture at birth in the name of authority and dogma? The latter type of fanaticism is bound to end in futility. The growth of reason cannot be stopped by dogma. But the former type is dangerous because it easily enervates a national culture with ennui and despair. (qtd. In Bellah et al.157)

Educational rhetoric does not privilege fanatical extremes, but seeks answers that can be practically implemented for a diverse community, not just for my kind.

Carroll Arnold charged us to distinguish good ideas from bad ones. Fanaticism is often a bad idea; it closes off conversation in the public domain, making collaborative discernment impossible. Fanatics applaud the new without concern for what is being displaced. Fanatics protect tradition by refusing to ask if it is any longer helpful. Educational rhetoric calls for the courage to listen and learn, publically offering evidence for a position and being willing to modify ideas in the face of public testing. Educational rhetoric is central to Carroll Arnold's referencing of George William Curtis's "'The Public Duty of the Educated Man'" (1974, p. 80). In post modern confusion of narrative decline and disruption, our rhetorical public duty is to sort out together what seems appropriate for a given historical moment. Today, we can hear once again the youthful voice of Carroll Arnold calling for society to listen, learn, offer positions and modify ideas as new evidence and historical needs demand. Educational rhetoric discerns good, not pure or perfect, temporal solutions in the public domain.

Our temporal solutions are tested in the public domain. Disputes offer opportunities for clarity and testing. Educational rhetoric situated in learning and evidence in the public domain is tested on the campus in the interchange between a questioning public and the academy's story of academic freedom. The University is not situated in a societal vacuum. The struggles of society are also issues that impact the academy. The academy cannot escape the rhetorical demands of a questioning society. A questioning public and the academy enact what Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) terms virtue disagreement. Higher education is not exempt from the stress of a postmodern culture.

Of course, the picture of higher education and the public is far more complex than two interlocutors in debate. There is disagreement among various groups in the "public." Knowledge of the varied forms of disagreement in higher education and the pulic itself only highlights the historical fact that agreement on one narrative standard of "good" higher education is not present in this historical moment.

Carroll Arnold would not be surprised that a cost-conscious public is questioning campus life. He asked temporally appropriate questions and was not easilt misled into unproductive critique. His response to the name of the discipline is a pragmatic example of the care he took in the selection of battles. "Thinking about teaching communication in this way [focus on the communicative experience with others and problems that beset us] makes it clear how I spent neatly fifty years in the departments variously called 'English,' 'Speech Communication,' and 'Communication' without worrying much about the academic nomenclature" (Arnold, 1985, p.71). Arnold practiced a pragmatic rhetoric to discern the important and respond in conversation. In a postmodern culture, disagreement and virtue incommensurability are to be expected. It is important to meet differences in the public domain, offer responses that engage others and seek rhetorical clarity as interlocutors learn from one another. Educational rhetoric is pragmatically tested by interlocutors in the public domain. Educational rhetoric is enacted in praxis, not in abstract, ideal speculation.

Rhetorical Praxis

Jacoby (1987), in The Last Intellectuals, reminds us of a larger public audience beyond one's individual discipline. Colleagues from multiple disciplines are calling for public application of academic knowledge—walking academic enterprise into a public arena is a historical necessity. Paying attention to a larger public audience requires rediscovering the notion of public and understanding the rhetorical shift from pure theory to praxis, theory-informed action. Rhetoric engaged in the public domain works to make a theory-informed practical difference, (praxis), as colleagues from different disciplines suggest. In theology, Stanley Hauerwas (1981) suggests that religious education must make a difference for local religious communities. Robert Bellah (sociology; e.g., 1991) emphasizes responsibility in creating a "good society." Christopher Lasch (history; e.g., 1979) and now his students describe the problematic of narcissism and our required role in its change. Carol

Gilligan (psychology; e.g., 1982) provided a public place for women in moral vocabulary. Emmanuel Levinas (philosophy; e.g. 1969) challenged the very foundation of Western philosophy—calling for ethics and responsibility based on concern for the Other. Edward Said (English; e.g., 1989) consistently calls for "worldly criticism." Julia Wood (communication; e.g., 1997) connects theory with social issues of significance in tis historical moment. Each of these scholars understands scholarship as praxis—theory-informed action, engaged in the public domain. *Praxis* scholarship relies upon theory-influenced rhetoric that connects ideas to the public domain of action.

 Praxis scholarship moves is into the public realm, the house that rhetoric builds. Babe Ruth was famous for building Yankee stadium; it was the "house," as more than a physical place, but a place of conversation, that he built. Ruth's life and success assisted with public place discussion about the "game." Ruth not only "built" Yankee stadium by bringing in crowds, he brought back constructive public discussion about the game of baseball after the "Black Sox" World Series scandal. Baseball players *and* even sometimes scholars can invited a rhetoric tat brings ideas to the public domain. Arnold's rhetoric took ideas into the testing ground of everyday life. The rhetoric of ideas could, according to Arnold, "generate a world" (1974, p. 10).

 Arnold's career as a teacher, scholar, and administrator emplified praxis scholarship. He understood rhetoric as public *praxis* of scholarship. Practical discourse in the public domain was central to Arnold's rhetorical praxis, theory-informed action. Arnold's rhetoric offers a basis for understanding the contribution of the communication discipline for this new century.

 Challenges to the academy offer an opportunity for the *praxis* of educational rhetoric. *Praxis* of educational rhetoric is exemplified as colleagues negotiate the tension between a critical public and the academic freedom requirements of the academy. Arnold understood that "influential rhetoric does not exist only in formal public speaking…[one] ought to be prepared to comment on…rhetoric wherever it occurs" (1974, p. 240). Rhetorical opportunities and challenges are not limited to formal settings of public discourse; such moments live on our campuses and call for our attention. Educational

rhetoric *praxis* is tested in the meeting of competing ideas that often embrace competing social goods on the campus.

Members of the University cannot expect less confusion on the campus than is present in the rest of the culture. Educational rhetoric rediscovers the public domain; no matter how good ideas are in private, the pragmatic test of rhetorical truth is whether or not others follow, whether the ideas work in a given situation, and whether or not the actions maintain support in the public domain after the moment of action. Educational rhetoric is tested as people follow or remain unmoved, as the implementation succeeds or fails, and as future public opinion tests the rhetorical praxis.

Moving people to action, successful implementation, and the test of posterity was fundamental to Churchill's rhetoric. He listened and learned from his enemies and interlocutors, then spoke with conviction. Arnold was impressed by Churchill's rhetoric (1974, p. 87). Four major keys guided Churchill's rhetorical engagement: (1) listening to the historical moment and to his interlocutors; (2) having a rhetorical position validated when people followed; (3) offering ideas that assisted pragmatically; (4) recognizing that the court of public opnion continued to judge rhetoric that listened to the demands of the historical moment, took a position, and then put ideas to the test in public domain. Few would remember Churchill's "A Solemn Hour" speech if the allies had lost. Virtually no one would know the speech if the British people had not followed the messages demand for courage and sacrifice.

Unlike Churchill's moment, we in the academy are not fighting a war. However, our efforts will determine the future of higher education. The fate of higher education now rests with our rhetorical efforts. The following story underscores demands of this historical moment in higher education. A colleague met with a group of educators who asked if she would still choose to enter in this profession. Her answer was simply, "Not in this profit-conscious moment!" The next day, however, our friend walked to each colleague and apologized. Her statement went something like the following:

We did not choose this historical moment. Higher education changed after we joined the academy. Words like customer, online education, profitability, and accountability were not part of our introduction to academic life. But here we are in this historical moment, and if we do not shape the meaning of these business-related terms the task will go to others. Our rhetorical

charge is to discuss the customer, not as an eighteen year-old, but as a graduate and supporter of the College twenty years from today. What kind of person do we want this customer to be? Additionally, we cannot give up the task of rhetorically defining this moment in an era of online education. We must shape the character of our students in this new delivery system. Education is more than information. Books, assignments, and conversations online are still the educational tools for shaping the character of future leaders. The content and pedagogy of online education are more important as we forego face-to-face meetings with students. However, writing and thinking are still educational keys. Our rhetoric needs to shape this unchosen moment. Educators are needed in this historical moment, our rhetorical framing of key ideas has never been more essential. If we fail to meet the demands of this era, we might finish our careers, but those who inherit the results of our laments of self-pity will not know an educational world of academic freedom and love of ideas. Rhetorical courage rejects lament, accepts the moment in which we are situation and is unwilling to forfeit the future of educators and students who come after us.

Our colleague's rhetoric reminds us of an educational rhetoric steeped in responsibility to answer the question, "if not us, then who?" Our colleague's statement, like Churchill's address, mixes passion situated in authentic insight and a historically appropriate call for action. Churchill's rhetoric is remembered for victory and moral appropriateness. Our rhetoric about higher education will be remembered if we succeed in keeping a sense of soul or direction alive on campuses that go beyond profit language. However, to do so we cannot ignore this historical moment of profit and accountability.

'Business with a soul' is the rhetorical metaphor that does not live in an ideal academic world, but in the give and take of positions within this historical moment, engaged with the views of others. Rhetoric foregoes the ideal. Rhetoric seeks the possible.

A demanding rhetorical moment is upon the academy. The shaping of higher education is in process. We know a campus life that can no longer be assumed. Our rhetoric must meet this era, framing ideas that engage a questioning public. Our legacy will be tested by whether or not our educational rhetoric spoke to this historical situation, not to abstract idealism. Rhetoric takes ideas into practical action. Rhetoric and lament do not coincide. Rhetoric, like the old Timex wristwatch commercial, "Takes a licking but keeps on ticking." Rhetoric meets the demands of this historical moment.

When terms, ideas, and visions of what education should be are unclear and confused, our task is to enter the conversation. We lessen the fanaticism of the bottom line. The fanatical push to make us a business must be held in check by a rhetoric reminding us that our task is to be financially viable, only because we have a larger task—shaping the character of future leaders.

Responsibility—On Our Watch

I witnessed the President of a small liberal arts college chastise himself and his colleagues. The college lost enrollment and stature during his leadership; with tears of genuine grief, he stated: "This decline happened during our 'watch.'" Each generation has institutional responsibility for the possibilities the next generation encounters. Our "watch" suggests that if we do not defend, support, and help shape public rhetoric about higher education the generations that follow will suffer from our indifference.

During "our watch," the tension between demands for business accountability and protection of a learning environment where academic freedom is protected generates ongoing debate. The "public" and the academy have long represented two different virtue structures. Each side of the discourse is tempted to see the other as an adolescent or at other times as a paternalistic authority figure. The adolescent cannot grow up if the parent knows all. Yet the adolescent still needs to hear a parental perspective. The parent needs to let go, and the adolescent needs to assume more responsibility. Adolescence is situated in conflict; the needs of both parties are in tension.

The dialectic of adolescence and paternal responsibility suggested above implies that it is not always clear who is the parent and who is the adolescent in this argument. The answer to this question is tied to the standpoint from which one enters the conversation (Harding, 1991). From the standpoint of a questioning public, the role of a parent is to prevent the adolescent academic from doing damage to himself or herself and to the culture at large. From the standpoint of the academic, the role of parent, assumed by the intellectual community, is to prevent a short-term thinking public (displaying the characteristics of an adolescent mind) from hurting the long-term intellectual health of the culture.

It is difficult to enter this conversation of conflicting standpoints and discover clarity without falling pretty to polarized communication. Arnold's

understanding of rhetoric encourages us to reject easy answers that equate ignorance with opposition and thoughtfulness with agreement (Arnett, 1992).

Such discourse requires understanding of opposing voices. Julia Wood connects standpoint theory to interpersonal communication, calling both parties to listen and learn from the other's socio-cultural standpoint. She outlines the importance of knowing one's socio-cultural position, understanding the other's position, and learning from one another (1997). Educational rhetoric assumes the learning style pointed to by Julia Wood, learning from the other and the public domain. Rhetoric in this light is not tied to persuading the other, but to discerning together the "best" temporal answers and directions to complex and unclear issues. Learning, not winning, is the key to educational rhetoric—learning from multiple standpoints that meet in the public domain.

Carroll Arnold conceptualized life as accountable to one rhetorical constant: "You state your case and you support it" (1974, p. 282). Carroll Arnold would view this moment as an opportunity to sharpen our rhetorical skills, offering insight for both the academy and the public. Rhetoric is the key to clarifying one's own position and understanding the position of the other. Rhetoric is situated in position, evidence and learning from the other. Nothing is so inherently important that rhetorical defense can be avoided. Ideas, positions, and departments on a campus must be rhetorically defended. In rhetorical articulation of a position we discover…, "that social environments cannot be fully understood without understanding the rhetorical discourse contained within them…" (1974, p.10). In a postmodern era of communicative confusion, rhetoric that clarifies ideas and defines our social environment is significantly needed.

Carroll Arnold's era is not lost, but is upon us once again. His voice reminds us that sincerity, integrity, and public engagement of ideas can often carry us well beyond expectations. Underdogs can win wars; faculty can shape the future of higher education. "*Ethos* is a powerful communicative force, and it is affected markedly by the ways a speaker seems to involve *himself with* the subject, his listeners, and their situation" (1974, p. 98). We must have integrity and competence that provides us with an *ethos* that propels active participants, not persons of lament. Educational rhetoric is carried into the public domain by those with a learning *ethos*.

Those with the *ethos* of a learning educational rhetoric encourage differing parties to decrease the focus on philosophical idealism and discern what is temporally appropriate. For the academy, perhaps, this conversation begins with the previously unthinkable—we are a *"business that must keep its soul."* This statement is a conviction that embodies rhetorical risk. Perhaps the statement accommodates too much. On the other hand, the risk of not meeting this "market driven" historical moment with the value added story and freedom of inquiry is even greater. An educator interested in educational rhetoric is more concerned about taking the risk to learn than appearing right. Carroll Arnold would embrace the risk of such rhetoric that calls us to be more interested in learning than winning with a predetermined argument. Educational rhetoric engages the Other in the public arena, ever willing to modify a position and learn from the other and this historical moment within which we are situated. Carroll Arnold modeled such an educational life. During our watch, we cannot afford to do less.

References

Ronald C. Arnett is Professor and Chair of the Department of Communication and Rhetorical Studies at Duquesne University.

Arnold, C. (1974). *Criticism of oral rhetoric.* Columbus, OH: Bell & Howell.

Arnold, C. (1985). Reflections on teaching communication. *Communication Education, 34*(1), 69-73.

Arnett, R.C. (1992). *Dialogic education: Conversation about ideas and between persons.* Carbondale: Southern Illinois University.

Arnett, R.C. (1997). Therapeutic communication: A moral *Cul de Sac*. In S.L. Longenecker (Ed.), *The dilemma of Anabaptist piety* (pp. 149-160). Bridgewater, VA: Forum for Religious Studies.

Bellah, R.N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W.M., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S.M. (1991). *The good society*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Frankl, V. (1978). *The unheard cry for meaning: Psychotherapy and humanism*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Fukuyama, F. (1990). Are we at the end of history? *Fortune 121*(2), 75.

Gilligan, C. (1982). *In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Harding, S. (1991). *Whose science? Whose knowledge?: Thinking from women's lives*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Hauerwas, S. (1981). *A community of character: Toward a constructive Christian social ethic*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Jacoby, R. (1987). *The last intellectuals: American culture in the age of academe*. New York: Basic Books.

Lasch, C. (1979). *The culture of narcissism: American life in an age of diminishing expectations*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Lasch, C. (1991). *The true and only heaven: Progress and Its critics*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Levinas, E. (1969). *Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority*. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.

MacIntyre, A (1984). *After virtue.* Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Manning, R.J.S. (1993). *Interpreting otherwise than Heidegger: Emmanuel Levinas's ethics as first philosophy.* Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.

Newman, J.H. (1996). *The idea of a university.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Niebuhr, R. (1960). *Leaves from the notebook of a tamed cynic.* New York: Meridian Books.

Rieff, P. (1987). *The triumph of the therapeutic: Uses of faith after Freud*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Said, E.W. (1998). The politics of knowledge. In R.C. Davis & R. Scheifer (Eds.), *Contemporary literary criticism: Literary and cultural studies* (4th ed., pp. 157-165). New York: Addison Wesley Longman.

Sennett, R. (1976). *The fall of public man.* New York: Norton.

Sykes, C. (1988). *ProfScam: Professors and the demise of higher education.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Wood, J. (1994). *Who cares?: Women, care, and culture.* Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Wood, J. (1997). Diversity in dialogue: Commonalities and differences between friends. In J.M. Makau & R.C. Arnett (Eds.), *Communication ethics in an age of diversity* (pp. 5-26). Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Bachelor's Degrees

Communication Studies

Communication/
Business Management

Minors
Communication Studies
Media

**Secondary Teacher
Certification**

Communication

CARLOW
COLLEGE
What you need to succeed

CARLOW COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION

STUDIES OFFERS:

- Award-winning teaching faculty
- Intensive career advisement
- Exceptional internship opportunities
- DVC Pro-based instructional TV-studio
- Active student chapter women in communication

FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT
MICHAEL BALMERT, Ph.D
PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR, COMMUNICATION STUDIES
412-578-6037 OR MBALMERT@CARLOW.EDU.

Duquesne University
Department of Communication & Rhetorical Studies
Dr. Ronald C. Arnett, Chair

Communication Skills •Technology • Character • Liberal Arts Tradition

Graduate Programs:
- Ph.D. in Rhetoric with emphasis areas in:
  o Communication Ethics
  o Interpretive Research
  o Interpersonal/Organizational Communication
  o Integrated Marketing and Public Communication
  o Communication Technology
  o Journalism
- M.A. in Rhetoric and the Philosophy of Communication
- M.A. in Corporate Communication
- M.S. in Multimedia Arts

Dual degrees in:
- M.A. in Communication/M.A. in Pastoral Ministry
- M.A. in Corporate Communication/M.S. in Multimedia Arts
- M.B.A./M.A. in Corporate Communication

Visit the graduate website at www.gradcomm.duq.edu

Undergraduate Majors:
- Communication Studies
- Journalism
- Media Communication

Visit the undergraduate website at www.communication.duq.edu

For more information call (412) 396-6460
e-mail: arnett@duq.edu

Duquesne University
600 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15282

The Ethical Difference

Walking the Humanities into the Marketplace

Department Of Speech Communication

Graduate Study in Ph.D. and M.A.

Degree Programs in:

- **Communication Theory**
- **Group Communication**
- **Health Communication**
- **Intercultural Communication**
- **Interpersonal Communication**
- **Media Studies**
- **Organizational Communication**
- **Public Address**
- **Rhetoric**

Graduate Assistantships Available

Contact:

J. Michael Hogan, Graduate Officer
Department of Speech Communication
234 Sparks Building
University Park, PA 16802
Phone: 814-865-3461
E-mail: jmh32@psu.edu
Web site: http://speechcomm.la.psu.edu/grad/welcome.htm