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Richard B. Gregg and the Rhetoric of Symbolic Inducement

What the Speech Teacher Knew

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Foreword: Entering the Conversation

Pat Arneson, Duquesne University

This volume of the Pennsylvania Scholars Series is dedicated to the scholarship of Professor Richard B. Gregg. The implications of his work for the field of human communication continue to resonate in his writings and in the scholarship of others. He touched the lives of many students and colleagues, several of whom include articles herein as a testament to his work and life.

The authors provide insight about Gregg’s scholarship that continues to endure. “Richard B. Gregg: Contributions to the Field of Communication” by Pat Arneson and Sarah M. Flinko provides an overview of Gregg’s rhetorical scholarship. In “Richard B. Gregg and the Rhetoric of Symbolic Inducement,” Martin J. Medhurst examines Gregg’s criticism of United States foreign policy rhetoric. Gerry Philipsen seeks to reclaim the knowledge and sensibilities to education exhibited by Gregg in “What the Speech Teacher Knew.” Mark Lawrence McPhail’s article “(Re)covering the Politics of Power: Richard Gregg and the Rhetoric of Race and Racism,” places Gregg’s ego-function within the context of his writings related to race and the politics of power. In “Rhetoric by Indirection: The Case of Anatoly Scharansky,” Gerard A. Hauser illustrates how indirection functions as a potential rhetorical form. Dale Cyphert reflects on conversations with Gregg about the primacy of the symbol and how rhetoric works in “Knowing about Knowing about Knowing about Knowing.” The “Afterword,” provided by Charles E. Morris III remembers Gregg’s eloquence of inducement.

In postmodernity, our focus on the immediate and individual has seemingly eclipsed our awareness of the past. Yet Gregg’s dedication to the study of rhetoric and his investment in the field of communication and the lives of others continues to influence understandings that inform our communicative creations.

Richard B. Gregg: Contributions to the Field of Communication

Pat Arneson, Duquesne University and Sarah M. Flinko, Duquesne University

Richard Bevve Gregg (1936–2001) dedicated his academic career to the study of rhetoric. Born and reared in Kansas, Gregg majored in speech at University of Wichita, earning his Bachelor's degree in 1959. He completed both his Master of Arts degree (1961) and his Ph.D. (1963) at the University of Pittsburgh in Pennsylvania (Benson 1). Following his education, Gregg accepted a faculty position at The Pennsylvania State University, where he would continue to pursue his interest in evidence and argumentation.

In the fall of 1963 both Gregg and Carroll C. Arnold joined other faculty members in what is now the Department of Communication Arts and Sciences at Penn State. Gregg attributed much of his success to Arnold, who taught him “if one could not explain complex phenomena so that an intelligent college sophomore . . . [could] understand it, then one did not understand the phenomena well enough” (Gregg, “Exploring the Cognitive” 6). Gregg’s ability to explain ideas in a comprehensible manner complemented his emphasis on debate: deliberation and decision-making in a democracy are reached through public deliberation. Gregg’s commitment to argumentation within the public sphere is reflected in his extensive body of research.

This essay provides a glimpse into Gregg’s scholarship, highlighting 35 of his scholarly publications. His writings traverse rhetorical topics including perception, cognition, criticism, and symbolic inducement within the realms of politics and education. Gregg also provided various maps to aid others in reading the field of human communication. He did so by compiling reports and indexes to literature in the field as well as numerous book reviews. Gregg’s writing continues to significantly contribute to the ways we understand human communication.

Rhetorical Scholarship

Richard B. Gregg’s contributions to our understandings of human communication lie primarily in his investigations of rhetoric. A chronological review of his rhetorical publications reveals the depth of his interests in this area. Gregg’s scholarship enfolded topics, holistically braiding together various constructs as he broadened his understanding of rhetoric in human communication.

While Gregg was a doctoral student at University of Pittsburgh, he published “Implications of Schiller’s Logic for Rhetorical Theory” (1962). Schiller claimed that truth is personal; absolute, universal truths about social issues will never be found. Gregg explained, “in other words, different people will look for truth in different ways, and various situations will demand diversified methods of verification” (32). Schiller asserted that various fields will have different standards and criteria for truth. Field-dependent criteria guide judgments. Gregg recognized that this awareness “discards the idea that formal logic provides the best method for weighing proof, and leaves the critic free to apply the appropriate standards to the argument in question” (35). Gregg perceived that the flexibility inherent within Schiller’s approach offers a profound contribution to the study of argumentation and rhetoric.

Continuing his work on rhetoric and language, Gregg focused on the value of linguistic analysis for determining meaning within rhetorical transactions. He published
“Let Us Look to Our Tools” (1962) in which he proposed the need for “a study of the semantic problems of language, how and why communication breaks down in the speaking situation, and some suggestions on how to avoid this failure” (14). One of the problems Gregg identified resides within the complexity of linguistic meanings. Words and symbols vary across contexts, providing possibilities for misinterpretation. Gregg suggested that one’s ability to analyze context aids in avoiding linguistic misinterpretation. His publications already foreshadowed his later writings on symbolic inducement.

Gregg’s doctoral dissertation, “The Contemporary Applicability of the Legal Rules of Testimonial Evidence for Argument” (1962), was chaired by his major advisor Robert P. Newman. Other members of the committee included Edwin Black, Theodore Clevenger, Jr., and William Schultz. Upon completion of his Ph.D. Gregg relocated to Penn State University as a faculty member. His first publication as an assistant professor, “Some Psychological Aspects of Argument” (1964), was published in Western Speech. In that essay he examined the psychological components of argumentation in the classroom and in academic debate. Gregg acknowledged the presence of both logical and non-logical components in argumentation. He emphasized the role of non-logical phenomena in the process of judgment, a vital aspect of argumentation.

[N]on-logical factors which permeate and shape our reasoning habits also influence our acceptance and rejection of the evidence, or factual support of an argument. . . . The significant thing to recognize is that we may choose one particular set of facts over another primarily because of preconceptions or desires and not as a result of careful evaluation. (“Some Psychological Aspects” 228)

Non-logical dimensions of reasoning became increasingly important to Gregg’s work, especially as he considered the relationships between phenomenological and psychological orientations to rhetoric.

Gregg published “A Phenomenologically Oriented Approach to Rhetorical Criticism” in 1966. That essay provided “an introduction to rhetorical criticism based upon the phenomenological interest in cognitive structuring” (83). In an explication of “cognitive imagery in communication” (85), Gregg noted that “the rhetorical critic who approaches his task phenomenologically is interested in these and other images which the rhetor constructs through his discourse and the methods he uses to construct them” (89). He identified several advantages of the use of the phenomenological orientation in rhetorical criticism. Gregg concluded: “[T]o concentrate on evidence alone, without also examining the ideas being supported by the evidence, and ultimately the over-all conceptualizations supported or attacked by the ideas, seems a questionable method at best. A phenomenological approach demands a holistic analysis of the rhetorical act” (90). In his subsequent research Gregg consistently sought to holistically understand the complexities of a rhetorical situation.

The 1960s was a time of social unrest in the United States. People actively engaged in discussions of social issues including civil rights, sexuality and women’s liberation, American foreign policy, and national involvement in the Vietnam War. People were seeking ways to understand and respond to conflicting messages. Gregg perceived that rhetorical criticism offers a means for evaluating various perspectives in one’s reasoning about human activity.
In 1967 Gregg published “The Study of Rhetorical Criticism,” in which he explained that a rhetorical critic engages in the analysis of a rhetorical transaction. He described a rhetorical transaction as “the interaction that occurs between the rhetor (one who attempts to influence), the linguistic message (which constitutes the discursive instrument of persuasion), and the auditor (who may react both to the rhetor and his message)” (39). The importance of evidence in rhetorical criticism prompted Gregg to publish “The Rhetoric of Evidence” the same year. He “delineate[d] some of the possible interactions between evidence and belief, the rhetorical patterns in which evidence may function as auditors’ react to arguments” by examining multiple dimensions of evidence (181). He emphasized that “individual perception, in terms of what is perceived and how it is perceived, seems to be generally dependent upon three primary factors: the nature of the stimuli, an observer’s expectations as influenced by prior learning and experience, and an observer’s emotional state at the time of perception” (182). Following this publication, Gregg would highlight the importance of perception as well as non-logical dimensions of reasoning in his study of rhetoric.

As a faculty member of rhetoric on a state university campus during the 1960s, Gregg was drawn into discussions related to tumultuous societal changes. During the summer of 1967, Gregg and A. Jackson McCormack taught an oral communication course in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Harrisburg as a location “had several predominantly Negro neighborhoods with high unemployment rates [and] no communication program of any type operating for the unemployed in or near the city” (Gregg and McCormack 25). The course was delivered in various locations, including a YMCA, a church basement, and an open room in a warehouse (Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen 2). Three publications emerged from that experience.

In “Whitey Goes to the Ghetto: A Personal Chronicle of a Communication Experience with Black Youths” (1969), Gregg and McCormack reflected on their experience delivering a ten week public speaking course to 40 black youths living in a Harrisburg “ghetto” (25). They concluded that the white faculty members best served in roles as advisors and listeners, in which the black youth were free to engage in self-identification.

In “The Rhetoric of Black Power: A Street-Level Interpretation” (Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen 1969), the authors noted that students in the class “talked constantly about the need to ‘know’ themselves in order to be men and escape from white subjugation” (152). The students emphasized that self-knowledge was the key to “psychological emancipation” (153). Their discussion was “concerned with creating a new frame of reference and imposing a new set of perceptions and values” (157), resonating with Gregg’s earlier contention that human perception informs social interaction.

In 1970, Gregg, McCormack, and Douglas J. Pedersen published a third article about their teaching experience, “A Description of the Interaction between Black Youth and White Teachers in a Ghetto Speech Class.” Throughout that summer term, they questioned “whether representatives of two cultures could find a way to accept each other’s difference and maintain cultural authenticity while establishing communication essential in beneficial co-existence” (8). By the end of the ten weeks, they reported that “mutual acceptance had occurred” (8). These three publications illustrate Gregg’s interest in education, as well as his desire to understand the role of cognition and cultural evidence in theoretical and practical rhetoric.
Concurrent with scholarship addressing Gregg’s instructional experiences, *Speech Behavior and Human Interaction* (Borden, Gregg, and Grove 1969) was published. The book echoed Gregg’s claim that people desire to attain self-knowledge in conversation with others. George A. Borden, Richard B. Gregg, and Theodore G. Grove wrote, “If the book helps you to better understand your own communicative behavior and that of others, if you are stimulated to probe more deeply into the unexplored and unanswered problems the researchers detect, we [the authors] will feel gratified” (6). The authors asserted that to best understand public messages, communication studies scholars must begin with a consideration of individual rather than group member behaviors. The organizational structure of the book reflects this theoretical orientation. The text begins with a discussion of individual communication patterns, moves next to situations of face-to-face communication, and finally addresses public communicative practices.

Gregg was interested in aspects that inform the construction of public rhetorical messages. In “Extemporaneous Speaking: Structuring Messages” (1970) he suggested that speakers consider the constraints of extemporaneous public speaking. These constraints include brief preparation time and a need for the use of clear language. He identified six conceptual schemes one could use in structuring extemporaneous speeches: time sequences, spatial relationships, categories, problem-solution, cause-effect, and comparison-contrast. Structuring a message enhances a person’s ability to more readily construct extemporaneous rhetoric that incorporates logical evidence to buttress one’s claims. However, Gregg also recognized the presence of non-logical issues in the construction of a message.

Thomas Benson identified “The Ego-Function of the Rhetoric of Protest” (1971) as one of Gregg’s “most famous essays” (1). In that work, Gregg identified the prominence of ego-function in protest rhetoric. He examined the nature of rhetorical transaction, noting that in the rhetoric of protest “the escalation of demands . . . appears to those in positions of power, reacting to the rhetoric, to foreclose meaningful discussion” (73). In protest, rhetoric becomes “self-addressed”; the self is the “primary audience” and the expression of rhetoric allows one to “affirm self-hood” (74). Gregg noted that “by identifying against an other, one may delineate his own positions” (82). By contrasting and attacking an other, “protestors appear to experience and express feelings of ego-enhancement, ego-affirmation, and even ego-superiority” (84). The prominence of ego-function in protest rhetoric reflects Gregg’s ongoing interest in the psychology of argument.

Gregg examined political rhetoric from the perspective of protesters and government politicians alike. In 1971 he wrote “Organized Politics: Parties and Bosses” for the larger scholarly work *A History of Public Speaking in Pennsylvania*. Gregg’s chapter was “concerned . . . with an examination of political rhetoric in Pennsylvania, with some of the Keystone State’s political leaders, and with the methods they used to attempt to secure their ends” (210). Pointing to the major role that the state of Pennsylvania played in the establishment of democracy in the United States, Gregg asserted that the “factionalism, vituperation, and narrow parochialism” underlying Pennsylvanian politics marred rhetorical messages in the political arena (210). The rise of newspapers, television, and other media brought about a ritualistic shift in the nature of political rhetoric, prompting Gregg to ask “Will the costs of television campaigning restrict political office to the wealthy” (227)? He noted that socio-economic conditions within the state affected both the dissemination and role of rhetoric.
In 1973, Gregg and Gerard A. Hauser co-authored “Richard Nixon’s April 30, 1970 Address on Cambodia: The ‘Ceremony’ of Confrontation” published in *Speech Monographs*. They examined President Nixon’s televised address informing the nation that the Vietnam War would expand into Cambodia. The public interpreted Nixon’s political rhetoric as part of an ongoing “pattern of perception established during the years of the Johnson Administration” in which official messages noting the positive outcomes of United States military strikes in North Vietnam directly contrasted reports from the media at large. The authors recognized Nixon’s address to be “a speech of policy justification” (169). Nixon’s justificatory rhetoric perpetuated a pattern of misperception and increased the tension between the American public, the media, and the government. Gregg began to seek a potential genesis for this pattern of public misperception in political rhetoric.

In “The 1966 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on Vietnam Policy: A Phenomenological Analysis” (1973), also published in 1973, Gregg identified the conclusions of the Committee hearings as a “potential force for [public] attitude change” (226). Working within a phenomenological orientation, Gregg recognized the importance of human perception in forming and potentially shifting one’s attitude. Gregg explained that “ideological positions expressed during the committee hearings reveals the kind of perceptual differences of opinion which were being more openly verbalized in public discussion” (230). He asserted that “in the long run the perceptual differences we just examined have the potential for profound impact on foreign policy” (238). More importantly, in the short-run the Senate Hearings “provided an authorized Constitutional setting for a debate on an issue particularly salient to the public” (241). The perceptual differences that were shared reinforced “the American ideal” of participation in the formation and sustainability of government and held profound importance for Gregg.

Gregg’s article “A Perceptual Approach to Rhetorical Study” (1975) discussed the problems associated with the neo-Aristotelian approach, including being “overly-rigid” (161). He advocated “new rhetorical forms” (161) that recognize the integral relationship between language and perception. He asserted that various aspects of communication interpenetrate one another: “no one message or part of the dialogue can be isolated for examination without distorting the holistic impact the dialogue will have” (169). Perceptions shape one’s interpretation of a rhetorical message as the message shapes one’s perceptions; they are holistically interconnected.

Gregg was also concerned with misperception in the deliverance of rhetorical messages. In “A Rhetorical Re-Examination of Arthur Vandenberg’s ‘Dramatic Conversion,’ January 10, 1945” (1975) Gregg examined Vandenberg’s Senate Chamber speech in which he announced his internationalist stance on foreign policy. Gregg argued that the “‘dramatic conversion’ interpretation of the Vandenberg speech is incorrect. . . . [W]hile a number of factors may have motivated Vandenberg to speak, he had one primary objective; namely, to induce President Roosevelt to articulate more openly and publicly his foreign policy objectives and programs” (155). Vandenberg had been gradually expanding away from his earlier isolationist view of foreign policy. “The Senator was not announcing any dramatic shift in this thinking, for one had not occurred. He was trying to get President Roosevelt to speak with honesty and candor to Congress and the American Public” (160). Perception—and misperception—influences human reaction and interaction.
Politically-charged messages shaped by the media interested Gregg. In “The Rhetoric of Political Newscasting” (1977) Gregg posed the question: “What are some ways sets of messages produced by television news lead us to know and judge political events, political leadership and political institutions?” (222). Gregg explained that “discrete one or two or three-minute narrative formats [in newscasting] result in the isolation, separation, and segmentation of events which may, in fact, impinge upon one another in reality” (224). Television narratives separate one’s perception by foregrounding a particular feature, isolating it from experiences that are ordinarily interconnected in everyday life. Short television narratives are abstracted from a holistic understanding of the social context, foregrounding particular features and potentially creating mis-understandings.

Gregg engaged rhetorical criticism in his everyday life and regularly examined the act of criticism in his writing. In “Rhetorical Criticism: The Quintessential Human Act” (1978) Gregg detailed the judgments a rhetorical critic makes to understand an argument. He asserted that all speech has the possibility of persuasion, whether spontaneous or planned. The rhetorical critic, said Gregg, “may examine, analyze, and judge the suasory function and potential of any symbolic interaction whatsoever” (5). Gregg educated students to critically consider arguments to which they were exposed in the public sphere.

In 1978 Gregg also examined how the theoretical works of Kenneth Burke contribute to an understanding of perception. In “Kenneth Burke’s Prolegomena to the Study of the Rhetoric of Form” Gregg examined Burke’s discussion of the symbolic, maintaining that Burke was “not assuming a simple stimulus-response action between man and his environment in which the forms of human cognition grow from sensory awareness. Rather . . . [Burke] assumes man is an active shaper of his knowing” (4). The cognitive level of human activity includes both psychological and perceptual dimensions, which inform the perspective one takes on a social phenomenon.

In “Rhetoric and Knowing: The Search for Perspective” (1981), Gregg considered cognitive human activity. Gregg identified “a set of ambiguously formulated assumptions holding that there is a mode of rhetorical knowing, or a way of knowing rhetorically, or that certain conditions may allow the processes of rhetoric to instantiate some kind of knowledge” (133). He offered three descriptive distinctions regarding knowledge as a social phenomenon. The “first distinction suggests that there is a difference between social knowledge and personal or private knowledge and that rhetoric is somehow concerned with the former (135). He explained that language and meaning are both social and that constant interaction occurs between private and social knowledge. The second distinction “is to categorize knowledge in terms of its explicit or implicit nature” (138). To assume that what is social is also necessarily explicit, Gregg argued, is “mistaken” (138). His final distinction recognized that “all areas of knowledge are human symbolic constructs guided by various human purposes in light of various human needs” (141). All knowledge is symbolic, “cognitive processing is tinged with affective state,” and “there is evidence which links comprehension with purpose and intention” (142, 143). Gregg concluded, “the study of rhetoric is the study of symbolic inducement . . . [occurring within] cognitive, systemic and social activity” (144). One’s knowledge about a social issue and openness to symbolic inducement on that subject may be shaped by perceived authority figures, such as news reporters.

In “Middle East Conflict as a TV News Scenario: A Formal Analysis” (1982), Gregg and Richard L. Barton analyzed the CBS television station’s coverage of the
March 1978 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. They found “two dominant, mutually supporting patterns of meaning—prediction and affirmation of network authority—are created by the interaction of conventional and organic formal elements of news” (172). The interplay between scenes from the invasion, authoritative tones, and conventional and organic forms resulted in the “shaping of a coherent unit, with the potential to satisfy the [viewer] expectancies it continually created” (184). The television news coverage maintains authority by creating audience expectations and then satisfying those expectations. The depth and range of Gregg’s rhetorical research provided him with the theoretical ground for identifying symbolic inducement as fundamental to rhetoric.

Gregg’s persevering interest in rhetoric in the public sphere led to his most well-known theoretical contribution, Symbolic Inducement and Knowing: A Study in the Foundations of Rhetoric (1984). Carroll C. Arnold elucidated the value of Gregg’s contribution in an introduction to that project: “Symbolic Inducement and Knowing deals with a fundamental question about humans as communicative beings: Do we ‘know’ because we perceive what is outside our skins . . . or do we ‘know’ the universe in direct symbol-less ways and then invent symbols by which to express our knowledge” (vii)? That work joined Gregg’s interests in perception, cognition, knowing, and human activity. For Gregg, perception allows one to know. Our “symbolic capacity is innately present in the mind-brain. . . . We must begin with what we know about the mind-brain, for whatever symbolizing, knowing, and inducing are, they are functions of mind-body” (22). Gregg posited that “rhetoric is the study of symbolic inducement as it manifests itself in neurophysiological, cognitive, and social levels of human activity” (149). To better understand Gregg’s lifelong exploration of symbolic inducement, we offer a brief explanation of each level of human activity.

One of Gregg’s central interests was humans’ neurophysiological capabilities in the process of making and interpreting symbols. For Gregg, our experiences (which encapsulate all that we can know) as well as the meaning that emerges in communicative interactions is possible because of our ability to engage in and respond to symbolic behavior. The way that one’s mind-brain processes information and experiences is directly tied to the use of symbols. Cognitive activity enables people to understand and respond to rhetorical stimuli. Gregg understood one’s cognitive capacities to be “a set of ambiguously formulated assumptions holding that there is a mode of rhetorical knowing, or a way of knowing rhetorically, or that certain conditions may allow the processes of rhetoric to instantiate some kind of knowledge” (Symbolic Inducement 133). Rhetorical knowing is a social phenomenon. There is “a difference between social knowledge and personal or private knowledge . . . rhetoric is somehow concerned with the former” (135). A person categorizes knowledge “in terms of its explicit or implicit nature” (138). Further, “all areas of knowledge are human symbolic constructs guided by various human purposes in light of various human needs” (141). Gregg illustrated the neurophysiological, cognitive, and social aspects of symbolic inducement by considering political rhetoric.

Political rhetoric, for Gregg, reflects conditions of society and the environment. In “Watergate Rhetoric: Apologia and Character” (1984) Gregg examined specific rhetorical instances of speech from several individuals involved in the Watergate scandal. He stated that “these accounts can be seen to fall into the genre of apologia, that is, of personal explanation” (269). Gregg recognized the centrality of perception in their communication: “each participant would view the affair largely from his own vantage point, colored by the growing realizing that events could have personal
consequences for him” (270). Perceptions serve as important starting points for the rhetoric of elected politicians.

Gregg’s work constructing a theory of symbolic inducement was elaborated in “The Criticism of Symbolic Inducement: A Critical-Theoretical Connection” (1985). Gregg adopted a “meta-critical perspective” in which he addressed the question of the impact of new rhetorical criticism theories (42-43). Gregg proposed that “in order to provide viable interpretations of rhetorical situations, rhetorical critics must deal with the perceptual and experiential worlds of the participants in those situations” (46). He examined two instances of rhetorical criticism that remain attentive to symbolic inducement, explaining that “both place emphasis on the engagement of certain symbolic or cognitive capacities of the audience with the symbolic structuring of messages; both indicate that the meanings evoked exceed the literal structures in messages” (57). He concluded that inducement is an active engagement of others, particularly in an audience, that encourages members of the audience to behave and to act on their own through persuasion. This active engagement of others was a vital component of Gregg’s rhetorical scholarship, particularly as it occurs in the political sphere.

The public generally perceives presidential election years to be historical markers. Gregg analyzed the rhetoric of presidential candidates in the 1980 election in his article “The Rhetoric of Denial and Alternity” (1989). He stated, “my primary purpose is not to examine the two sets of samples for their own sake, but to reach beyond them to uncover the ideology that might be giving them life” (387). Gregg recognized Edward M. Kennedy’s use of rhetoric as perpetuating an obsolete traditional liberal ideology; he interpreted Ronald Reagan’s rhetoric as encapsulating the traditional value of American individualism while pushing for change (393-394). Gregg noted that the media places an obligation on candidates to be dramatic, rather than addressing issues. He desired “conceptual transformation, aided and abetted by various sorts of rhetorical messages” (415). Gregg’s own rhetoric was designed to symbolically induce others’ in constructing their own messages.

Gregg wrote a second piece on Burkian philosophy and perception in 1993. In “Kenneth Burke’s Concept of Rhetorical Negativity,” Gregg noted that language elucidates individual perception and drives rhetorical negativity. Gregg addressed Burke’s concept of “the negative,” stating that negatives are complex and derive meaning from “positive others” (191). He asserted that “wherever there is symbolic meaning, negativity is present, influencing the outcomes of rhetorical interaction and awaiting the disclosure and explication of the rhetorical critic” (207). Burke announced the referential power of language; we perceive and define an object or idea by determining what it is not. Rhetorical negativity is an important contributing construct in symbolic inducement theory.

In “The Rhetoric of Distancing: Eisenhower’s Suez Crisis Speech, October 31, 1956” (1994), Gregg examined Eisenhower’s speech through his own understanding of symbolic inducement, analyzing each paragraph as subject to human perception. Gregg recognized that a successful speech “distanc[es] a multitude of ancient and contemporaneous exigencies, and in so doing, achieves its objective” (161). Eisenhower’s speech “reveals the constraints of the moment” (160-161). Eisenhower distanced himself from political issues and the current campaign by establishing the importance of bipartisanship within his speech. This distancing further reveals the power of symbolic inducement in political rhetoric.
Gregg also published “Rhetorical Strategies for a Culture War: Abortion in the 1992 Campaign” in 1994. In that piece, he considered the concept of a culture war, which he defined to be “about matters that are perceived to be of fundamental importance [to various publics] and about issues that need to be addressed in ultimate terms” (230-231). The issue of abortion influenced the rhetorical strategies of both presidential candidates William J. Clinton and George H. W. Bush on the topic of family values in the 1992 campaign. Gregg analyzed symbolic inducement in the rhetoric of imagery, especially in terms of the image of an aborted infant that permeated political campaigning.

Gregg focused on the cognitive area of symbolic inducement in “The Mind’s I, The Mind’s We, The Mind’s They: A Cognitive Approach to the Rhetorical Analysis of Public Discourse” (1998). He considered cognitive developments that take place in one’s interaction with his or her external environment as well as in one’s “intentions and purposes” (245). Gregg claimed the human mind-brain to be an important level in symbolic inducement, significant in deriving meaning about one’s social situation.

“Embodied Meaning in American Public Discourse during the Cold War” (2004) was Gregg’s final work, published posthumously. In that essay he offered a contextualized understanding of embodied meaning in an analysis of American public discourse throughout the Cold War. Gregg drew upon metaphor as a way to organize and to understand human thought and understanding. He wrote, “Scholars of rhetoric understand that metaphor is a thoroughly rhetorical cognitive practice” (60). The use of metaphors in the Cold War evoked visceral reactions from the American public. Such metaphors include “containment” (66), a comparison of Communists to a “swarm of rats” (67), and the phrase “the cancer of communism” (68). These embodied meanings shaped the climate of opinion in America during that time.

Throughout Gregg’s academic life, his scholarship incorporated rhetorical topics including perception, cognition, criticism, and symbolic inducement within the realms of politics and education. His scholastic contribution was not limited to generating theoretical insights about rhetoric. He was also interested in aiding the intellectual endeavors of others, which he did by providing some of the earliest maps of the field of communication studies.

Mapping the Field

In addition to Richard B. Gregg’s rhetorical scholarship, he was also concerned with summarizing the past and building the future of the field of communication studies. He worked to ensure that others’ scholarship was duly recognized, identified trends in graduate education, and sought to define the future of rhetorical criticism as well as the field of communication studies.

Gregg joined Robert E. Dunham and L. S. Harms in creating the Revised Index and Table of Contents of Regional Speech Journals (Dunham, Harms, and Gregg 1966). The volume includes tables of contents and indexes terms for several regional speech journals including Southern Speech (1935-1965), Western Speech (1937-1965), Central States Speech (1949-1965), and Today’s Speech (1953-1965). This archival research preceded the well-known “Matlon Index” (Matlon and Matlon, “Table of Contents”; Matlon and Matlon, Index to Journals; Matlon and Ortiz) and contemporary online databases including EBSCO Host (which underwrites Communication and Mass Media Complete) and JSTOR, among others. Gregg’s citation work exhibits an interest in
supporting other communication scholars as well as the future of the communication studies field.

The “Wingspread Conference” to discuss the future of rhetoric was held from January 25-27, 1970, at the Wingspread Conference Center in Racine, Wisconsin. Gregg served on the “Committee on the Advancement and Refinement of Rhetorical Criticism” along with Thomas O. Sloan, Thomas R. Nilson, Irving J. Rein, Herbert W. Simons, Herman G. Stelzner, and Donald W. Zacharias. Members of the Committee met from May 10-15, 1970 in St. Charles, Illinois. In their report, they explained that a critic is rhetorical “to the extent that he studies his subject in terms of its suasory potential or persuasive effect” (220). The most important functions of rhetorical criticism are to “(1) contribute to rhetorical theory or (2) illumine contemporary rhetorical transactions” (Sloan, Gregg, Nilsen, Rein, Simons, Stelzner, and Zacharias 222). Committee members recognized that rhetorical critics examined discourse in various forms including television, film, song, books, magazines, and public letters. Gregg’s knowledge of rhetorical criticism also made him a leader in graduate education.

In “Trends in Graduate Education: The Study of Rhetoric” (1978), Gregg discussed the state of graduate education—particularly rhetorical education—at the end of the decade. He noted that flexibility and adaptability were central for employment in the marketplace. Gregg explained, “for me, the most interesting new direction for rhetorical study is beginning to focus sharply on the constitutive quality of symbolic behavior” (28). Placing rhetorical study at the forefront of education Gregg noted, “we are beginning to understand how fundamental rhetorical behavior is to human knowing, doing, and being. What lies ahead for rhetorical study is the challenge of intellectual exploration made possible by such knowing” (28). Rhetorical study aids students in contributing to the marketplace and in constructing a better society. His contribution to the Wingspread Conference and examination of trends in graduate education are complemented by his work on the future of the field.

The edited volume *Toward the Twenty-First Century: The Future of Speech Communication* (1995) was the product of a six-year project led by Julia T. Wood and Gregg. Then Speech Communication Association (SCA) president Michael Osborn charged contributors with defining “questions critical to collective identity and mission, to situate those within cultural horizons, and to initiate thinking about how the field should address the questions as we stand on the threshold of a new century” (Gregg and Wood 2). Editors Wood and Gregg called upon individuals who participated in two mini-conferences during the 1989 SCA convention to identify “interests and concerns designated as pressing by their constituencies and these were then explored by the group as a whole” (Gregg and Wood 3). Conferences “generated four questions deemed critical to the field’s scholarship and teaching in the 21st century” (Gregg and Wood 4). From those questions, chapters within the work were organized into four sections: technology and communication; definitions of communication; diversity and communication; and communication, power, and order. According to contributor Dennis Gouran, “in one way or another, each contributor has shown concern about the ways in which research and teaching have become focused at the expense of matters that may be as, or more, important to understand about how communication functions as those that have historically received the lion’s share of attention” (220). Drawing attention to what is foregrounded and backgrounded in a field of inquiry reminds readers of the importance of a holistic understanding of human communication.
Gregg’s knowledge of and interest in the whole of communication studies are indicated in his work on the citation index, participation in determining the future of rhetorical criticism, providing information about graduate programs, and crafting the edited volume considering the future of communication studies. He also reviewed numerous books, which provided additional insight for scholars as well as enriching his own scholarly interests. His work braided the past, present, and future of rhetorical inquiry. Throughout his career Gregg was interested in the work of scholars within the field of communication studies as well as how contributions from other academic disciplines could further our investigations and understanding of human communication.

Conclusion

Richard B. Gregg’s commitment to the field of communication studies is reflected in his extensive body of work. His contributions to the study of rhetoric in human communication are best illustrated in Symbolic Inducement and Knowing: A Study in the Foundations of Rhetoric, which brought to the field a deep appreciation of human perception and interpretation in both the act of persuasion and the study of persuasion. Reviewing his expansive works, we recognize that Gregg took to heart an idea he initially inscribed in his dissertation: “Much of our trouble is caused by lazy habits of mind which constantly need correcting and an understanding of what those habits are is invaluable to self-correction” (“The Contemporary Applicability” 132). We are the beneficiaries of Gregg’s scholarly habits; his intellectual contributions continue to resonate in contemporary studies of rhetoric.
Works Cited


Richard B. Gregg and the Rhetoric of Symbolic Inducement

Martin J. Medhurst, Baylor University

I was first introduced to the scholarship of Richard B. Gregg in my M.A. program at Northern Illinois University. It was the fall of 1974 and the course was “The Rhetoric of Social Protest,” taught by Richard L. Johannesen. We read Gregg’s much-cited article on the “ego-function” of protest rhetoric (“The Ego-Function of the Rhetoric of Protest”). The next year, still at NIU, I would read Gregg’s chapter on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Vietnam hearings published in Explorations in Rhetorical Criticism, edited by G. P. Mohrmann, Charles J. Stewart, and Donovan J. Ochs (“The 1966 Foreign Relations Committee’s Hearings on Vietnam Policy”). Little did I know in that 1975-76 school year that I would soon be studying with Dick Gregg and within four years would become G. P. Mohrmann’s colleague. But that is exactly what happened.

When I arrived at Penn State on a bright August day in 1976, the first person I met on campus was Dick Gregg. Dick was serving as Director of Graduate Studies and was thus the contact person for all incoming graduate students. I do not remember much of the substance of what we discussed that day, but I do remember the ambiance distinctly. First was the smell of cigarette smoke as I entered his office. Those were the days in which faculty could still smoke in their offices, and Dick took full advantage of the privilege. He put out his cigarette as I entered and I couldn’t help but notice the numerous butts and mounds of ash in the small ashtray he was using. This man was a serious smoker. That was the olfactory impression. Visually, the entire office seemed to center on the large whiteboard that adorned one wall. On it was a visual layout—a map or chart really—of Kenneth Burke’s rhetorical theory. I found the chart fascinating but also a little scary. This man was a serious Burkean.

Like most beginning Ph.D. students, I was a bit in awe of the campus, the faculty, and my fellow graduate students. The whole experience of going off to another state (I had lived my entire life in Illinois up to that point), meeting famous professors whose works I’d been reading, encountering students from all over the country, and trying to navigate a mega-university campus was somewhat breathtaking. Dick Gregg helped put it all into perspective. He immediately made me feel welcome. I know that we talked about my interests and that at one point I must have said something about religion because no sooner had I mentioned that magic word than Dick decided that my interim advisor should be Eugene E. White. Dr. White was the nation’s leading expert on Puritan rhetoric—not exactly the kind of religious discourse I had in mind. But Gregg’s job was to distribute the incoming students more or less evenly across the faculty. I would soon switch advisors from Gene White to Tom Benson, but all three—Gregg, White, and Benson—would become valued members of my doctoral committee.

Dick Gregg had been on the Penn State faculty for 13 years when I arrived in Happy Valley. He joined the faculty right out of graduate school at the University of Pittsburgh, where he had completed his Ph.D. dissertation in 1963 under the direction of Robert P. Newman. His dissertation was on the applicability of the legal rules of testimonial evidence to public argument (“The Contemporary Applicability of the Legal Rules of Testimonial Evidence for Argument”). Several of Gregg’s early publications grew out of his interest in argumentation theory, including “Some Psychological Aspects of Argument” (1964) and “The Rhetoric of Evidence” (1967), both published...
in Western Speech. Although examination of arguments would always be an interest of Gregg’s, he would not become known as an argumentation theorist. Indeed, if there is any hint in his early work as to the future trajectory of his career, it was not the term “argument,” but the term “psychological.”

If Gregg’s interest in argument can be traced back to his studies with Newman, his interests in the psychology of the speech act can be traced to his work with another of his Pitt professors, Edwin Black. Black had just completed his own dissertation in 1962 in which he introduced the idea of psychological criticism, an orientation that would become widely discussed (though not widely practiced) with the publication of Black’s 1965 book Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method. Black’s own approach to psychological criticism would be heavily influenced by the psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud. But Gregg would take the psychological approach in a different, more philosophical, direction—toward phenomenology. Indeed, if there is a single strain that runs throughout the corpus of Gregg’s work after the mid-1960s it is his sustained effort to understand the phenomenological aspects of rhetoric.

Like Black, Gregg eschewed the search for “method” and adopted instead an “orientation” for examining rhetorical events. That orientation was phenomenology and it began with his article in the 1966 volume of the Central States Speech Journal entitled “A Phenomenologically Oriented Approach to Rhetorical Criticism.” In that article, Gregg noted that all human behavior “is a product of the individual’s perception of the event” (83). People form perceptions by being able to “intellectualize and symbolize” their environment into “cognitive structures” which then induce them to “act on the basis of those structures” (83). The critic’s task is to identify what those cognitive structures are and how they manifest themselves in rhetorical discourse. One way in which to do this is to search for the “underlying value judgments present in the discourse” (89). Since those value judgments will always reflect the larger environment into which the discourse enters, “a phenomenological approach forces the critic to focus on the larger context” (90).

For the next 35 years, Gregg would bring his phenomenological approach to bear on a wide variety of rhetorical artifacts, especially the social protest rhetoric of the 1960s and the rhetoric of United States foreign policy. He would also continue to write in a more theoretical vein about the relationships between and among language, thought, and knowing. This ongoing fascination with the human mind/brain would lead in 1984 to the publication of Symbolic Inducement and Knowing, a book for which he won the Winans-Wichelns Award for Distinguished Scholarship in Rhetoric and Public Address by the National Communication Association. All of these lines of research were well-established by the time I met Dick in 1976. All of them played major roles in his teaching as well as his research.

Penn State was on the quarter system when I arrived in the fall of 1976. The next quarter, in the winter of 1977, I took my first course from Dick Gregg—“The Philosophy of Criticism.” It was a small seminar with about ten people. What I most remember about the experience was Gregg’s attitude toward both the subject matter and his students. He was excited about rhetorical criticism, curious about the operations of the human mind, open to many different ideas and approaches, and encouraging of each student’s special interests and abilities. Unsurprisingly, much of the term was spent on Kenneth Burke and his ideas. It was an exciting class and one that proved especially valuable to my career, for it was in that first seminar with Gregg that I discovered what would become my dissertation topic—inaugural prayer. I wrote my term paper on the
invocation given by Bishop William Cannon at the 1977 inauguration of Jimmy Carter. Gregg loved the essay and urged me to submit it for publication. It was published later that year (Medhurst). And that’s how my personal relationship with Dick Gregg began.

I would take only one other formal course under Gregg, a senior/graduate-level course that was entitled “Contemporary American Political Rhetoric,” but which was really a course in the rhetoric of American foreign policy. Looking back, it is not hard to discern the influence of that course on my later career, though it would be a decade down the road before I would start writing about the Cold War and Dwight Eisenhower. Dick Gregg had planted the seed. Over the course of his career, Gregg would go on to publish at least six articles and chapters on foreign policy or Cold War rhetoric. Careful examination of those essays, along with his book Symbolic Inducement and Knowing (1984) and his chapter “The Criticism of Symbolic Inducement: A Critical-Theoretical Connection” (1985) will allow us to understand how Dick Gregg approached the art of rhetorical criticism and what his enduring contributions to that art have been.

**Gregg’s Criticism of United States Foreign Policy Rhetoric**

The six essays I want to examine span from 1973-2004; the 2004 chapter was published posthumously. They are:


To begin, we must recognize that Gregg’s perspective on criticism grew directly out of his commitment to phenomenology as orientation and mind/brain neurophysiology as biological fact. For Gregg, the structures and functions of the mind/brain (he refused to separate the two) are the foundation of everything. Nothing happens outside of mind/brain functioning. As he wrote in *Symbolic Inducement and*
Knowing, “all human experiencing is the result of brain processing which creates the structures we call ‘meaning’” (17). We can “know” nothing apart from the capacity of the brain to process and structure information. Therefore, the first important step is to learn the mechanisms by which the mind/brain does its processing and structuring, for it is those mechanisms that constitute the innate symbolic forms that all humans utilize and to which all humans respond.

According to Gregg, there are at least six such mechanisms: (1) edging or formatting of boundaries, (2) rhythm, (3) association, (4) classification, (5) abstraction, and (6) hierarchy. “Insofar as anything has meaning for us,” Gregg wrote, “it will have meaning in accord with these principles.” Why? Because “meaning in all its forms is generated in the human brain” (Symbolic Inducement and Knowing 50-51). There is, in Gregg’s view, nothing outside of human symbol use, or if there is, it is impossible to access because everything we “know” is mediated through the symbolic processes of the mind/brain. The task, then, for critics is to examine how these innate symbolic capacities interface with the particular environments into which the interlocutors enter. As Gregg noted, “In order to provide viable interpretations of rhetorical situations, rhetorical critics must deal with the perceptual and experiential worlds of the participants in those situations” (“The Criticism of Symbolic Inducement” 46). This is where phenomenology meets neurophysiology—in the concrete rhetorical situation.

Unlike some rhetorical scholars who counsel critics to place primary focus on the message element, Gregg held that the key to proper interpretation lies not in the message per se or the situation per se, but rather in the “perceptual and experiential worlds of humans in interaction with those characteristics and elements” (“The Criticism of Symbolic Inducement” 46). How an audience comes to perceive and experience a rhetorical world is the focus of Gregg’s criticism. To discover how audiences come to perceive and experience, Gregg advised that the critic seek out what he called “perceptual promontories” (52). What are perceptual promontories? They are statements or message elements or figures that “shape other statements placed around them” and that “operate to draw attention to certain ‘realities’ and cast others into shadow” (52). Such promontories might be stark contrasts, opposing lists, suggestive metaphors, rhythmic patterns, word associations, or any number of other features that correspond to the innate symbolic forms of the mind/brain.

Throughout Gregg’s critical corpus there are certain terms that recur: perception, patterns, relationships, ambiguities, intention, expectancy, structure, form, experiencing, repetition, and symbolic inducement chief among them. Such terms constitute the essential vocabulary for the performance of phenomenological criticism. For example, in his coauthored article on Nixon’s televised speech on the Cambodian incursion, Gregg and Hauser began with the assertion that there is a “pattern of perception” already established between what presidents have said about the progress of the Vietnam War versus what news reports have revealed, and that Nixon’s speech can readily be seen as participating in that pre-established pattern. In fact, according to Gregg and Hauser, “the Nixon announcement was perceived to fit the pattern all too well” (167). Thus it is this basic contrast between what Nixon says about the state of the war and the “symbolic connotations cast by its dramaturgical stance” (169) that forms the pivot point of the critical analysis. Gregg was constantly on the lookout for things that don’t quite go together—ambiguities, weaknesses, places where there is a surplus of meaning that is, perhaps, being downplayed, or hidden, or even denied. What he found in the last third of Nixon’s speech is “a Manachean world where the antagonists are
locked in heroic combat, and the rest of civilization and its future hangs in the balance” (173).

Likewise, in his chapter on “The 1966 Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Hearings on Vietnam,” Gregg noted that he was “concerned with the relationship between language and perception,” with perception being defined as “a set of readinesses to respond habitually associated with a particular stimulus array” (227). Gregg wrote: “we will be concerned with those linguistic patterns which project perceptual images, with possible reactions to the images, and with the way the rhetorical situation forced and focused public perception. . . . we shall be interested in the various perceptual ‘ambiguities’ which arose during the course of the hearings” (227-228). One of those ambiguities was the differing perceptions about the very nature of the Vietnam conflict. For Johnson administration spokespersons, Vietnam was a war of “external aggression which the North has repeatedly escalated.” But to opponents of the war, Vietnam was a civil conflict between North and South. Gregg notes that the very term “aggression” carried with it a moral valence and a history stretching back to Hitler’s violation of the Munich Pact. It connoted “images of naïve bargaining, of skillful duplicity, of erroneous faith, and of the inhumane, tragic aftermath” (232). Likewise, the term “civil war” had its own extensions and associations the effects of which were to render Vietnam an internal issue, to separate it from the march of International Communism, and to understand it not in the light of Munich but in reference to colonialism and its aftermath. Thus, Gregg found “two predominant perceptual patterns” at work, both of which involve ways of thinking and perceiving, ways of valuing, and ways of acting in the world (232).

In his examination of Arthur Vandenberg’s “Dramatic Conversion” speech, Gregg began by observing that “when we examine a rhetorical situation . . . we are watching various strands of human intention, expectancy, and perception weave themselves together with events to form a moment in time, the result of past moments, with the potential of influencing future moments” (157). Such was the case of the moment on January 10, 1945, when Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg, once a staunch isolationist, announced his support for the Roosevelt administration’s international peace efforts. While many observers, both then and later, described Vandenberg’s speech as a “conversion,” Gregg argued that it was no such thing, holding, instead, “that an analysis of the interacting constituents of the rhetorical situation existing on January 10, 1945, which emphasizes human intention, expectancy, and perception, uncovers a situation marked by ambiguity and shaped partly but importantly by accident” (156). In short, the Roosevelt administration perceived Vandenberg’s speech as agreement with its international peace-making efforts, soon to take shape in the form of the United Nations. But Vandenberg perceived no such thing. What he thought he was doing was forcing the Roosevelt administration to consult with the Senate and to engage both lawmakers and the public with “honest candor,” something that Vandenberg and other opposition leaders had found lacking during the war. Gregg noted that “the phrase ‘honest candor’ occurs throughout the speech, and always with emphasis” (163). It was precisely this repetition of the phrase that drew Gregg’s attention to its perceptual possibilities. And what he found is that the connotations and future expectations generated by “honest candor” as understood by Vandenberg were quite different from the way the phrase was interpreted by Roosevelt. Vandenberg’s intentions guided his motives just as FDR’s intentions guided his. And those intentions led both parties to perceive in line with their own expectations.
In all of his work, Gregg was fascinated by the idea of symbolic form. In his coauthored article with Richard Barton on how the Middle East conflict was covered by television news, they wrote:

If one is to account for the way form is manifest in its most complete sense, that is, the sense in which it is apprehended, comprehended, and appreciated, then one must examine the interaction of conventional and organic form. For any final product of human endeavor is a holistic presentation, comprised of materials never wholly raw because of the nature of human perception, materials that are further organized through limiting and shaping procedures guided by artistic or technical procedures. It may be, then, that “form” in television newscasting has not yet been adequately accounted for because the distinction between conventional and organic form, rather than their intermingling, has guided the explication. (Barton and Gregg 174)

Here Gregg articulated one of his foundational beliefs—that symbolic forms are always interactional both among themselves and with the environment into which they enter. In examining the news coverage, Barton and Gregg found “two major patterns,” which they labeled “prediction” and “affirmation of network authority” (176). That these patterns were intentional artistic choices is revealed by the detailed breakdown of the audio and video segments. Such patterns induced viewers to perceive the Middle East conflict in particular ways. But they were able to do so precisely because they participated in the kinds of innate forms that structure the human mind/brain. As Gregg had earlier written in his article “Kenneth Burke’s Prolegomena to the Study of the Rhetoric of Form”: “We must somehow conceive of form as shaped meaning which may emerge and be perceived in messages by readers or listeners or viewers. To fully understand that forms mean and that all meaning is formed is to bring together what we have heretofore thought of as form and content into a conceptual whole” (3). News reports are formed and they simultaneously participate in the forms of the human mind/brain. “Such concretized and individuated manifestations of form as those experienced in literature or rhetorical discourse,” Gregg wrote, “partake of the more general, generative, and foundational nature of symbolic form structured by the human mind interacting with its external environment” (4).

It was precisely this belief concerning the interaction of the organic (mind/brain) and conventional (artistically created) forms with the “external environment” that led Gregg to place such high importance on understanding the rhetorical situation. For it was the actors’ perceptions of the rhetorical situation that interfaced with their symbolic forming capacities and their intentionally chosen strategies to create the meanings which auditors were then invited or induced to accept. The rhetorical situation is therefore always a key component in how meaning gets created.

We can see the importance that Gregg placed on a thorough understanding of the rhetorical situation in his chapter on “The Rhetoric of Distancing: Eisenhower’s Suez Crisis Speech, 31 October 1956.” He began his analysis by “reviewing the days immediately preceding Ike’s speech” and concluded that “the context for Eisenhower’s speech was complex and variegated” (158, 161). Gregg found four historical constraints
that acted upon the speech: the establishment of the State of Israel, the need for Middle Eastern oil on the part of the British, Cold War ideology, and Eisenhower's public persona. These historical constraints interacted with such contemporary contextual factors as the conflict between the United States and Egypt over funding for the Aswan Dam, the surreptitious military planning on the part of Israel, France, and Great Britain with respect to an attack on the Suez Canal, and the fact that all of this was taking place in late October of an election year, with Ike standing for re-election. So central is a proper understanding of the rhetorical situation to Gregg's analysis that he spent twelve pages setting it up before turning to the speech itself.

When he does turn to the speech, Gregg wrote: "All public address . . . will invite members of the audience to perceive phenomena in a particular way, to adopt attitudes toward them, to evaluate and value them, and to situate them in a larger symbolic context. In so doing, it will necessarily be selective, emphasizing some options while closing off others, and ignoring some possibilities altogether" ("The Rhetoric of Distancing" 169). Eisenhower began the speech by symbolically distancing himself from politics and partisanship and announcing that he will present only the "essential facts." But like all facts, Ike's were selective and weighted. As Gregg noted: "As strategy, the speech operated to distance the events, to which Eisenhower refers, from the United States and thus from any major concern of the American public. This was accomplished by bracketing events and by placing boundaries around them in such a way that the arena of action was not allowed to impinge upon vital concerns of the country" (176). Eisenhower strategically chose to leave out many "facts," particularly those that might suggest a more active American presence in Eastern Europe or the ongoing concern within the administration of Soviet intervention in the Middle East.

Gregg clearly saw Eisenhower's intention as one of distancing the problems in the Middle East from the concerns of the American people and his strategy for doing so as one of selective exposure intended to guide perceptions of the situation into politically safe channels. As Gregg concluded: "What emerges from beneath Eisenhower's speech of 31 October 1956, a speech of idealism, upholding principle, law, and international commitment, all in the name of securing peace, is a world of realpolitik" ("The Rhetoric of Distancing" 184). That world becomes visible in Gregg's critique only by locating the speech with respect to the overall rhetorical situation of American Cold War policies and politics. Indeed, it is the situational background in interaction with the symbolic forms utilized in the speech that ultimately reveal the meaning of the moment.

Gregg's final essay, published three years after his death, is "Embodied Meaning in American Public Discourse during the Cold War." This is a short chapter in the book Metaphorical World Politics, edited by Francis A. Beer and Christl De Landtsheer and, like the book itself, is devoted to metaphor as a cognitive process that "induces us to act in accord with one set of attitudes, feelings, values, and intentions while blinding us to other possibilities" (60). Gregg wrote that metaphor "provides us with the schema and orderings that make sense of our experiences. It initiates perception, conception, intention, and action. It is partial, and thus biased in the presentation of its structuring, calling forth feelings, intentions, and actions in accord with its meaning" (60). One such metaphor was "containment," which according to Gregg "became the master cognitive scheme for animating and organizing U.S. Cold War strategies." It was, he argued, "a thoroughly embodied concept" (66).
Part of what being “embodied” meant for Gregg was that the entire mind/brain, including emotions, are part of the meaning-making process. This was certainly true for the metaphor of “containment.” “As metaphor and synecdoche,” Gregg wrote, “containment became a vessel for a variety of anxieties and fears” (“Embodied Meaning” 66). And the language that often accompanied the metaphor was designed to evoke certain emotions that were preparatory to particular kinds of actions. George Kennan, the father of the containment metaphor, often compared Communists to “rats,” “germs,” “disease,” or “convulsions.” Others imaged the Communists as “lice,” “scum,” “poison,” and “cancer.” Because such conditions, left untreated, could result in death, they “demand constant surveillance and harsh remedies for eradication of the dangers” (“Embodied Meaning” 68). Thus, language led to perception, perception to the formation of conceptions, and conceptions implied certain kinds of actions. As Gregg concluded: “These embodied meanings coalesced to help form a climate of opinion in America during the Cold War that judged events, actions, and individuals in accord with its fears” (“Embodied Meaning” 72).

These six articles are prime examples of the way Dick Gregg practiced rhetorical criticism. His criticism always grew out of his phenomenological orientation, which held that “all behavior is determined by and pertinent to the perceptual field of the behaving organism” (“A Phenomenologically Oriented Approach to Rhetorical Criticism” 83). As the terms “behavior,” “determined,” and “organism” imply, Gregg saw the formative capacities of the mind/brain as largely given—products of evolutionary biology. This was one of the reasons he was so drawn to the work of Kenneth Burke, who also saw a distinctly “animalistic” dimension to human behavior. Yet, as a phenomenologist, Gregg also realized that there was more to human meaning-making than simply neurophysiology. Although such cognitive structures were necessarily the basis for all further symbolization, they interacted in complex ways with the human’s individual symbolic capabilities as well as with the environments within which that particular human operated. The task for the critic was to examine the “perceptual promontories” that induced humans to attend to, perceive, and conceive ideas for action; to analyze how those promontories are articulated, positioned, symbolized, and weighted; and to understand how the perceptual promontories interfaced with the particular rhetorical situation to invite audiences to perceive and respond in ways consistent with the intentions and purposes of the speaker.

Gregg was insistent that all human meaning-making was the result of “holistic experiencing” (“The Criticism of Symbolic Inducement” 56). Such experiencing included everything that we would call reason or argument, but it also included feelings, emotions, fears, and other non-rational phenomena. Because human knowing is always based on perceptions and perceptions are always mediated by rhetoric, rhetoric as symbolic inducement becomes the primary way in which we understand our world, and by which we invite others to share that understanding. So understood, rhetoric could be any kind of message, event, artifact, act, or process that functioned perceptually to invite or induce acceptance of a point of view. This is why Gregg often repeated the formulation of the Committee on the Advancement and Refinement of Rhetorical Criticism from the 1970 Wingspread Conference, a formulation he helped to construct as a member of that committee: “The critic becomes rhetorical to the extent that he studies his subject in terms of its suasory potential or persuasive effect. So identified, rhetorical criticism may be applied to any human act, process, product, or artifact which,
in the critic’s view, may formulate, sustain, or modify attention, perceptions, attitudes, or behavior” (Sloan et al. 220).

The world was, quite literally, the domain of the rhetorical analyst. And Dick Gregg ranged widely over that world. His criticism encompassed protest rhetoric, foreign policy discourse, television news, presidential rhetoric, and campaign speeches. His interests were broad and ecumenical. His sense of wonder and curiosity were a continuing source of amazement to those who knew him well. Because he took seriously his own phenomenological orientation, he understood that different people could perceive the same events differently. Dick and I often saw the political world from different points of view. But those perceptual differences never interfered with our friendship, never prevented him from offering support to any project, and never caused a moment’s hesitation on my part when I needed his expertise and guidance. He was an amazing intellectual, but an even better human being.
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What the Speech Teacher Knew

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In the autumn of 1968, two faculty members from the Speech Department at The Pennsylvania State University taught a ten-week “speech class” in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania to 20 young African-American men and women who had been classified as hard-core unemployed. The stated purpose of the class was to help the students learn skills that would be useful to them in seeking employment and in performing effectively in the workplace once hired. In three papers and one master of arts thesis, all published from 1968-1970, the teachers of the class (Richard B. Gregg and A. Jackson McCormack) and a Speech Department faculty colleague (Douglas J. Pedersen) told the story of the development and implementation of the course.

The present article appears in a volume that honors and examines the scholarship of the late Richard B. Gregg, the first-listed author of the three published journal papers and the adviser of McCormack’s thesis. This article joins the tribute to Gregg by reclaiming these papers, using them to a purpose of my own. In them I find a rare instance of academic teachers of speech reporting in detail how they taught their subject. In their report I find evidence of an unstudied phenomenon, what I refer to as “what the speech teacher knew,” with reference to academic teachers of speech in United States higher education in the mid-twentieth century.

There are at least two different orders of knowledge that a midcentury teacher with a graduate degree in speech possessed. The first is the sort of knowledge obtained in completing a master of arts or doctor of philosophy in speech. For an example of what masters of art and doctors of philosophy studied for their graduate degrees in the Department of Speech and Drama at Cornell University, see Appendix 1 to Thomas W. Benson’s “The Cornell School of Rhetoric” for graduate reading lists in Rhetoric and Public Address for 1958. The second order of knowledge, the order I am most concerned with here, is knowledge not necessarily referenced in reading lists, curricula, and publications, which can be described as any and all the notions, sensibilities, dispositions, and practical wisdom gleaned from one’s experience as a student, teacher, or professor of speech.

To build my claims about what these speech teachers—Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen—knew, I rely primarily on the three papers: “Whitey Goes to the Ghetto: A Personal Chronicle of a Communication Experience with Black Youths” (Gregg and McCormack 1968), “The Rhetoric of Black Power: A Street-Level Interpretation” (Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen 1969), and “A Description of the Interaction Between Black Youth and White Teachers in a Ghetto Speech Class” (Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen 1970). I draw from various materials of contemporaneous disciplinary discourse as well as my remembered experiences to build my claim that the knowledge they displayed in these papers could be a manifestation of a more general common culture of which midcentury teachers and professors partook, the culture I seek here to begin to reclaim.

A Disposition to Listen

In manifold ways the teachers listened to their students and to others involved in the project. Listening of this sort involved not only a physical hearing, but a complex intellectual, physical, and postural response to the speakers to whom they listened.
Prior to conducting the course, Gregg met with some faculty colleagues who did not participate in the delivery of the course. He also met in a series of meetings (many a full day long) with members of the community in which the course was to be taught, with young people who would be eligible to take the course, with local officials in Harrisburg, and with experts in African-American culture and education. In these meetings he sought to ascertain whether to conduct the course and, if so, how.

In the first preliminary meeting, “three speech department personnel . . . carefully explained that [they] had no preconceived program but . . . were willing to offer [their] skills and knowledge in whatever way might be relevant to the target population.” There followed a conference with Speech Department faculty and graduate students and “some forty ghetto youths” to discuss the desirability of such a course. The young men and women from the ghetto responded with charges of “white intervention” and said they did not wish to “listen” to any more promises from “Whitey” (Gregg and McCormack 26, 25). The Speech Department personnel listened to the concerns of the students and kept the discussion going over several subsequent meetings until a tentative teaching plan was agreed.

For the first four weeks of the class, the students expressed considerable suspicion about the motives of the white teachers and the utility of what they might teach. In these sessions it was not uncommon for students to “stand up” and “defiantly suggest” that the teachers “shouldn’t come down here to teach us how to talk; go back and teach the white man how to listen.” The teachers listened to the students address “threats, recriminations, and invectives” to them. They listened to a Muslim minister who was invited to the class start his talk “by looking at us” (the teachers) and implying that we were “the enemy in the camp.” Later, when the teachers thought they were enjoying good relations with the students, they were surprised to hear “our own students proclaim that our behavior was filled with deceit.” When the students asked the teachers to accompany them to a City Council meeting where the students were lodging a complaint against police physical abuse of a 15-year-old boy they knew, the teachers accompanied the students and listened to them talk. The teachers wrote about their participation throughout the ten weeks of the course: “An important function was that of listener. We were a white audience, and we had willingly placed ourselves in a position to listen to ghetto youth” (Gregg and McCormack 26, 28).

I know of no observational studies of how much time contemporaneous speech teachers sat and listened to others, but I remember them listening for hours on end to young people speak, and I remember them listening with sufficient intensity to be able to provide a critique, judgment, or affirmation of comprehension of what the young person had said.

One of my earliest experiences with an academic teacher of speech was in the spring of 1960, when I was a high school sophomore. Warren Gasink, an instructor of speech at Portland State College, came to my house to help me prepare for speech contests, giving freely of his time. Sitting on the sofa, he looked up at me as I spoke and then talked with me about my oral performance and my manuscript, doing this through preparation for two different oratorical contests. In teaching me the conversational quality of delivery and the motivated sequence of a persuasive speech, along with his interrogation of me to help me “speak what you know,” he taught what I later recognized as the state of the art of persuasive speaking instruction
as that art was taught by a teacher with an advanced degree in speech. In the previous year I was coached by a man who taught what I now recognize as what Charles Henry Woolbert referred to as *The Overexalted Manner*. This man wrote most of the speech I was to deliver, which consisted chiefly of a string of platitudes expressed in an elevated vocabulary (32). The differences between these two practices indicate what the founders of the National Association of Academic Teachers of Public Speaking meant by inserting “academic” in the name. Mr. Gasink’s approach, which I mention here for its emphasis on listening and drawing out the thoughts and experiences of the prospective speaker, modeled precisely the cultural common sense, the preferred sensibility, of the midcentury academic teacher of speech.

For four years in high school and four years in college I participated in competitive speech and debate. Hundreds of academic teachers of speech listened to me, including the following (in some cases a parenthetical includes a remembered comment delivered to me orally or on a written ballot): Bower Aly, Wayne Brockriede, Glenn Capp, James A. Costigan (“Cicero would have loved your commonplaces.”), Austin Freeley, Annabel Hagood, Robert Huber (“You’ve come a long way since last I heard you.”), James Johnson, Richard Murphy, Scott Nobles, Richard Rieke, Janice K. Welle (“You’re asking people to give up their religion.”), Roy V. Wood (“How do you think you did?”), and George Ziegelmueller (a “loss” ballot in the quarterfinals of the Heart of America debate tournament at Lawrence, Kansas). At least seven of these men and women who listened to me and to thousands of other callow youths are authors of published textbooks in argumentation and debate. Most were, or became, full professors of speech at a United States college or university.

As with the men and women who sat and listened to me, so too in the Harrisburg speech class there were speech teachers who listened to their students stand and speak, who listened to the students when they directed hostile comments toward them, who accompanied them to a meeting where the students spoke and the teachers listened, who intentionally placed themselves “in a position to listen to ghetto youth.” One of these teachers was Richard B. Gregg.

**The Problematic as Topos**

The word “problem” appears 14 times across the three papers, multiple times in each essay. Here are four such appearances: “No domestic problem presses so urgently upon our society as the problem of equal rights and opportunity for all citizens.” “[The teachers allowed the] students to suggest the problems they wanted to work on.” “[T]he youth of the ghetto perceived [for themselves] a special problem. They had to formulate a self-image in full awareness of their blackness” (Gregg and McCormack 25, 28). “[T]he major problem now facing white society appears knowing when and how to respond to [the rhetoric of black power]” (Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen, “The Rhetoric of Black Power” 158). The authors also reported multiple “needs” that the teachers experienced in the course of teaching the class, including the need for disciplinary knowledge they deemed to be lacking for their current project and crucially, problems pertaining to their own conduct in the classroom. Indeed, for every aspect of the project they consider, the authors reported something deeply problematic.

A concern with talking about social problems had a long history in the literature of the field of speech as these teachers must have found it. The first article
to appear in the discipline's founding scholarly journal, then entitled *The Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking* (now *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*) is R. L. Lyman's 1915 piece “The Forum as an Educative Agency” in which he reported on and discussed the activities of extension divisions at United States universities. The “chain of educational theory” of these extension departments, he wrote, lies in seven points, the first of which is “The primary emphasis on problem-situations requiring judgment” (7). Although Lyman’s paper had almost no uptake in its time, its placement as lead article in the inaugural issue of the discipline's first journal suggests a concern to place speaking about substance. More specifically, Lyman situated speaking in the service of solving social problems at the heart of the fledgling enterprise, an enterprise trying to distance itself from the “unacademic and somewhat commercial schools of expression” of the time (Lyman 7, 12).

The first textbook in the discipline devoted exclusively to group discussion (McBurney and Hance) was devoted primarily to problem-solving discussion. From 1939 to 1964, of the 17 discussion textbooks published in the field of speech, 16 had as their centerpiece an adaptation of John Dewey’s reflective thinking approach to problem solving. By midcentury *The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Speech Monographs*, and regional speech journals had published a substantial body of original research and theorizing pertaining to problem solving group discussion, nearly all of which was concerned with the reflective thinking approach (Philipsen).

By the time of the Harrisburg project in autumn 1968, the problem-solution format was a standard organizational scheme for speeches to be prepared and delivered in college and university courses in public speaking. Contemporaneous textbooks included chapters or sections on the problem-solution speech and in many cases also treated the “motivated sequence” that had been formulated by Alan H. Monroe, a professor of speech at Purdue University. The motivated sequence consists of five steps that an orator or persuasive speaker is advised to follow including: Attention, Need, Solution, Visualization, and Action, a sequence that houses both problem (need) and solution.

When Mr. Gasink sat in my living room helping me prepare an oration for a contest sponsored by a Christian denomination, the subject of the contest was the importance of Christian witness in the world. He began by asking me what I thought were the major problems facing the world today. This was not something that I, age 15, had thought much about, but I answered, hesitantly, “prejudice” and then, after some thought, “materialism.” Materialism was deemed a suitable problem for the circumstances. Mr. Gasink questioned me about the nature of materialism and how Christian witness might be used to address it and then told me to bring to our next meeting research materials that might inform the speech. I struggled to find something to say for this speech, as I had in preparing other original orations and the problem-solution approach as aid to rhetorical invention was new to me. I now believe that, as with the conversational quality of delivery, the problem-solution approach to content was part of the common culture of which professors of speech, including Gregg, and their students, could at that time partake. Working with me in our home, Mr. Gasink emphasized the problematic as *topos*, as did members of the Harrisburg project.
The Speech Teacher as Advisor

Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen wrote that the Penn State faculty members who conceived the idea of a course started with one model of purpose, classroom activity, and teacher role. Specifically, the teachers would create a series of activities and experiences, including role plays of employment situations, through which the ghetto youth could enhance their communication skill in finding employment and in conducting themselves in the workplace. From the outset, they rejected the idea of a “traditional speech class” with its “training format of lecture-performance-critique” (“A Description of the Interaction” 1) and sought rather to contribute what they could, based on their acquisition of “knowledge and techniques useful for better human relations and more efficient communication” (Gregg and McCormack 25).

The teachers discovered in the first four weeks of the course that what they perceived to be a flexible approach to the course was met with considerable resistance from the students. The students said that learning to talk like the white teachers wanted them to talk would be of no use to them in their efforts to address the problems facing them. The course, to be of any value at all, should make it possible for them to work on the problematic attitudes of white society, attitudes that blocked opportunities for ghetto youth to get good jobs or to advance in them. The students proposed using the class as a site in which to form “a viable community action group” that could address those problems and soon the teachers changed their approach to allow the class to concentrate on such a formative project (Gregg and McCormack 3).

The students took over the management of the class from the teachers and put it in the hands of the community action group that they established. The faculty members altered the nature of the speech situation from one of students giving speeches to the teacher and the class as audience, to one of a series of projects through which students prepared and delivered presentations to the larger community. These presentations were directed toward changing the attitudes of white society.

Focusing on the teachers, we can ask how they responded to and how they supported students’ efforts to create a classroom plan that was radically different from that which the faculty had initially conceived and proposed. This was new ground for the two speech teachers. They wrote that they found themselves “forced to deal with questions we had no ready answers for” and that “interest in community projects enabled us to deal with communication in ways we had not anticipated” (Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen, “A Description of the Interaction” 6). In their concluding comments about their roles in the classroom—“we gave no directions, made no hard and fast assignments and issued no orders” (Gregg and McCormack 30)—they suggested that they had accepted, indeed embraced, a stance that was radically consultative.

Although the authors did much to contrast their instruction with the traditional speech class format, I think the adaptations they made to the Harrisburg circumstances are not inconsistent with much of the culture of the speech teacher circa 1968 and to that point I offer some particulars. As a college debater in the mid-1960s I worked in the studio, as it were, of a competitive forensics program lodged within a department of speech and directed by a professor of speech. Most of our debating was on a nationally-established resolution, but the debaters had full
responsibility for the construction of the affirmative and negative cases they used in competition. As a competitor in original oratory at speech tournaments in high school and college, I had complete responsibility for selecting and developing topics for persuasive speeches. With regard to the “theory-performance-critique” model that Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen associate with the traditional speech class (“A Description of the Interaction” 1), there was little theory supplied by the faculty in the program, much performance, and some local critique. Case selection, construction of debate cases, and topics for persuasive speeches were left up to the students. In this regard we had the same freedom as the students in the Harrisburg classes. Like them, for the most part we addressed audiences outside of the classroom that were not under the control of the local instructional staff. So for the Harrisburg teachers, the shift from the traditional “training format” of the speech classroom to a more project-based experience and a consultative role for the teachers was not as radical as it might at first have seemed to people with whom they initially met prior to offering the course.

A cultural resource likely informing the Harrisburg teachers was a disciplinary disposition toward audience analysis and adaptation. Barnett Baskerville, a distinguished scholar of American public address, writing in the self-identified persona “speech teacher,” referred to the speech teacher’s “insistence upon analysis of and responsiveness to one’s audience” (65). It is not hard to read much of the Harrisburg teachers’ conduct as responsive to that common injunction in their considerable effort to analyze, but also their steely determination to be “responsive” to, the “audience” of students with whom they were working. Such attention to audience analysis and adaptation was, I propose, virtually wired into the cultural common sense of the midcentury academic teacher of speech.

In linking the Harrisburg teachers’ embrace of a consultative role to something that is part of a disciplinary common culture, a vivid image that comes to my mind is painted in the words of Gary B. Crocker, a student of Professor Laura Crowell of the Department of Speech at the University of Washington in the early 1960s. At the end of a distinguished career in international negotiations with the U.S. Department of State, Crocker wrote about “the skills for group participation that I have used almost everyday of my career,” that he learned from Professor Crowell’s “voice” from just outside the discussion circle reminding him to “phrase my input toward the goal of reaching a group solution” (Crocker).

One can easily imagine Gregg and McCormack sitting in the Harrisburg classrooms, serving comfortably in a consultative role to their students. Indeed here is what they wrote about the kind of things they said in the teaching opportunities they seized in the classroom: “if you think it might be helpful you might try . . . ,” “Did you think about . . . ,” “Here are several ways you might proceed . . . ,” and “If I were doing it I would probably . . .” (Gregg and McCormack 30).

These comments evoke strongly for me Crowell’s reported advisory style in the speech classrooms over which she presided for 24 years beginning in 1948. My recollection of academic teachers of speech in the 1960s suggests that Crowell and her contemporaries Gregg and McCormack were acting in a manner altogether familiar and proper to the midcentury academic teacher of speech.
Speech as Means, Communication as End

Each of the three papers written about the Harrisburg project appears in a journal with “speech” in its name. In each paper the authors identified themselves as personnel from a department of “speech.” But across the three papers a form of the word “speech” appeared only nine times, while a form of the word “communication” appeared 29 times. At one point the teachers referred to themselves as “responsible professionals in the area of human speech communication.” They wrote that they have “for years” taught “a variety of regular courses in speech,” but wrote in the same paragraph that they “additionally” provided “knowledge and techniques useful for better human relations and more effective communication.” In two of the papers they referred to the project as teaching a “speech class” (Gregg and McCormack 25; Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen, “A Description of the Interaction” 1, 2). In the third paper the project was referred to as a “class in oral communication” (Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen, “The Rhetoric of Black Power” 152). Their tentative initial proposal was to “offer our skills and knowledge in whatever ways might be relevant to the target population.” Their account of what they tried to do in the classroom included the broad statement that “we constantly tried to focus their [the students’] interest on the role communication could play, both in self-improvement and in community development.” They talked “about communication in ways that we hoped were relevant to them [the students],” suggesting the authors’ beliefs in the efficacy of “communication.” Yet when the faculty members referred to what they actually did in terms of concrete teaching, they deployed the register of the teacher of speech, saying “we helped specify and clarify problems as they saw them” and “we presented some guidelines for organizing ideas for public presentation” (Gregg and McCormack 25, 26, 30).

One could conclude from the authors’ use of “speech” and “communication” as terms for characterizing themselves and the subject they taught as evidence that they distanced themselves from speech when they could and moved toward the term communication as human activity. Furthermore, they expressed no sense of loss when they supported a class structure that required no speaking assignments, noting that training in public speaking might not be suited for the needs of their present students. In these matters, the authors might be read as counter to, or anomalous from, the ideal of the midcentury professor or academic teacher of speech. But the teachers’ easy giving up of any preference for “speech” as opposed to “communication” or “human relations” is not an anomaly in its time; rather, it mirrors and expresses a fundamental notion of the cultural commonsense of the midcentury academic teacher of speech.

This section of my essay is entitled “Speech as Means, Communication as End.” The midcentury academic speech teacher felt a sense of pride and satisfaction that speech had become “a dignified, academic discipline in its own right” (Woolbert, “The Teaching of Speech” 1), but showed little interest in valorizing or theorizing speech over other means of action as an efficacious resource in the conduct of human affairs. In the common culture of the midcentury academic teacher of speech, speech, I suggest, was considered a means among other means, to a more valorized end, namely, communication.

I came to this conclusion after reviewing several published statements in which academic teachers and scholars of speech, writing from 1915 to 1967, identified
speech as practice or object of study. Each of these statements provided an exemplification of the “speech as means, communication as end” notion I posit here as part of the cultural commonsense to which the midcentury academic teacher of speech had ready access.

The first appearance of the notion that I found is from James A. Winans, one of the founders in 1914 of the National Association of Academic Teachers of Public Speaking. In his classic textbook *Public Speaking*, he recommended to the student of public speaking, “whatever else you do, you should make your speech genuine communication” (27). The book is one of the first published that expressed the creed of the *academic* teacher of public speaking, those men and women who set out to create a place in United States higher education for the teaching of public speaking as a communicative act, “a genuine dealing with men” (28), as distinct from a performance or an exhibition. In establishing speech as serving the end of communication, an act in which the speaker communicates to a listener the substance of his or her own thoughts, Winans distanced himself from the elocutionists and from the unacademic teachers and schools of speech of his time.

Charles H. Woolbert, another founder of the National Association of Academic Teachers of Public Speaking, led the campaign to coalesce the field and its subject around “speech” (or “speech science”). Woolbert’s articles “The Organization of Departments of Speech Science in Universities” (1916) and “The Teaching of Speech as an Academic Discipline” (1923) were important documents in the campaign to establish “speech” as the controlling term for disciplinary naming. And yet in his rationale for “speech,” he wrote that “the very thing for which it [speech training] ought to exist, [is] the art of communicating ideas to listeners” (“The Teaching of Speech” 11).

As surprising as it might be to some readers to learn that Winans, Woolbert, Edwin Flemming, Alexander M. Drummond, and others in the earliest years of the development of the “speech” discipline placed speech in the servant position to “communication,” it might be just as surprising to learn that several midcentury presidents of the national association and other distinguished scholars of “speech” treated speech in precisely this way. See works by Loren Reid, Ronald Reid, and Wallace for systematic and relentless positioning of speech as means to the end of communication.

In autumn of 1978, the first quarter I was a faculty colleague of Barnett Baskerville in the Department of Speech Communication at the University of Washington and eager to get to know the distinguished scholar, I asked to meet with him and he invited me to his office. I told him that I was a scholar of communication and he took that news with some apparent apprehension, saying that he was concerned about the growing number of faculty in the field who specialized in communication as opposed to speech, the art he had professed throughout his career. And yet, in 1953, Baskerville had written, in his brilliant apologia for the speech teacher, that “a speech which has any excuse for being given is a communication” (63). It would seem that the Harrisburg teachers agreed with Baskerville’s premise and in so doing spoke in the cultural idiom of the midcentury academic teacher of speech.

**A Complex and Nuanced Notion of an Act of Speech**

The issue of *The Speech Teacher* in which Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen (“A Description of the Interaction”) appear includes Jane Blankenship’s review of John R.
Searle’s *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (“The Rhetoric of Black Power”). In a brief aside, Blankenship suggested that speech teachers are interested in something far richer than what Searle provided in his account of the speech act, that is, speech teachers are concerned with “the totality that is the speech act (a communicative act)” (85). In their descriptive and interpretive practice in the three papers, our authors exemplified Blankenship’s assertions in the ways they described and interpreted the speech activity of a complex and unfolding human scene.

The authors’ reports of speech activity in the planning for and teaching of the class are filled with references to a great variety of communicative actions and effects, including references to their own conduct, the conduct of the students, and the conduct of others who participated in the process. These reports manifest a rich implicit scheme for the classification, characterization, and interpretation of the elements and processes of speech activity. Their ‘scheme’ suggests a complex and nuanced notion of speech as a social activity.

The three published articles, taken as a whole, include references to dozens of different linguistic action verbials, that is, verbs or verb-like expressions designating a particular type of linguistic action (e.g., forms of “talk,” “excoriate,” “proclaim,” “announce,” “address,” “teach,” “accuse,” “tell,” and “call”), terms deployed to characterize actions performed by specific speakers. There are numerous references to modes, styles, or manners of speaking (e.g., “defiantly,” “quietly and earnestly,” “privately,” etc.), suggesting a sensitivity to the key, tone, or style of acts of speech. Various named ways of speaking that the authors referred to include “white liberal talk” and “telling Whitey like it is.” Extraverbal and contextual matters were represented frequently and in detail (e.g., describing a speaker as “looking right at us,” “turned directly to us,” “stand up,” “at the front of the room,” “avoided direct eye contact,” “swaggering,” “flinching,” and “pose of belligerency”). This sample of descriptive categories suggests something of the range and complexity of the working model of speech activity the authors used to take the measure, as it were, of what they referred to as “a description of the interaction between black youth and white teachers in a ghetto speech class” (“A Description of the Interaction” 1).

As catholic as is Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen’s enacted scheme of observation, it also has a special focus: “rhetorical statements and behaviors.” “Rhetoric,” they wrote, “reflects how the black man perceived the contemporary situation” (“The Rhetoric of Black Power” 151-152). They meant at once the black men who had become nationally recognized spokespersons for “black power” but also the younger men in their speech class whose rhetorical statements and behaviors in the classroom the authors were keen to comprehend. And they intentionally juxtaposed the statements of nationally prominent speakers to some of the acts of speech of their students so as to discern the situated meanings of the latter.

In their efforts to interpret the situated meanings of statements students made in the classroom, the teachers considered the configuration of form, function, and direction of address of the speech acts the students produced in an effort to grasp the totality of these utterances as actions of purposive rhetors. “At times,” they wrote, “students turned directly to us with accusations of deceit and evil intentions. But shortly after such diatribes someone in the class would admonish us to ‘cool it, man; we weren’t talking about you.’ At first we were puzzled. . . .” Eventually, Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen concluded that “the students’ rhetorical exercises were ‘proofs’ to each other of the speaker’s integrity as a black man, one part of a solution
to a problem that the students had raised in the early weeks of the course” (“The Rhetoric of Black Power” 158). Here the authors, in a brief interpretive passage, display many of the elements of their intricate interpretive scheme—the naming of a speech act, the interpretation of a motive expressed in the action, the noting of to whom the act was addressed, and the act’s rhetorical form—in a dazzling display of their scheme’s use and its interpretive application in moving from initial puzzlement to eventual discernment.

Were Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen representative of midcentury academic teachers of speech or rather were they ahead of the game? Is what they knew part of a disciplinary common culture or rather evidence of a singular innovation? I see them as on the disciplinary cutting edge, in terms of the degree and sophistication of descriptive detail that was used in the larger project, something more akin to a contemporaneous ethnographer of speaking, such as Ethel M. Albert (an anthropologist and philosopher of science then resident in the School of Speech at Northwestern University) or Richard Bauman (a historian who had become an ethnographer of speaking), than to the rhetorical critics of the day. One exception is the report on the advancement of rhetorical criticism, to which Gregg contributed, in the volume on the National Developmental Project in rhetoric sponsored by the Speech Communication Association (Bitzer and Black). That they were ahead of the game is especially evident in their juxtaposition of the rhetoric of the public drama playing in the national and international media to the rhetoric of the drama playing out in the Harrisburg classroom. Others followed but did not acknowledge the Harrisburg authors.

By midcentury other innovative and imaginative interpretive work was being done in the field of speech. I refer to the informal knowledge that one might have picked up on the margins perhaps of extant disciplinary scholarship. There was, I surmise, in many places, something innovative to be learned about interpreting acts of speech. I suspect A. Jackson McCormack picked up a lot from Gregg, his thesis advisor and co-teacher in the speech class.

I surmise further that there were, in many midcentury graduate programs in speech, informal things to learn and come to know with regard to a complex and nuanced approach to the study of acts of speech. Here I give an example from my experience. Beginning in the autumn of 1967 I took a three-quarter sequence in the history of rhetorical theory from Professor Leland Griffin at Northwestern University in the School of Speech. One day in class, as eight or nine of us squeezed together in Griffin’s large office, a student asked Griffin about his method of critical procedure in his celebrated studies of the rhetorical structure of the new left. Griffin, seldom opposed to a digression, paused and then answered that he spent long evenings sitting in his cold second-story study working in this way: he would take the items from his corpus of new left discourse (speeches, essays, news reports, etc.) and, figuratively, put them on a barbecue spit, crank the spit round and round, over and over, examining and re-examining each item of discourse, until after several months he found his way through the materials and was ready to say something about them.

Griffin’s impromptu exposition was not on the syllabus (or, I should say, would not have been on the written syllabus had there been one). This was a bit of wisdom one picked up, simply by being there. I was an aspiring ethnographer of speaking, not a rhetorical critic, but I have repeated Griffin’s exposition, as best as I could, to appreciative qualitative inquiry students in my graduate classes for over 40
years.

I surmise (yet again) that students of Gregg, of Gregg’s teacher Edwin Black at University of Pittsburgh, of Marie Hochmuth Nichols at University of Illinois, and in many other midcentury graduate programs in speech, were picking up something just like Gregg’s notion of juxtaposing the rhetoric of the media to the rhetoric of the local community or Griffin’s barbecue spit metaphor that was not part of the formal curriculum but in some way served the purpose of helping people comprehend what Blankenship called “the totality of the speech act” (85).

A Well-Demeaned Persona

Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen wrote “how important it was that we listen and respond seriously to the remarks our students made, even those that seemed unreasonable, unrealistic, or outrageous” (“A Description of the Interaction” 7). They gave no indication that the teachers, after listening, ever responded to such remarks in a way that was challenging, critical, or anything short of making a concerted effort to grasp the meaning behind them. The teachers’ way of responding to “unreasonable, unrealistic, or outrageous comments” seems to fly in the face of a cherished ideal of the academic teacher of speech, who is, according to Baskerville, enjoined to criticize students for “inaccuracies,” “inconsistencies,” and “lack of evidence in support of assertions,” in their utterances (62–63).

This was not, of course, intended to be a “traditional speech class” with its “training format of lecture-performance-critique” (Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen, “A Description of the Interaction” 1). Were the Harrisburg teachers, then, not acting as academic teachers of speech? Had they been reduced to teaching “human relations”? Might Professor Baskerville be disappointed that his erstwhile colleagues had lost the faith?

Baskerville did write, invoking Aristotle in the Rhetoric, that for the speaker, it should be “the audience which determines the very end or object of the speech” (65). If we think of the Harrisburg teachers as the speakers and the students as the audience listening to their utterances, we might inquire into the ends these teachers as speakers sought to reach. They wrote that their purpose was to provide students with the opportunity to experience, for the first time, a white man taking seriously their expressions of grievance (Gregg and McCormack 30). Invoking Baskerville again, we might say the Harrisburg teachers were following his admonition that “The goal [for the speaker] is a kind of social sensitivity—a perception of what on a specific occasion is appropriate and what is not, a feeling for what must be said and what left unsaid, the exercise of good taste in the choice of words and manner of utterance so as not to grieve the judicious” (65).

Here I turn to a midcentury sociologist for a complementary way to think about the enactment of what Baskerville refers to as social sensitivity, one aspect of which is, according to Erving Goffman, good demeanor, which he defines as that which “is required of an actor if he is to be transformed into someone who can be relied upon to maintain himself as an interactant, poised for communication” with others in the immediate situation (489; emphasis added). Goffman wrote:

In our society, the ‘well’ or ‘properly’ demeaned individual displays such attributes as: discretion and sincerity; modesty in claims about
self; sportsmanship; command of speech and physical movements; self-control over his emotions, his appetites, and his desires; poise under pressure; and so forth. (489)

These seem to be exactly the sort of attributes the Harrisburg teachers displayed in their disposition to listen, their willingness to relinquish control over the classroom, their reticence in moments when someone in their position might have taken the floor, and their silence in the face of unfriendly comments spoken directly to them. Our teachers wrote that they conducted themselves in this way so as to “find a way to accept each other’s differences and maintain cultural autonomy while establishing communication essential to beneficial social co-existence” (Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen, “A Description of the Interaction” 8; emphasis added).

What resources might Richard Gregg have drawn from to help him conduct himself in such a well-demeaned way in the Harrisburg classroom? His Penn State colleague, Thomas Benson, wrote that Gregg was a modest and rational man and that he had played high school football in Newton, Kansas (“Richard B. Gregg” 1). Perhaps his humility, sense of purpose, and experience on the playing fields of Newton prepared him for the interactional rigors of his Harrisburg assignment.

I propose that whatever personal resources Gregg and McCormack brought to their classroom task in Harrisburg, they could have drawn as well on disciplinary resources available to the midcentury academic teacher of speech. To that end, I provide some anecdotal evidence from another playing field, competitive debate, as it was taught and judged by academic teachers of speech in midcentury America.

Richard Gregg was not only a high school football player in Kansas but a high school debater as well (Benson, “Richard B. Gregg” 1).

In December of 1965 I attended my first convention of the Speech Association of America, as a member of the two-person United States international debate team, preparing for upcoming debates at 26 university debate unions in the British Isles. At the convention, my partner Stuart Ross of Cornell University and I debated against two debaters from Cambridge University in front of a large audience composed principally of American professors of speech who coached debate. The Cambridge debaters were dazzling in their display of cogency of argument, wit, and artful invective directed at the persons of the American debaters. After the debate, I was reeling from the force of the Cambridge debaters’ treatment of us and an elderly debate coach approached to say how shocked he was at the personal remarks of the Cambridge debaters. In the ensuing months, I learned that such conduct was an integral part of British union debating and a part I came much to enjoy.

In the autumn of 1966, fresh from the British experience, back on the American debate circuit, in the final round of the first tournament of the year, I responded to an argument with a personal comment directed at the speaker I was answering. I later found, in a judge’s ballot, a statement seared on my mind ever since, “a superior debater would not resort to such a remark.” Over the course of some 300 judged debates in high school and college, I came to learn something of the code of the academic teacher of speech, a code that emphasized, among other things, discretion, sportsmanship, command of speech, self-control, and poise under pressure.

In the winter of 1969, just after the completion of the Harrisburg speech class, I found myself employed as director of a community program at a settlement
house on the near south side of Chicago in an all-white neighborhood bordering an African-American neighborhood. Relations between residents of the two neighborhoods were agonizingly troubled and my agency sent me to a series of downtown workshops on race relations where, like our teachers in Harrisburg, I listened to black men tell me that the first thing I had to learn is that because I was a white man, I was part of the problem. I have always believed that to the extent I was able to listen to the passionate critiques delivered to me there and to profit from rather than resist them, I owe much to my education in demeanor at the hands of American academic teachers of speech and debate, who provided a long-term crucible in “how not to grieve the judicious” (Baskerville 65). I speculate that this disciplinary resource was of some value to Richard Gregg as well as he sat in some similar rooms in Harrisburg a few months before.

**Conclusion**

In this paper I used the published words of Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen to reconstruct how the Penn State speech teachers conducted themselves in planning, implementation, and chronicling of their efforts to teach a speech class in the Harrisburg ghetto in 1968. I found evidence in their reports of several enacted or expressed notions, sensibilities, dispositions, and bits of practical wisdom with regard to the teaching of speech. Other readers can scour these texts to find errors of commission or omission in what I claim to have found and I would welcome such further investigations of this remarkable ensemble of texts, which has been largely ignored since its publication over 40 years ago. I do not claim to have exhausted these texts, rather that there are riches here to mine that I have only begun to notice and sift through. One among many possible further readings would be to approach the textual materials from the standpoint of the point of view of the students.

The second effort I have made here goes beyond a reading of how these teachers conducted themselves to make claims that the enacted or expressed notions I found in the texts provide us some insight into the more general matter of what the midcentury academic teacher or professor of speech knew about her or his subject. Here as well I would welcome efforts to find and correct errors of commission and omission. The question of what the midcentury academic teacher of speech knew, as to canon or cultural commonsense, has not been raised before and I hope here at least to suggest that there is something to learn about a group of people and what they knew. In this regard, there is a great deal of reclamation work to be done.


In 1971, two important publications emerged in the field of rhetoric and public address that recognized how Western assumptions regarding the universalized character of persuasion were bound and limited by cultural norms that inhibited the ability of dominant members of society to hear those whose voices that had been silenced or marginalized. In their book *The Rhetoric of Black Americans*, James L. Golden and Richard D. Rieke questioned the efficacy of rhetoric when the basic beliefs whites held about blacks were taken into account, suggesting that racism was more a problem of “psychiatry” than persuasion (6). Richard B. Gregg took a similarly psychological turn in his seminal essay, “The Ego-Function of the Rhetoric of Protest,” arguing that “analytical views which presuppose that ‘communicative intent’ and ‘reasoning together’ or even ‘feeling together’ exhaust the primary goals of men’s and women’s serious discourse do not yield either useful or plausible accounts of much current discourse” (89). This “psychological turn” in the study of public address opened several spaces for exploring intersections between rhetoric and race that challenged traditional assumptions held by rhetorical theorists and critics and influenced significantly several research trajectories that have shaped and defined the study of rhetoric, race, and racism.

Although Golden and Rieke’s insights were largely overlooked until relatively recently,1 Gregg’s writings on Black Power and protest rhetoric had both direct and indirect influence on the study of rhetoric and race. This essay will consider Gregg’s influence through a recovery of his “ego function” essay, placing it within the context of several of his other writings related to race and the politics of power. Gregg’s writings anticipated three significant trajectories of rhetorical scholarship that focused on the rhetoric of racism: the rhetoric of racial recovery, the rhetoric of symbolic realignment, and the rhetoric of re-signing. His analyses were grounded in both public artifacts and his own personal encounters with African American students. Thus he had to a certain degree an insider’s insights into the resistance and resignation that defined African American personal and political discourse. His work was infused with both intellect and empathy, and he approached the study of race not only from the lenses of abstract theorizing but also through an engaged and embodied understanding of the failure of the powerful to listen to the voices of the dispossessed.

Gregg’s “ego function” essay was strongly influenced by earlier work on the rhetoric of Black Power that offered a profoundly personal appreciation of the political realities of identification and difference. His essay suggested that no singular or universal way of knowing or being framed rhetorical situations: instead they were complex, dynamic, and certainly within the case of racially defined interactions,

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1 While numerous scholars, among them those mentioned in this essay, have argued for alternative conceptions of rhetoric for addressing the unique discursive strategies of African American rhetors, none have systematically addressed Golden and Rieke’s argument regarding racism as a psychiatric as opposed to rhetorical problem. I have pursued this line of inquiry in a number of publications, most recently in an analysis of the execution of Troy Anthony Davis. See Mark Lawrence McPhail, Rachel Lyon, and David Harris, “Digital Divisions: Racial (In)justice and the Limits of Social Informatics in *The State of Georgia vs. Troy Anthony Davis.*” *Northern Kentucky Law Review* 39 (2012): 137-161.
circumscribed and constrained by diverse and often divergent experiences and perceptions of “reality.” Gregg recognized that the “realities” of racial domination and discrimination were resistant to the usual “means of persuasion” upon which rhetorical inquiry and theorizing had rested for centuries, and that a “critical disclosure” of the social, symbolic, and political implications of the rhetorics of race and racism was necessary (Benson). His “critical disclosure” of the rhetoric of protest had its roots in an earlier encounter with African American men and women in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in 1968.

Teaching a ten-week course with Jack McCormack and Doug Pedersen, Gregg and his colleagues encountered a situation for which they were unprepared, one in which they became the “targets of a great deal of invective which ostensibly condemned and threatened us,” and in which a “ritualistic pro-black, anti-white catechism would be repeated all over again” when new students or community members entered the classroom (Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen, “A Description of the Interaction” 4). Their experiences of the oppositional impulses emergent in African American discourse were unsettling, but ultimately transformative. As Thomas Benson explains: “The three white liberals, who portray themselves as having started out on something of a rescue mission, learned that they were not and could not be at the center of their students’ education, and they found themselves discovering ways to contribute even as they relinquished their leadership” (4). One of Gregg’s most important contributions would be realized later in his reconsideration of the efficacy of rhetoric to engage audiences across divisions of identity and difference.

Gregg responded to his experience in Harrisburg by examining more closely the rhetorical dynamics of protest as they were expressed in the rhetorics of the Black Power, Student, and Women’s Liberation Movements. He argued that these rhetorics were inner-directed, characterized by “reflections of intense feelings of self-deprecation and ego-deprivation,” motivated by the “struggle for a resurrected self” (“The Ego-Function” 81), and illustrative of a blurring of boundaries between the personal and the political that challenged traditional notions of rhetoric just as they challenged the exclusionary practices of dominant culture:

The content of the rhetoric we have examined reveals a central concern of protest movements. The concern expressed publicly is nonetheless a personal concern, often seeking affirmation of individual identity through group unity. The thrust of the rhetoric of protest is disturbing precisely because it so blatantly personal and because it reflects a stance which seems to thwart the idealized kind of problem discussion we like to see on the public stage. (85)

Gregg considered explicitly the rational and moral limitations of traditional rhetorical theorizing and criticism. “Historically much of rhetorical and philosophical analysis and criticism tends to set ‘rhetorical discourse’ within moral ideals which presupposes the principles of ‘rational’ discussions,” he explained. “Such critical perspectives grant approbative notice to discourse which appears to coincide with the demands and constraints of ‘rationality’ and disregard or deprecate discourse which falls outside of these domains” (“The Ego-Function” 89). The realities and practices of protest rhetorics fundamentally challenged and changed the norms of rhetorical inquiry and expression: the analytical abstractions that had shaped those norms were inadequate to
address the ideological impulses of privilege and power that silenced the voices of those for whom the available means of persuasion seemed peculiarly unavailable.

One of the earliest amplifications of Gregg’s analysis emerged in Aaron David Gresson’s explication of “minority epistemology.” Gresson sought to “enlarge on the line of inquiry opened by Gregg,” arguing that “most social relationships characterized by domination/subordination preclude immediate entrance into rational discourse as we typically define it” (“Minority Epistemology” 245). Gresson posits the existence of an “epistemological imbalance” that circumscribed and constrained interactions between dominant and subordinate cultures. He asserts that this imbalance gave rise to “radical” rhetors who believed “intuitively, at least, that the ‘order of things’ must be changed before traditional rational discussion can be pursued” (247). He suggests that the rhetoric of protest represents a “paradigm shift” that challenges the underlying rational beliefs and assumptions that have historically governed rhetorical inquiry and expression. “When we see protest rhetoric as partially a matter of paradigm shifts its character becomes less irrational. For this reason it is very important for rhetoricians to judge the logic and reasonableness of protest rhetoric in reference to its particular epistemological functions” (250). Like Gregg, Gresson points to the resistance, and perhaps inability, of dominant cultures to respond to the demands and demonstrations of those they have dominated.

Gresson argues that the oppositional impulses of the rhetoric of Black Power emerged out of an alternative epistemology, one defined by a “rhetoric of creation” expressed in three “psycho-social” processes: consensus creating/riting, consensus breaking, and consensus renegotiation (“Minority Epistemology” 259-260). “By breaking with the consensus contract which underpins modern social orders” Gresson explains, “the protester is reminding the ‘rulers’ that reality is largely a socially negotiated proposition” (260). He extends Gregg’s work by illustrating how the social construction of racial reality required rhetors to

create new perspectives and promote social alternatives. Such rhetors must first generate the norms of their ‘new order’; only later can they align or integrate these new norms with old ones. Their first move is essentially the advocacy of a ‘new’ epistemology and the second involves treating as indeterminate precisely those value structures that others see as axiomatic. (247-248)

Gresson’s elaboration of Gregg’s work on protest informs another significant exploration of the rhetorical study of race: Steven R. Goldzwig’s examination of Louis Farrakhan’s “symbolic realignment” of the rhetoric of demagoguery.

Like Gregg and Gresson, Goldzwig begins his analysis by challenging the efficacy of traditional modes of persuasion for addressing, and responding to, the rhetoric of historically marginalized and excluded groups and individuals. Drawing upon Gresson’s elaboration of Gregg’s “ego-function” essay, Goldzwig affirms and extends the role of a “rhetoric of creation” in challenging systems of domination and subordination. “Minority participants in the cultural milieu must assume the task of creating discourse that helps them reconstitute existing paradigms of what counts as ‘knowledge’ and minorities must apply such reconstituted views in an effort to effect social change,” he writes. “Such a process serves individual and group ego-functions, restoring cohesiveness and purpose to an otherwise chaotic and implacable situation”
Goldzwig argues that the establishment of a “minority epistemology” that is “both shaped by, and bent on shaping, the dominant culture” offers an alternative reading of discursive strategies considered “obscene” or illegitimate by the dominant culture, and allows the explication of demagoguery as “a rhetoric of symbolic realignment” (211).

Goldzwig integrates and extends the epistemic and psychological concerns that motivate both Gregg and Gresson: “As a process of symbolic realignment, demagoguery becomes a matter of shaping and affirning a subcultural rhetorical style that is directed primarily to internal audiences through consensus creating/riting and consensus breaking” (Goldzwig 211-212). The rhetoric of Louis Farrakhan, Goldzwig argues, exemplifies a discursive strategy that challenges the dominant culture’s basic beliefs and assumptions by recourse to symbolic resources traditionally defined as beyond the scope of moral suasion. “What is often labeled as demagogy and then summarily dismissed as beneath further discussion and analysis may be a verbal sign of intense, implacable cultural ‘warfare,’” explains Goldzwig (218). His discussion of symbolic realignment resonates powerfully with a concern that characterized both Gregg’s and Gresson’s analyses: the need for new rhetorical tools for understanding and evaluating the voices of those historically unheard or dismissed as “irrational.”

For Gregg, the voices of protest demanded a response from rhetorical scholars. For Gresson, that response was “necessary to capture the creative, visionary, reconstructive features of human discourse” (“Minority Epistemology” 261). And for Goldzwig, those features required an understanding of rhetoric that recognized how even those dismissed as “demagogues” by the dominant culture needed to be heard and understood. “As consummate manipulators of the verbal symbol, their discourse is truly symbolic. It stands for what it is not. It is trick and chicanery and fluid motion; it is also a marred and marvelous portrait of ourselves. To realize this we must listen before we judge and exercise judgment in our attempt to listen” (Goldzwig 222). Gregg’s research, and the scholarship it shaped and influenced, informed my own work on rhetoric and race, which emerged as a call for a new vision of rhetoric that questioned the viability of traditional notions of persuasion, and offered an alternative conception of rhetoric for explicating the dynamic ways in which oppositional discourse both resists and reifies dominant discourse and culture (McPhail, The Rhetoric of Racism).

Over the course of its evolution, my research on rhetoric and race has addressed a number of issues that paralleled Gregg’s theoretical and critical concerns. Like Gregg, I envisioned an understanding of rhetoric and race that could lead “to mutual welfare ending ultimately in mutual respect” (Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen, “Rhetoric of Black Power” 160) and I was also attentive to the “perverse” ways in which oppositional discourse could “force the kind of counter-reaction which is ego gratifying to some individuals” (Gregg, “The Ego-Function” 87). Unlike Gregg, I viewed the counter-reactive impulses of African American discourse as epistemologically problematic in terms of their construction of identity based on the same principles of negative difference that were at the root of dominant theories of knowledge. The resultant theories of rhetorical coherence and complicity attempted to consider how an actively non-violent or dialogic rhetoric might ameliorate racial conflict. These theories have evolved in significantly new directions, largely influenced by Gresson’s work on racial recovery, which extended Gregg’s writings on denial and alterity in the rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, and revealed a number of psychological and epistemological challenges that had profound implications for the rhetorical study of race (McPhail, The
According to Gresson, Ronald Reagan’s rhetoric foreshadowed a racial recovery project that affirmed, a “‘traditional emphasis placed on rugged individualism and the heroic quest’ (Gresson, *The Recovery of Race* 10). This emphasis offered “a recovery project for individual whites” that “described the average American (a white) as the ‘real hero,’ one whose birthright included imagining himself or herself as destined by God to grow indefinitely and to rob death of its sting: ‘We have every right to dream heroic dreams’” (11). This white racial recovery project “resulted largely in judicial, occupational, and symbolic losses for Blacks and others previously targeted for so-called mainstreaming,” according to Gresson, who argues additionally that “the perceived need for this recovery of White Power is the exigency, in Bitzer’s words, that has silenced Black Power and its progeny, the Rainbow Coalition” (12). Gregg’s earlier observations regarding counter-reactions against the protest rhetoric of the 1960s and 1970s anticipated the rhetorical reaction that Gresson would envision as a White racial recovery project initiated by the Reagan “revolution.”

Reagan’s revolution had its roots in the essentializing of difference embraced by both the rhetoric of protest and the responses to it that affirmed mainstream values in opposition to discourses that questioned their legitimacy and sincerity. The counter-reaction to the demands of the rhetorics of protest, themselves invested in discourses of vilification and opposition and expressed most saliently in the language of Spiro Agnew, prefigured the rhetorical strategies of denial and alterity that would buttress White racial recovery rhetoric:

*Agnew takes self-proclaimed pride in such things as incentive, respect for law, and patriotism. He inveighs against the enemy: the ‘glib activist element who would tell us our values are lies,’ the ‘arrogant ones’ who are ‘asking us to repudiate principles that have made this country great. Their course is one of applause for our enemies and condemnation of our leaders.’ Agnew calls for a ‘positive polarization’ against ‘kooks,’ ‘demagogues,’ ‘cynics,’ ‘learned idiocy,’ and the ‘radical or criminal left,’ against the whole ‘effete corps of impudent snobs’ ‘with their masochistic tendencies.’ (Gregg, “The Ego-Function” 88)*

Agnew exhibited what Gregg would later describe as “the normal human tendency to turn away from those phenomena that make us uncomfortable and to identify with a symbolic ‘reality’ more to our liking” (“The Rhetoric of Denial and Alterity” 400). That tendency would resurface in the heroic racial recovery narrative that Reagan later popularized, a narrative that was expressed in both psychological and social forces of resistance. “I believe that many Americans were engaged in denial behavior in 1980 when they identified, no matter how vaguely, with Ronald Reagan and his ideological position,” wrote Gregg (400). Without understanding this strategy of denial at the heart of Reagan’s heroic narrative, Gresson argues, “we will find it difficult to explain or appreciate fully the mythic linkage between contemporary Black and white conservatism in the United States,” or see “the so-called white backlash as itself a recovery project for individual whites” (*The Recovery of Race* 11). Influenced by Gresson’s discussion of racial recovery, along with Gregg’s conception of protest rhetoric and Goldzwig’s discussion of symbolic realignment, my research led to an approach to rhetoric and race that
focused on the use of discourse as a way of “re-signing/resigning” social and symbolic realities.

In a chapter entitled “Re-signing the Opposition” in *The Rhetoric of Racism*, I bring together the insights of Gregg, Gresson, and Goldzwig to analyze the discourse of Louis Farrakhan as a form of protest rhetoric which reflects an alternative epistemology aimed at symbolic realignment. Each of these scholars recognizes that protest rhetorics often invoke oppositional stances that reify and reinforce essentialist notions of difference and identity, and Farrakhan’s rhetoric clearly exemplified this oppositionality and the resistance it elicited. My early work on the rhetoric of racism saw this oppositionality as problematic, but as my views evolved I began to consider the intersection between the epistemological and psychological dynamics of identity and difference. In particular, I began to consider how Gresson’s notion of “consensus” as a “contract” which the rhetoric of protest intentionally disrupts might be understood in relation to Charles W. Mills’s discussion of *The Racial Contract*. Mills offers the Racial Contract as a reconstructive critique of the abstract “social contract” that purportedly guides and defines social interaction in Western societies (9). In my view, African American rhetoric offers a “re-signing” of this contract that calls for an authentic recognition by whites of the ways in which they have failed to extend the social contract to persons of African descent. This recognition, which constitutes the first steps in “resigning” the social, economic, and political privileges of whiteness, is necessary for any type of genuine dialogue about the historical and material realities of racial division and domination, and a prerequisite for any successful rhetorical intervention aimed at racial reconciliation (McPhail, “Race and the (Im)possibility of Dialogue”).

This reading of the rhetoric of racism recovers an observation made by Gregg in his early exploration of Black Power regarding the potential for rhetoric to address the racial beliefs held by whites. “The idea that the rhetoric of black power addresses white society is a perception founded, not unreasonably, on a strong belief in white responsibility for the plight of the black man” (Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen, “Rhetoric of Black Power” 159). Gregg and his colleagues recognized the moral incoherence of white attitudes, beliefs, and language, and understood that the material conditions that had limited and defined the lives of Black people in America were undeniably at odds with the professed values of the dominant culture. This rupture between principle and practice has guided my own recovery of Gregg’s seminal insight: the need for the majority to truly listen to the voices of the dispossessed. The power of that insight is revealed, I believe, most coherently by Golden and Rieke’s observation that the “rhetorical goal—communicating with white men about their beliefs and attitudes regarding black men—may be more a psychiatric than a persuasive problem” (6). Although Golden and Rieke arrive at different conclusions than Gregg, the psychological turn taken by these scholars suggest that the possibility of racial reconciliation begins with the ability of whites to “resign” the Racial Contract. Gregg’s writings suggest that, to a large degree, he understood and perhaps even achieved this resigning.

Indeed, Gregg’s experience with African Americans in Harrisburg heightened his awareness of the material realities of racism and likely influenced his own reflexive understanding of the ego-functions of whiteness and white privilege. “History indicates, however, that our culture’s moral character, so far as the self-determination of non-white minority groups is concerned, is an unfulfilled potential” (Gregg, McCormack,
and Pedersen, “Rhetoric of Black Power” 159). Gregg recognized that the rhetoric of Black Power, while primarily inwardly directed, was also directed at the dominant culture, and that the “truths” it articulated fundamentally threatened the conceptions that white Americans held of themselves as moral agents. While black oppositionality was focused internally and often reinforced essentialized notions of identity and difference, it was nonetheless motivated by a demand for moral coherence on the part of the white majority. The men and women with whom Gregg and his colleagues worked, while reaffirming their own sense of identity, also had a message for white America: “They talked to white authorities about the necessity for teaching black history in the schools, putting a halt to police brutality in the ghetto, obtaining better garbage pick-up, improving housing and employment opportunities, and the like.” Yet, because of the failure of the dominant culture to listen, “their inherent pessimism concerning the attitudes and behavior of white culture did not dissipate” (159). The pessimism expressed by Gregg’s students over 40 years ago continues to influence contemporary considerations of rhetoric, race, and the possibility of persuasion to reconcile the Racial Contract.

Gregg, in his work with his colleagues in Harrisburg, and in his later work as well, believed that such transformations were possible. He saw in the rhetoric of Black Power in the 1960s the potential for a “rhetoric of coexistence” (Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen, “Rhetoric of Black Power” 160). Even as he recognized the dangers of denial and alterity that emerged in the 1980s, he remained committed to the belief that discourse could bring about positive change. He saw “rhetorical currents running, some of them strongly, that are urging changes in our perceptions and therefore our attitudes and behaviors” (“Rhetoric of Denial and Alterity” 401). Yet Gregg also recognized the limits of language alone to bring about change: “Language interacts with cognition, further stabilizing cognitive processes,” he explained. “Its stabilizing actions are not confined to processes we have typically labeled ‘reasonable’ or ‘rational,’ but also lend encouragement to projection beyond what is, to fantasy and illusion and denial” (Symbolic Inducement 91). These psychic projections of racial recovery continue to undermine the work that scholars like Gregg sought to initiate. He worked to address the “imperfection marked by urgency” that challenges our ability as Americans to reconcile the differences and divisions that alienate us from ourselves and each other.

From his early work with black citizens in Harrisburg, to his explorations into the epistemic and psychological grounds of symbolic inducement, Gregg recognized the double-edged character of such projections and their capacity to transform and also to inhibit transformation. His insights opened spaces for scholars of racial identity and difference to rethink rhetoric’s traditional boundaries and redefine the scope of rhetorical inquiries to the realms of recovery, realignment, and re-signing. His willingness to listen to the voices of those whom dominant culture had ignored or rejected and to challenge the privileges of his profession and culture allowed him to ask the “fundamental question” that continues to drive explorations of the rhetorics of race and racism: “whether representatives of two cultures could find a way to accept each other’s differences and maintain cultural autonomy while establishing communication essential to benefit coexistence” (Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen, “Descriptions of the Interaction” 60). Although we may not yet have found a definitive answer, scholars of rhetoric and race remain indebted to Richard Gregg for asking, and encouraging us to continue to ask, this difficult and important question.
Works Cited


Rhetoric by Indirection: The Case of Anatoly Scharansky

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Dick Gregg was my colleague at Penn State from 1969-1993. He also was my collaborator in research, valued reader of my manuscripts, trusted confidant, and treasured friend. Among the many ways our lives intersected, one of the earliest and most enduring was through a team-taught seminar in contemporary rhetorical theory, SpCom 507, which we offered for eight consecutive Spring Terms from 1970 through 1977. In many ways Dick's collaborative interactions with me were the formative agency of my early career, modeling my pedagogy, redirecting my vision of my work as a scholar/teacher and of myself, and helping me orient my professional trajectory.

We met religiously for an hour or more before and after each session—even into the seminar's eighth year! We took nothing for granted, including how each other thought or what each other might say, because we both understood that our seminar, at that moment of disillusion in American history, intersected theory with the intellectual and personal experiences of our students in powerful and informing ways. Each class was a rare and precious ensemble invention and to be respected.

This intense teaching experience gave me a deeper sense of rhetoric as a holistic (a concept Dick favored) discipline. It led me to a deeper feel for how to move from explication of a theory to an interpretation of the theory with practical traction, or as Dick often put it, “what happens when the rubber meets the road.” Mostly, it gave me a deeper appreciation for the concept of form, which was at the center of everything rhetorical for Dick. Form—the idea of recurring patterns that we are “hard-wired” to perceive and respond to—was formalized by Kenneth Burke as “the arousal of an appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite” (31). Dick saw form as central to Burke’s thinking and, in fact, as central to his own. From his reflections on Burke’s notion of form (Gregg, “Kenneth Burke’s Prolegomena”) he was led to Ernst Cassirer, and from Cassirer to neuroscience and Dick’s speculations on the neurological bases of rhetoric in Symbolic Inducement and Knowing: A Study in the Foundations of Rhetoric (1984). The idea of form lurks in his earliest writings on “The Rhetoric of Evidence” (1967) and “A Phenomenological Orientation to Criticism” (1966), and is evident in his distinguished essays on the Cold War (Gregg, “A Rhetorical Reexamination”; Gregg, “The Rhetoric of Distancing”). An awareness of form entered my thinking early through our collaborative analysis of Nixon’s “Cambodia Incursion Speech” (1973) and was reinforced throughout our common labor in SpCom 507.

Dick’s emphasis on form rubbed off in ways neither of us anticipated when in mid-career my work congealed around a focus on theorizing the public sphere as a rhetorical construct and on vernacular rhetoric as a major mode of discourse by which publics make themselves and their opinions known (Hauser, Vernacular Rhetoric). Although neither of us used the expression “vernacular rhetoric,” our deep discussions of Burke’s corpus, my fascination with quotidian rhetorical practices, and Dick’s experiences in teaching a course to politically disaffected inner-city blacks (Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen, “The Rhetoric of Black Power”; Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen, “A Description of the Interaction”) had us using the vernacular of the day as prime examples of the forms of verbal resistance that dominated the American rhetorical landscape of that time. Within that context, his renowned “Ego-Function” essay (1971), almost as a throw-away observation, makes the point that while critics
decried protest rhetoric as “coercion, threat and intimidation” (74), these were surface features masking the underlying form of deliberately excoriating an opponent as a means of reaching the true target audience. It was rhetoric by *indirection*, which brings me to the subject of this essay.

The idea of indirection, of seemingly addressing a given audience, especially an audience in power, in order to reach a larger audience whose sympathies one wishes to court, struck me then, as it does now, as a major rhetorical form of the oppressed. The political dissident knows that dialogue is not the métier of totalitarianism; public criticism carries a price. During the Cold War, the consequence for dissidents and opposition leaders who chose to live in truth often was detention or imprisonment. Similar expressions of opposition are heard today from Vietnamese cyber dissident, Dr. Pham Hong Son, under house arrest for posting material critical of the government (Amnesty International, “Viet Nam: Cyber Dissident”); Myanmar dissident Aung San Suu Kyi, held under house from 2003 until her release in 2010 (Amnesty International, “Annual Report”); and Benazire Bhutto, who returned from exile to share in the governance of Pakistan only to be detained under house arrest when she became critical of President Pervez Musharraf’s government (CNN.com/Asia) and then assassinated upon her release amidst charges that Musharraf had denied her adequate security.

For political prisoners unwilling to abandon their conscience—prisoners of conscience (POC)—electing to remain in detention carries the salient problem of dealing with the confrontational situation they have embraced. Their choices inevitably are among rhetorical forms. Sometimes their objective is to mitigate conditions of terror that are immediate and life threatening. More often it is to find ways of reaching an outside world to which there are no available direct channels of communication. Through letters smuggled to the outside, trials, hunger strikes, and other modes of reaching an external audience, the POC testifies to the value of resistance, communicates one’s resistance to a wider audience often beyond her or his own culture, and keeps the call to conscience and identity alive.

For example, Adam Michnik ended his “Letter from Gdansk Prison” by profusely expressing gratefulness to General Czesław Kiszczak for ordering his arrest. Kiszczak is due his gratitude for “your thoughtful watch over my steps and for providing proper direction for my meditation” (98), he writes, because it gives him the opportunity to do what he does best—write dissident prose. Michnik’s sarcastic expression of thanks to Kiszczak was intended for eyes on the outside. He was practicing rhetoric by *indirection*.

My concern in this article is to illustrate how indirection functions as a potent rhetorical form. After a brief discussion of the form itself, I wish to explore how indirection was used by Anatoly Scharansky to engage an oppressive government, which also was using this mechanism to remind its citizens of its power, in order to bring outside pressure to bear on the Soviet government. From this illustrative case, I also hope to disclose some of indirection’s functions that may help us better understand both this mode of appeal and its power as a form of POC rhetoric.

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2 For a more detailed discussion of indirection, see *Prisoners of Conscience* 99-121.
Rhetoric by Indirection

In a world of contingencies, imagination can compensate for, if not overcome, material constraints on the range of alternatives for displaying power. The rabble rousing address of a militant leader to an audience of ardent supporters may have inventional virtues, but we still understand it as rabble rousing directly addressed to an audience, however ephemeral, susceptible to the ardor of strong emotions that lead to action. On the other hand, emotional ardor leading to resistance can come from less direct appeals. A public performance seemingly moderate in its tone and addressed to a specific audience is also accessible to others, who in their own ways can be influenced by what they see and overhear. Sometimes reaching onlookers is the point. Direct address may intentionally use its declared audience as a foil to make a point about the foil to an undeclared audience. Its purpose is to persuade through indirection. A clear example is Martin Luther King’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail” (16 April 1963), written in direct reply to a statement issued by eight Alabama clergymen but also published in a variety of formats as an open letter intended to alter the collective consciousness of racism in the larger United States.

In addition to speaking to an apparent audience in order to reach another, a POC’s practice of rhetoric by indirection has at least three additional defining features. First, indirection can constitute the POC as a metonymic embodiment of the body politic. The prisoner’s personal struggle for survival under state-imposed conditions of custody represents the body politic’s struggle to survive the thumb of oppression. The POC makes a special claim on us to understand our own political situation in terms of our roles as they are played under current circumstances. As in tragedy, indirection can bring us to peripety, a sudden reversal of fortune that follows from a moment of recognition. Insofar as indirection awakens a sense that what is happening to the POC is happening to the body politic, one’s rhetoric can undermine the capacity of authority to control sentiments of opposition.

Second, in the case of POCs, indirection confronts onlookers with a scene that involves them as witnesses to the pain of others—psychological, physical, political, social, economic, and cultural. Indirection’s way of teaching is intensely personal and public. Because of this, subjectively witnessing the pain of a POC makes claims beyond compassion; it requires effort to make sense of what we are to certify. One of the things we learn is how we see ourselves in relation to what we are witnessing; it is a moment of self-discovery. For another, we learn how our sense matches up against the public sense being made of the scene, including the public sense of relationship; it is a moment of sociality. These epistemic apperceptions of self and other are themselves acts of involvement brought to consciousness through indirection.

Third, indirection may not always take the form of discursive appeal, but bodily performances are no less exhortative and no less instantiations of realities with which we can identify. Without question, a great deal of our response to tortured bodies that are metonyms for the body politic is triggered by the pathos they elicit. However, in all of its manifestations by the POC, indirection is a performance of conscience. Involving its audience as related to if not part of a body politic in extremis reflects a primordial choice of appeal. Giving the body politic visible and tangible form in the personage of a POC reflects a commitment to a unique way of seeing and living in a world by both the rhetor and those witnessing and participating in their political
performance. In other terms, as Maurice Natanson in “Rhetorical and Philosophical Argumentation” astutely observed, indirectness is a rhetoric of ethos.

**Strategies of Indirection in the Show Trial of Anatoly Scharansky**

In important ways, the site of political contest, for both the state and the movement, is the prisoner’s body. Control of the prisoner’s body provides the government an opportunity to make statements to the population in general and to dissidents in particular. From the prisoner’s perspective, inventive demonstrations of self-control provide an opportunity to assert personal dignity and use his or her body as a symbolic weapon to communicate deep opposition to the government in general while exhorting partisans of the resistance and those observing a political drama unfold.

During the period of Soviet rule, open criticism or suspicion of opposition could result in imprisonment or hard labor in the Siberian camps. In *Gulag: A History*, Anne Applebaum estimates that over time The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic’s (USSR) 473 labor camps housed as many as 15 percent of the Russian population. The vast majority of those in the camps were common criminals whose fate seldom became a cause célèbre. The defendant charged with a political crime, on the other hand was cast in the starring role of a three-act morality play: show trial, verdict, and imprisonment.

A show trial is a cautionary tale that punishes dissidence as much as the dissident through a mesmerizing and intimidating political spectacle. It is a quintessential performance of indirection. The prisoner’s body symbolizes the threat to the body politic; the prosecution symbolizes its protector. The trial uses legal proceedings to confer official status on a predetermined outcome. The verdict officially removes an opponent from circulation, but the trial’s larger point is its symbolic display of defending the body politic from acts against the state, which in the play’s mythos are the people themselves. Troublemakers must be punished to preserve society and the prosecutor, as its defender, makes sure that happens.

There is no evidence that a show trial puts an end to opposition, but it can coerce dissidents into the underground through the indirection of its threat: dissidents will be punished severely if they persist. As a cautionary tale a show trial further performs the necessary work of reminding the ordinary citizen of the state’s ‘heroic’ role that it continues to fulfill. To the general population, the court’s verdict also carries via indirection the moral that disobeying the rules carries consequences; avoiding suspicion is prudent. The verdict is a vehicle for the post-totalitarian state’s method of control (Havel). Those who take the trial’s point show their compliance not only by ceding the public sphere to the state but also by doing the state’s dirty work of surveillance on their neighbors.

The accused in custody has few options. In an authoritarian state, where news coverage is state controlled, family and friends on the outside are left to publicize the dissident’s legal cause. His or her physical treatment in jail is known only if supporters are made aware of it. In cases where the prisoner is held incommunicado, the methods of public resistance rely on the rules in play. Although the state invokes the pretense of forensic rhetoric to legitimate railroading an activist into the penal system, often a more authentic rhetorical battle is waged over the proceeding’s constitutionality. Dissidents and oppressed groups share a common aspiration for inclusion under constitutional provisions intended to protect the rights of citizens. Consequently POCs often focus their rhetorical efforts on forcing the state to play by the rules.
The USSR’s show trials regularly violated the accused’s constitutional protections. Those under arrest, and their families and supporters on the outside, regularly petitioned state officials to permit the accused exercise of their rights, charged that proceedings were unconstitutional, and called on the state to reverse a verdict based on unconstitutional practices by the prosecution and the courts. Their legal arguments also were spirited out of the Soviet Union to the West, where activist groups publicized them in an effort to mobilize external pressure.

The trial of Anatoly Scharansky is illustrative of rhetoric by indirection at play when prisoners of conscience seek to get the state to play by the rules. Scharansky, a Soviet mathematician, was among the most visible spokespersons for the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate. Scharansky also was a founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group composed of human rights activists who endeavored to keep an eye on and publicize Soviet deviations from the Helsinki Accords’ human rights provisions. Because he spoke fluent English, Scharansky became spokesperson for the group. His activities were regarded as challenging the government’s authority to deny Jews exit visas. Scharansky was arrested in March 1977 on charges of engaging in espionage based on acts that, in their sum, were publicizing his plight and that of other Soviet Jews who were denied their right to emigrate. He was convicted at a show trial held July 10-14, 1978 and sentenced to 13 years in prison—five at Christopol prison and the remainder at the Perm labor camp in Siberia. He was released after serving eight years of his term and emigrated to Israel.

A significant number of Russian Jews, mostly scientists, who sought to emigrate from the USSR were refused permission on grounds that they had knowledge important to national security. Others, mostly non-scientists, were required by a Catch-22 provision of Soviet law to leave their jobs in order to apply for an exit visa. However, because they then were unemployed they were denied permission to emigrate on grounds that they were parasites on the state. Many Jews who were denied exist visas, commonly referred to as ‘refuseniks,’ were convicted at mock trials and imprisoned. Across the 1970s, increasing internal protest over the USSR’s contravention of the Helsinki Accords’ provision entitling all persons to leave any country, including their own, attracted growing international attention. President Carter, for instance, exchanged letters with Nobel Laureate physicist Andrei Sakharov regarding human rights abuses in the Soviet Union, which Carter then released to the press.

Amidst mounting pressure, Moscow was convinced something had to be done, preferably a public renunciation of the emigration movement. Sakharov was too well known to arrest without causing an international furor. The same held for Alexander Lerner, who was leader of the Helsinki Monitoring Group. Scharansky, on the other hand, would serve its purposes since he was relatively unknown in the West and connected with everyone in a leadership position (The Jerusalem Post 116). In early 1977, the KGB arrested three prominent dissidents: Alexander Ginsberg on February 3, Yuri Orlov on February 10, and Scharansky on March 15. Scharansky was charged with treason under Article 64A of the criminal code, not, as Ginsberg and Orlov were, under Article 70 with anti-Soviet activities. If convicted, Scharansky’s charge carried the possibility of death (Buwalda 205).

Scharansky’s unimportance in Western eyes contributed to his arrest receiving scant notice. Once the charges of treason for providing state secrets to the United States were made public, however, there was an international uproar. President Carter put the credibility of his presidency on the line by publicly stating he had made deep inquiries at
the State Department and CIA and found no evidence that Scharansky had been an informant. Peter Liacaros, Dean of the Temple Law School, sent a resolution signed by more than 70 other United States Law School deans objecting to Scharansky’s arrest (The Jerusalem Post 125). In the USSR, 12 alumni of the Moscow Institute of Science signed a letter to “Professors, lecturers, and students throughout the world” calling on them to “use your connections and influence in order to prevent the repetition in our times of the nightmare of the Dryfus case” (The Jerusalem Post 125). The range of voices speaking on Scharansky’s behalf to the Soviet Union seemed to encourage spreading involvement as demonstrations occurred in the United States, Canada, Europe, Australia, and Israel. If the KGB had been counting on Scharansky giving them an admission of guilt on the treason charge, renunciation of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, and cessation of his efforts on behalf of refuseniks, it made a catastrophic error. He did not crack and by the time his trial began, it was hailed as the most important dissident trial of the post-Stalin era and was a front-page news item in Western media for the next week.

Scharansky was detained for 16 months between his arrest and trial, which contravened Soviet law allowing a maximum of nine months detention before being tried. During that time, his detention received continuing international attention. President Carter, who made human rights a centerpiece of his administration, often referred to the Scharansky case as illustrative of abuses in the Soviet Union. Within the USSR, Scharansky’s family and supporters made ongoing pleas that his constitutional rights had been violated.

As a form of indirection, the constitutional arguments are significant. For one, people objected to Scharansky’s detainment without trial past the nine-month limit. A group of refuseniks went to the office of the Procurator General to protest Scharansky’s extended detention. They met with his assistant, a Mr. Tsibulkin. The refuseniks transmitted their transcript of this meeting on January 18, 1978, six months before Scharansky’s trial, to the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews (UCSJ) and Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry (Union of Councils). Both groups, which were highly organized to disseminate information on the plight of Soviet Jews and maintain pressure on Washington, circulated the transcript within the community of Jewish activists in the United States who were keeping Scharansky’s detention before the public’s eye. The transcript portrayed Tsibulkin’s performance as an exercise in equivocation and sophistry to evade answering direct questions that cited relevant passages of the legal code and the limits of the Presidium’s power.

Scharansky’s legal representation also received wide publicity. In December 1977, he wrote his mother, Ida Milgrom, requesting that she and Scharansky’s wife, Avital, find him legal representation. Milgrom did not learn of the note until three months later. She wrote Prosecutor General Rudenko to protest the KGB’s concealment of the letter, denial of visitation with her son to discuss his legal representation, and providing him a court appointed attorney against his wishes. Her letter of April 13, 1978 was shared with the UCSJ for public dissemination (Milgrom).

The state also had means of indirection. Before a lawyer could represent a client charged with a security-related matter, she or he had to have a dopusk, a clearance by the Presidium of the Collegium of Advocates issued through the KGB. Dina Kaminskaya, who lost her dopusk for pleading the innocence of a dissident seven years earlier, agreed to defend Scharansky. Milgrom’s request that Kaminskaya receive the required clearance to defend her son was denied and Kaminskaya was therewith
disbarred after a 37-year career (Jerusalem Post 121). Knowing what happened to Kaminskaya, the remaining 30 attorneys on Milgrom’s list refused to defend Scharansky for fear they would suffer the same consequence or because they refused to give the show trial an illusion of justice. The court appointed a defense attorney, who was selected by the KGB, which also selected the prosecution, lending the trial the surreal incongruity of absurdist drama. Scharansky fired his court appointed attorney at the beginning of his trial and defended himself.3

Admittance to the trial was by invitation and limited to 50 spectators. Scharansky’s mother was denied admission, but his brother Leonid was permitted into the courtroom. Leonid appeared outside the court each day to report what had transpired and wrote a transcription of parts four and five of the trial,4 in which he details the cross-examination of witnesses and Anatoly Scharansky’s counters to the charges against him (Scharansky). The report includes Scharansky’s closing statement to the court, which concludes with his expression of unity within the Jewish Diaspora and disdain for the court:

For more than 2000 years the Jewish people, my people, have been dispersed. But wherever they are, wherever Jews are found, each year they have repeated, ‘Next year in Jerusalem.’ Now, when I am further away from my people, from Avital [my wife], facing many arduous years of imprisonment, I say, turning to my people, my Avital: Next year in Jerusalem! And I turn to you, the court, who are required to confirm a predetermined sentence: to you I have nothing to say. (Scharansky)

During the 16 months leading up to the trial and then the trial itself, the direct conflict contained in Scharansky’s failed efforts to force the state to play by its own constitutional rules was recast among the Russian people and in the West in a human rights narrative. The continuing news story that made audiences witnesses to Moscow’s intransigent refusal to honor Scharansky’s human rights functioned as a form of indirection. The USSR’s insistence that this was an internal affair only served to congeal world opinion that Scharansky’s trial was a travesty of justice.

When the trial concluded, the crowd outside the courthouse included figures whose prominence beckoned press attention. In addition to Scharansky’s supporters and Western journalists, the crowd included Western diplomats, two of the Soviet Union’s most noted refuseniks Alexander Lerner and Veniamin Levich, along with Yelena Bonner and her husband Andrei Sakharov, internationally known leaders of the human rights movement at that time. Afterwards, Sakharov called a hastily arranged news conference in his small Moscow apartment to denounce the sentence as “cruel” and “an act of vengeance.”

Scharansky’s guilty verdict and sentence triggered widespread protest in the West. British Prime Minister James Callaghan charged that these cases “bear some of

3 Because Soviet law required that the defendant have legal representation for the death penalty to be imposed, Scharansky’s self-defense may well have saved his life (The Jerusalem Post 132).

4 The prosecution insisted that day two and three of the trial be held in closed session because testimony and evidence dealt with matters of security, hence the absence of those days in L. Scharansky’s transcription.
the hallmarks of the trials we knew in Stalin's day.” Italian Communist Party chief Enrico Berlinguer declared, “Convictions for crimes of opinion cannot be tolerated.” The Communist Party in France wrote the Soviet embassy petitioning for his release. The next day saw a mass demonstration that brought together French communist officials and Jewish groups, such as the Youths for Zionism, marching arm in arm and chanting “KGB equals Gestapo” and “Socialism, yes—Gulag, no” (Time.com). President Carter condemned the verdict. The Moscow Helsinki Group, Lithuanian Helsinki Group and The Christian Committee to Defend the Rights of Believers issued a joint report that gave a synopsis of the Scharansky, Victor Petkus, and Ginsberg trials. The report emphasized the improbability of the charges (Moscow Helsinki Group). In the United States, scientists organized a boycott of Soviet scientific exchanges and conferences; eventually 10,000 scientists pledged to join the boycott.

From the USSR’s perspective, the mock trial and sentencing dealt directly with Scharansky and functioned as rhetoric by indirection to remind Russians that there were consequences for being a political troublemaker. USSR leaders miscalculated, however, in surmising that Scharansky’s lack of notoriety in the West would allow the trial to proceed without external notice. Through the efforts of Avital Scharansky, Ida Milgrom, and others, Scharansky stayed alive in the USSR’s Samizdat culture and in the international news as a symbol of Soviet repression. Scharansky’s correspondence with his relatives was publicized, keeping his treatment and declining physical health visible on the world stage. The Bay Area Council for Soviet Jewry orchestrated a Tribunal of Inquiry, presided over by three prominent Human Rights judges, and involving Alan Dershowitz, Irwin Colter, and a Soviet advocate who defended the USSR. The Tribunal called for Scharansky’s immediate release and a video of the proceedings was sent to Soviet Premier Andropov. The target audience for this inquiry is unclear. On the surface The Tribunal appeared to be directed to the Soviet Union, but the video certainly made its point to sympathetic audiences in other parts of the globe.5

In both the sham Soviet trial of Scharansky and the quasi-legal Tribunal of Inquiry, legal proceedings were used to give official status to their outcomes. Set within the frame of judicial norms intended to protect the rights of citizens, Scharansky’s show trial and subsequent treatment conveyed ominous consequences for supporters of the emigration movement. In the broader context, Scharansky’s case exemplifies the way institutionalized norms of civil conduct can be a vehicle of indirectness for exposing the state’s hypocrisy when contrasted with their embodiment in practice.

Conclusion

The show trial of Anatoly Scharansky reflects a panoptic model of governance in which each citizen is constantly reminded that he or she is under surveillance and that there are dire consequences for challenging the dictates of the state (Foucault). A show trial establishes terms of engagement between state and subject in which those who are designated as Other have no protection from surveillance or cruelty. However, this divide also has heuristic value for sketching the political and moral significance

5 The video of the Tribunal of Inquiry (1983) is part of the archival collection of the Bay Area Council for Soviet Jews, formerly housed at the University of Colorado Boulder. The collection has been relocated to the American Jewish Historical Society in New York. I do not possess precise file documentation for its current location.
'humanness' has to each person. It is especially provocative with respect to the question of how the politically damned acquire political agency.

Appeals directly addressed to Soviet authorities, in which the Soviet constitution was invoked to protect Scharansky’s right to a fair trial, were a participatory form that also constituted observers as involved witnesses to Scharansky’s performance of political agency. Their form capacitated a global public to testify to the reality of his claim to rights assigned to humans. As witnesses, the global public became part of the performance of resistance insofar as its members were stirred to involvement and further action. Rhetorical analysis of such cases needs to consider, if not center on, rhetoric by indirection to account for the characteristics of political agency under duress, how its appeals reach distant observers to involve them as witnesses, how this ensemble of witnesses enters the public realm and influences public actions, how countercultural spheres of resistance communities remain energized, and how the subaltern gain leverage to put pressure on official spheres in which decision makers conduct public business.

At its core, Scharansky’s verbal and bodily appeals called attention to the instability of both the POC’s and the state’s political agency. Indirection blurred the boundaries of legitimate state action. The state framed acts of resistance based on political conscience as criminal conduct, while partisans framed the same acts as the only remaining alternative to crushing domination by an oppressive regime. In the face of oppression, as Scharansky’s supporters illustrate, invoking institutionalized guarantees can be a counter-weapon. Invoking such guarantees can redefine the official public sphere as an arena of irony that exposes appearances of due process as another form of repression.

In this negotiation of political agency, unusual rhetorical means are used to subvert the overwhelming imbalance of material power represented by courtroom proceedings that lead to imprisonment in which the prisoner’s body is treated with disregard for his or her person-ality. This internal political contest, in turn, projects the prison onto the larger society as a discursive interrogation of existing conditions and the locus of political agency.

Each body politic has its own legal identity, often coupled, in theory, with the state. A body politic also has a cultural identity that is separate from the state. When the state appears to set upon the body politic, the person of the political prisoner has the rhetorical potency to serve as its metonym. When the state disregards constitutional guarantees, the rules of court, or norms of humanitarian treatment, it makes a statement about its monopoly on violence. When displayed before an audience of onlookers, these abridgements of human rights can transform them into participants in the moral pageant unfolding in public view. Such events require more than an acknowledgement that they are occurring; they require a choice.

Rhetoric by indirection assumes sufficient literacy to infer the point being made from what we are seeing. It enters the public sphere of its target audience as something other than a mode of deliberation and it shapes a public sphere as something other than a forum for deliberation. It is no surprise, therefore, that vernacular discourse plays a key role in its execution. Bodies in pain or prisoners being railroaded make no moral claims on their own. Indirection reflects a rhetorical choice to establish moral claims. By playing out a political drama in which onlookers have a stake, rhetoric by indirection reflects an alternate world to the lived realities of its times. The POC’s pain invites onlookers to see it as a display of conscience—as a sign of each POC’s ethos.
and the ethos of the people and ideals they represent. In this same regard, vernacular rhetoric, by its very nature, has embedded choices and indirection performs them. Indirection’s indictment andbeckoning call references a world of values, actions, and commitments that define political relationships we endorse and on which we can base judgment and conduct. Rhetoric by indirection aligns with Gregg’s analysis of protest rhetoric’s ego function by beckoning its audience to a choice about itself as part of a body politic in extremis. Indirection’s vernacular appeals engage an audience of witnesses on terms of its own moral quotidian. That is what makes it so powerful, gives it rhetorical salience, and qualifies it as a rhetoric of ethos.


Knowing about Knowing about Knowing about Knowing

Dale Cyphert, University of Northern Iowa

I headed to Penn State in the summer of 1994, the happy recipient of a welcoming letter from Dr. Richard B. Gregg, graduate director. My intention was to study the contrasting rhetorics of literate and oral cultures, but I hadn’t given much thought to how I would frame that investigation . . . much less the choice of an advisor. One send-off gift had been Steven Pinker’s brand new book, *The Language Instinct*. By the time I reached State College, I had discovered the exhilarating new field of cognitive neuroscience, which seemed to offer a way to explain why and how a community’s dominant communication mode could have such an impact on its rhetorical presumptions and practices.

The story did not end as you might think. Dr. Gregg had written his own book a decade earlier, and he’d moved on. He appreciated my interest in cognition but had no intention of taking on a new student. Ultimately, he suggested a couple of the graduate faculty who might make good advisors and saw me on my way. That way eventually wound back to his office, but circuitously. Each time I came across an interesting development in neuroscience, I knew he would be up for a chat. Each time I’d ask again to be his advisee, and he’d shoo me back out. I think I finally just wore him down.

We actually disagreed about quite a bit—not the least of which was the primacy of symbol—but we both enjoyed an enthusiastic and well-informed discussion partner. In the end, the point of the discussion wasn’t really about a correct understanding of human cognition, anyway. That was just our expression of a shared assumption that knowing more about how human beings worked is useful in understanding how their rhetorical interactions work. Perhaps even more fundamentally, we both saw rhetorical theory as a project to explain how rhetorical interactions work.

In the second half of the twentieth century, this was not a trivial goal. The field’s theoretical subject, “a speaker constructing a persuasive discourse to influence other people” had been “called into question” as Wayne Brockriede (“Trends in Rhetoric” 124) understated it. Political performance, sometimes violent, had demonstrated persuasive potential (Bower and Ochs), as had the collective power of social movements (Griffin). The speaker’s generative role could be played by the situation itself (Bitzer) or turned around to call forth an audience (Bitzer; Charland). Knowledge, a persuasive speaker’s tool, was beginning to look instead like a consequence of rhetoric (R. L. Scott). Theory that had once explained effectiveness in terms of conformity to rational thought was being asked to consider ways to “derive formal logic from the rhetorical concerns and transactions of human beings” (Johnstone 86). Rather suddenly, there seemed to be a lot for rhetorical theory to explain.

Even in easier times, the explanation of rhetorical processes is not a straightforward task. Rhetoric that works within one community can fall flat in the town down the road, and theory must distinguish culture-bound rhetorical practices from the fundamental processes by which humans establish and maintain their discourse communities (Cyphert, “Ideology, Knowledge, and Text”). Seeking to know how rhetoric works, furthermore, suggests nothing about what it might work for. In ancient times, theorists were careful to distinguish among rhetoric’s deliberative, judicial, and epideictic species. When the very notion of knowledge was being challenged by
twentieth century discoveries of fundamental uncertainty in physics (Heisenberg) and mathematics (Gödel), theory seemed to have taken a path into a hall of mirrors.

Looking back, the reflections have only multiplied, and I’ve grown suspicious that rhetorical theory functions as a builder of fun houses. The assumption that Dick Gregg and I shared—that theory ought to aim for understanding how rhetoric works—rests on perceptions and claims that seem to have wound back on each other. Michael Calvin McGee argued in 1982 that “cutting edge” rhetorical theories were more aptly called philosophies of rhetoric, that scholars were focused less on rhetoric than on what idealist critics had said about rhetoric (23). The trend continues. Stephen Hartnett recently credited an “epistemological explosion” with eliminating whatever “breezy consensus” there might have been on the relationship between theory and criticism at the middle of the twentieth century (523). The discipline can’t seem to say exactly why, but now theory-building is also a quest for emancipation (McKerrow), social justice (Biesecker), and “the imagination of better worlds” (Shome 516).

The clearest view down the mirrored maze might be queer, bent through a glass held just so to see what lies around the next corner. A straightforward investigation of how rhetoric works carries all the assumptions and implications of objectivism. The fun house produces a different experience. The series of contrasts and contradictions nevertheless creates a reality of sorts, and from the perspective of a century earnestly tackling the mysteries of post-Newtonian science, the multiplicity seems reasonable and constructive.

**Rhetoric as a Strange Loop**

The self-reflexive nature of rhetorical theory necessarily creates a *strange loop* of the sort with which Kurt Gödel so famously shredded mathematical certainty. Douglas Hofstadter calls these self-reflexive loops “shy creatures” (104) that are seldom found in the material world, but there seems to be generative power in the physical manifestation of paradox. The self-reflexive contemplation of discourse from within a complex human community, which is itself sustained by discourse, might be the source of its own self-organized viability.

First, call to mind one of the more famous representations of a *strange loop*, Escher’s drawing of an artist’s hand drawing an artist’s hand drawing an artist’s hand drawing . . . . In what Hofstadter also calls a *tangled hierarchy*, movement upward or downwards through the levels of a hierarchical system brings one back to the start, as we seem to do with knowledge about knowledge. Theorists are self-consciously aware of—they *know* that they *know*—the process by which a community develops its rhetorical norms, of which one set addresses the boundary between what is *known* to be true without discussion and the contingent realm of rhetoric. The community’s distinctions among fact, conjecture, opinion, inspiration, and insanity are built, at least in part, on the shared perceptual processes by which human beings can *know* by virtue of the character of their internal and external environments. The rhetorical theorist’s perceptual processes, as for any human, functions in concert with emotional and cognitive processes within a cultural environment that influences what she is able to *know* about rhetorical processes. She thinks she *knows* what she *knows*, and she begins to consider what she *knows* about rhetoric.

Hofstadter explains the powerful force of a *strange loop* in terms of “upside-down causality.” In the example of self-reflective consciousness, we humans “filter the
world into macroscopic categories” in order to perceive the “abstract and ill-defined high level patterns as mothers and fathers, friends and lovers, grocery stores and checkout stands . . . that are a million metaphorical miles from the microworld of physical causality” (172-173). The rhetorical power of Gödel’s *strange loop* theorem lay in revealing a larger, if paradoxical, truth “inherent in any arrangement of meaningful symbols” that might build the argument (Cyphert, “Strategic Use of the Unsayable” 89).

Working theorists seem to be in the same boat. Rhetorical scholars might *know* that a discourse community comprises an infinite accumulation of “ordinary discourse” that “permits interactivity among people” (McGee 27), but a theory that remained in contact with that “brute reality of . . . daily social phenomenon” would turn the world of rhetorical theory “upside-down” from what are perceived as the more foundational phenomena of “consciousness’ and ‘ideology,’ ‘myth’ and ‘phenomenon’” (McGee 25).

Upside-down. Cellular activity gives rise to hearts and kidneys, mothers and fathers, but we attribute intention, agency, and causality to the latter—even though we *know* that it is impossible to will our fat cells to shrink. The self-referential nature of rhetorical studies seems obvious.

Self-referential entanglements have led to bickering about whether one sort of knowledge is better or worse than another. When I entered the conversation in 1994, I brashly assumed the humanists’ rejection of neuroscience would evaporate once they had caught up with their reading. Dick Gregg had no such illusions. He understood that attention to cognitive sciences elicited “deep-seated and longstanding feelings of aversion” from those with a “humanist perspective” on rhetorical theory (“The Mind’s I” 244).

Gregg continued to reassure the field that human physiology was sufficiently complex to avoid deterministic “constraints” on “human initiative and choice,” but his proof required that rhetorical scholars “look closely at what is known about the nuts and bolts of brain function” (244). An objectivist project would anticipate a look, but just last year, with 20 years to look closely, one reviewer called neuroscience a “hokey press-release science” without any relevance to rhetorical studies. Why is this *knowing* loop so resistant to change? How is it that *knowing* how rhetoric works is so closely entwined with idealist philosophies of how it *ought* to work and critical theories of how the *culture* works?

**Levels of Knowing**

The answer might lie in the upside-down entanglements of the *strange loop* hierarchy. The processes of human neurophysiology are less interesting as causal nuts and bolts than they are as evidentiary effects to support the relative value of perceptual over intuitive forms of knowledge—abstract concepts that lie at least a couple of levels up the hierarchy, regardless of how the human brain actually works. The framing and reception of Gregg’s work on the very fundamental nuts and bolts of human cognition serves as a useful example.

Carroll Arnold introduced Gregg’s *Symbolic Inducement and Knowing* as an exploration of epistemology that inventoried scientific research to “refine and give flesh to an essentially Gorgianic vision of life as symbolic experience” (ix). Unsurprisingly, reviewers and respondents took up the work within an ongoing argument over idealist and contingent forms of knowledge, abstractions that lie several levels up the hierarchy. Neurophysiological processes were framed as an alternative to human experiences a
level or so up, which they necessarily support: creativity (Enos), revelation, and mediation (Rosenfeld). They were deemed contradictory to the macroscopic categories of rhetorical knowledge they might allow (Waddell). Consistency in low level biological processes seemed to disallow interpretive variability at the higher level of perceived knowledge (Ehrenhaus). Knowledge of nuts and bolts was deemed not useful without a macroscopic filtering into an “overarching theory” of ontology (Carleton 228).

We debate the attributes of knowledge as though our phenomenological experience drives the underlying mechanisms of genetics and biology. Just as the conscious mind perceives only the lovers and grocery store checkout stands, unaware of the neurophysiological processes that produce that interpretation, theorists work hard to assign abstracted and value-laden interpretations to the symbol-producing processes of the human mind. In the upside-down world of strange loops, thinkers act as though their abstracted interpretations determine how the biology must work.

The identification of rhetorical theory as a strange loop offers a mechanism to describe the reflective fun house, but sheds no light on its function. I am increasingly suspicious there is more to the story. A dozen years ago, I blamed tiresome arguments around fundamental rhetorical choices on a failure to differentiate between rhetorical practices within a culture from the process of forming rhetorical culture (Cyphert, “Ideology, Knowledge, and Text”). Now, it seems quite possible that it is the generative power of the endlessly looping paradox that drives and sustains rhetorical community. The rhetorical norms we seek to understand are the self-organized, emergent result of our own endlessly self-reflective discourse.

Much has been made of the last century’s “rhetorical turn” (Simons vii) in response to physicists’ (Heisenberg) and mathematicians’ (Gödel) demonstration that foundationalism’s bugaboos, imprecision and inconsistency, were fundamental conditions of the physical universe. With the dreadful realization that Laplace’s demon could never, ever, ever know “all of the forces that animate nature and the mutual positions of the beings that compose it” (4), Western rhetoric began its adjustment of the macroscopic filters, forging new discourses of evidence and knowledge and science that would be suitable in a post-positivist world.

The point here is not that one or another epistemological perspective is or ought to be correct, but that Western culture’s self-reflective response to change in the rhetorical environment began (and continues). Not just a response, mind you, like a lobster reacting to noxious stimuli in its watery environment or a dog biting the hand that feeds it, but tiresome, self-reflective, navel-gazing, iterations of meaning and significance and moral behavior. All the arguments for and against foundationalism had to be reframed, revised, and adjusted to a world without the epistemological luxury of mathematical certainty.

These adjustments are not trivial. The rules of civil discourse are not trivial. Human communities cannot continue to function rhetorically—that is, they cannot act collectively to make and act on decisions—if they cannot agree on the foundational rules of who decides, what information forms the basis for decision, and how decision-making is performed (Cyphert, “Ideology, Knowledge, and Text”). In normal times, the rules will seem obvious, taken for granted. The discourse formation remains intact. When major change occurs—the invention of writing or the printing press, or a photo of our earth from space—rhetorical order demands adjustment, reconsideration, and revision. Agreement on those revisions requires a good deal of discourse: neither a happy nor a short conversation. Each adjustment of one rule in one context changes
every relationship with the rest. Every adjustment tweaks the reward mechanisms that sustain the structure. Who but rhetorical theorists would keep that fire burning?

**Self-Organizing Rhetorical Community**

Meanwhile, at science’s nuts and bolts level, alternative principles to Newtonian mechanics started to emerge with mathematical advances in nonlinear dynamics, Isaac Newton’s treatment of the two-body problem of planetary motion being one of the first (A. C. Scott). Nineteenth century mathematicians continued the work, but an explosion of activity took place in the early 1970’s when advances in computing power made the calculation of nonlinear equations possible. In just over four decades, then, what is now commonly called complexity science has provided what has been described as a paradigm shift in our understanding—not merely of human beings, or even of biological sciences—but of the material conditions of the entire universe (Prigogine; A. C. Scott; Wolfram).

The forces of the universe cannot, as it turns out, be explained with linear equations of cause and effect. The neat determinism of billiard balls turns out to be an approximation—and not a very good one at that. On the other hand, the universe does exhibit consistencies and patterns and principles of order. The messiness of biology, thought to be a realm that simply had not yet been explained mathematically, turns out to be the more general rule, if still a somewhat mysterious one. The ongoing challenge is to redescribe the world around us according to principles that are still only partially understood.

This melding of physics and biology leads to the most profound implication of complexity: its character “finally overcomes the Cartesian division between mind and matter” (Capra 33). There is little question, a half-century into the research, that human society exhibits the characteristics of self-organizing complex systems (Barnett and Houston), sometimes called complex adaptive systems, or autopoietic systems (a term derived by biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela from the Greek, “self-organizing”). The typical point of comparison is with a beehive or an ant colony, relatively simple systems that nevertheless exhibit the key characteristics of self-organization. The more general definition points to entities that exhibit “the spontaneous emergence of new structures and new forms of behavior in open systems far from equilibrium, characterized by internal feedback loops and described mathematically by nonlinear equations” (Capra 85). Those working in the humanities or social sciences will recognize these as features of a human society that builds and discards social and cultural institutions, uses resources from the environment and creates waste, and organizes itself through endless feedback loops of conversation and cultural production.

It is one thing to note that human communities exhibit the characteristics of complexity, and quite another to embrace the idea that principles of complexity must therefore govern the mechanisms of human community. It seems that many scholars use the concepts metaphorically, describing human community as an organism without an appreciation for the material reality of complexity principles (Barnett and Houston). Complexity is a development with profound implications for what we think we know about human behavior and human relationships and the potential for a radical post-Newtonian revision of how we understand rhetoric.
Hints toward complexity have been around for a while. Wayne Brockriede (“Dimensions of the Concept of Rhetoric”) pointed explicitly to mathematician Warren Weaver’s very early descriptions of “organized complexity” (7) to emphasize the nature of rhetoric as “a matrix of complex and interrelated variables” with possible permutations that “approach infinity” (12). Despite his focus on the “mind-brain” at the microscopic level of an individual human, Dick Gregg was aware of some complexity principles in 1984. He simply assumed self-similarity, a well-documented characteristic of complex systems (Capra), when he pointed to nascent work in sociobiology, claiming that “socio-cultural interaction has meaning and stabilizes experience in accord with the principles of cognition that are initiated by mind-brain” (Gregg, *Symbolic Inducement* 97), then applying those principles to a community’s rhetorical practices as well. Gregg was more explicit, calling “it reasonable to presuppose that human symbolic behavior is a closed feedback-loop behavior” (Symbolic Inducement 22), referring to complexity work then being done in paleoanthropology.

I will spare the reader further discussion of complexity, except to point out that “self-organization is neither a mystic process nor a random one” (Cilliers 89). It is not a metaphor. It is not an analogy. Fully material mechanisms are at work, and their effects have been explored in social systems by biologists (Maturana and Varela), sociologists (Luhmann), and communication scholars (Barnett and Houston; Brown, “Attention”; Brown, “Power”; Gunaratne; Hoffman; Houston; Opt and Gring).

**Evolution of Rhetoric Systems**

At this point, there is not much news (as T3B says) in the observation that human society exhibits the characteristics of complex adaptive systems. It is that lack of newness, however, that obligates some attention to what the principles of complexity might tell us about rhetorical behavior. If, as McGee advocated, we understand rhetoric as the material “whole of ‘speaker/speech/audience/occasion/change’ which impinges on us” (30), we will need to acknowledge the collective role of speaker/speech/audience/occasion/change within the mechanisms of self-organization. This is an ongoing area of research that I have no space to explore here, except to point out that rhetorical scholars, with some 3000 years of data on one particular class of systems, are poised to make a significant contribution to the general understanding of complexity.

Theorists have already acknowledged one rhetorical process of *autopoietic* communities: the adaptive evolution of rhetorical practice in response to environmental and internal change. Differences between rhetorical eras, as well as the theories that arise within them, have been traced to advances in the understanding of human psychology and social behavior (Black; Crable; Ehninger), and more recently in terms of affordances of the available communication technology (Gronbeck, Farrell, and Soukup; Jamieson).

The obvious follow up questions would seem to ask how that happens, and my suspicion is that one mechanism involves that endlessly looping, self-reflective discourse that proposes, considers, rejects, enjoys, adjusts, tests, justifies and normalizes the rules by which the collective conducts its business. It might look like an endlessly reflective fun house to those standing inside its mirrored walls, but the *strange loop* of theoretical naval gazing creates the possibility of change. In the terminology of *autopoietic* systems, the rhetorical community changes its structures, adapting, learning, and
evolving in “the coevolutionary dance of cooperation and competition” (Waldorp 292) with its environment.

In a single snapshot moment, it might be possible to consider what the rhetor knows and how she knows it. A listener might be able to say that one way of knowing was more appropriate or effective than another way of knowing. A theorist might itemize those things that are discussable in contrast to what is known to be “incapable of being different” (Aristotle 41). But, time does not stand still. Nor do relationships or available technologies or human neurons as they engage in bounding, rhythm, association, classification, abstraction and hierarchic ordering to make sense of perceptual input (Gregg, Symbolic Inducement). The conversation about knowing about knowing about knowing about knowing generates paradox, insight, revelation, nuance, and resistance—the stuff of creative choice that allows a rhetorical system to adapt, evolve, or occasionally self-destruct—even as it drives toward the consensus of pedagogy and critique to create equally necessary structures of stability, discipline, and continued existence.

I wonder whether Dick Gregg appreciated his own mirrored contribution to the fun house when he began his book with these words: “As human beings, we know, and we know that we know” (Symbolic Inducement 3). He framed his project as part of the “evolutionary trend in our intellectual development” that changes what we think we know over time (4), but his allusions to still-emerging principles of complexity were lost in the shifting zeitgeist. The Postmodern turn was in full swing, and the relationship of rhetoric to knowing was a salient topic for rhetorical theorists.

Claiming “no new theory of rhetoric” (Gregg, Symbolic Inducement 131), Gregg’s effort might be best understood, in theoretical terms, as fleshing out his good friend Kenneth Burke’s claim that humans are “symbol-using, symbol-making, symbol-misusing beings” (6). Still, his evidence clearly supported just one side of what was a hot-button issue of the day: the distinction (or not) between “what humanity knows and what there is to know” (Brummett, “Some Implications” 28). Gregg’s intention was to enhance the material perspective: “The goal of such scholarship is presumably to comprehend rhetorical behaviors more fully.” He saw theory-building as an examination of “actual or potential functions of symbolic inducement” and discovery of “the actual or potential consequences of those functions” (Gregg, Symbolic Inducement 137). Nevertheless, Gregg’s explication of the neurobiological substrates of symbolizing was reflected and refracted as an argument against the possibility of physical reality.

Barry Brummett reported the demise of epistemic rhetoric as a line of research after 1985, starved by “unproductive disputes over terms” (“A Eulogy” 70). The call for attention to material processes of physiology seemed to be lost, in part, with the seeming “anti-material” position that “all human experiencing is symbolic, ‘Reality’ is a symbolic reality. That is all we have” (Gregg, Symbolic Inducement 133). The desire to know about knowing became entwined within the ongoing quest to know how it is that we can know about knowing.

The questions of the day change. Sometimes the community is faced with challenges to reconsider what knowledge can be trusted. At other times, it must question the social relationships that define who is allowed to engage. In another cycle, technology might disrupt the rules of rhetoric’s proper performance. Through it all, philosophers, theorists, and critics perform a necessary function, facilitating the adaptation of norms to facilitate the everyday business of rhetorical practice. The fun house conversation can be tiresome, but fully settling an issue would reduce the community’s capacity for adaptive change.
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Afterword: Remembering the Eloquence of Inducement

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“To Chuck, ‘Criticism is easy, Art is difficult’—Le Glorieux 1732.
Here’s to a good life of artful critique! Dick & Dianne 12/20/98”

Well before dawn on a spring day in 1997, four Penn State Rhetorical Studies graduate students—Bernard Armada, Andrew Hansen, Rick Pucci, and myself—ate breakfast together at Ye Olde College Diner on College Avenue, excitedly finalizing our strategy. Distinguished professor Carroll Arnold had passed away in January, a man whose professional legacy towered in Sparks Hall, as in the field writ large, and whom we all during our time on campus had the honor and pleasure of meeting. His longtime colleague and friend, our teacher, Professor Richard Gregg, tasked with dispatching Arnold’s library, had donated a substantial portion of it to the annual American Association of University Women (AAUW) book sale. Not long before the sale, with that marvelous grin of his, he conspiratorially told us about this once-in-a-career opportunity, one we would ravenously pursue. In what felt like a rhetorician/bibliophile’s Ocean’s Eleven (although that film didn’t appear until the year of his death in 2001), we plotted, we arose early, we ate grilled stickies, we stood in line for hours before the doors opened, and then buzzing on anticipation and collective effervescence we efficiently took to all corners of that wide hall, swiftly grabbing every coveted book we could spot, depositing them all together in a pile against a wall. When, breathless, our work was done, the four of us sat right there on the floor, wide-eyed and crossed-legged in a circle, collegially and equitably distributing this remarkable trove. We were giddy with good fortune and camaraderie, now co-curators of this precious archive, memory. And somehow this venture also seemed in the end to have been sparked by an eloquent inducement, familiar in retrospect if one knew our instigator, to become a better rhetorical theorist and critic. At least that’s how I remember this episode (Samuel R. Delany: “even as I work after honesty and accuracy, memory will make this only one possible fiction among the myriad” [The Motion of Light in Water 16]). All thanks to Dick Gregg.

It is not an epideictic exaggeration to say that Dick Gregg was there for every rite of passage moment throughout my graduate education. In his role as Graduate Director, Professor Gregg phoned me as a senior at Boston College in the spring of 1991 to ask me who the competition was; I was so disarmed by his charming friendliness that I think my deliberation ended right then and there with a blurted acceptance. After Stephen Browne departed briefly for California, Professor Gregg advised my Master’s thesis; after its defense he suggested I might like to call my parents with the good news, and offered me his office phone to do so. Professor Gregg was there at that same oak table as a committee member during my comprehensive exams, and again at my dissertation defense. Professor Gregg was there when Professor Browne hooded me in 1998. And when for the first time I returned home, as a very young plenary speaker at the 2000 Public Address Conference hosted by Penn State, Professor Gregg was there, though ill (the last time I’d see him), listening and encouraging as always, hugging me, expressing his sweet congratulation and friendship. He was always there.
My colleagues gathered in this special issue celebrating Dick Gregg’s legacy (Arneson and Flinko; Medhurst; Philipsen; McPhail; Hauser; Cyphert), and elsewhere (Benson), insightfully and movingly spotlight the many diverse and unique contributions that have made his intellectual mark lasting. From my perspective, Gregg’s curiosities and capacities made him both a deft rhetorical theorist and a discerning rhetorical critic, a rare combination then or now. Take context, for example, which is arguably more an article of disciplinary faith than a vein of deep conceptual and critical praxis. Not so in Gregg’s work. His phenomenological perspective (“A Phenomenologically Oriented Approach”) on the rhetorical situation in my judgment remains an invitation to contextualization critics have yet to fully accept and pursue. Let me quote one instance at length:

One the one hand, a critic can focus on a single message, delivered on a particular occasion, with a view toward explaining its immediate impact. But such a critical perspective, with its arbitrary time-slicing, excludes a great deal of the action of the larger scene which informs the immediate context of the act, and leaves us looking at the tip ends of human interaction. On the other hand, we can place a rhetorical act among many others in an attempt to get a perspective on a whole scene, movement, or era. . . . In our search for system and order, we suffer from a tendency to ‘overrationalize’ history, to see motive and purpose and behavior clearly when in fact the scene may have been anything but clear to the behaver. We necessarily abstract from the contingencies of the moment, and thus miss the specific vagaries, proclivities, immediate reaction to events, and sheer accidents which result in rhetorical impact. Both perspectives miss the incremental building and joining of motive, purpose and reaction that lead to the occurrence of the rhetorical situation and the resultant momentum of will and perception that extends beyond the moment of the rhetorical act to be manifested in other situations. (“Arthur Vandenberg’s ‘Dramatic Conversion’” 157)

Such expansiveness and complexity in Gregg’s rhetorical imagination deepened his criticism of foreign policy discourse and social movement rhetorics, and shaped his innovative theorizing about psychology, cognition, neurophysiology, perception, form, and experience in rhetorical engagement. From his germinal study on identity in confrontational protest rhetoric (“Ego-Function”) and explication of Kenneth Burke’s conceptualization of form (“Prolegomena”) through his major work on the mind-brain in human symbolization (Symbolic Inducement and Knowing), Gregg ambitiously sought holism in accounting for the domains and operations of the rhetorical world. Moreover, the critic and/or theorist must be reflexive and embodied—that is to say, deeply situated—in engaging the rhetorical world, as Gregg exemplified by humbly and earnestly listening to those African American students he sought to teach, and more importantly from whom he sought to learn about the rhetoric of race in that Harrisburg “ghetto” in 1968 (Gregg, and McCormack; Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen, “A Description”; Gregg, McCormack, and Pedersen, “Rhetoric of Black Power”; McPhail).

I cannot sing better than those in the chorus already praising Dick Gregg’s influential scholarly corpus, but I would like to add a grace note. What I relish most
about the Carroll Arnold books I now possess is not the content itself (given my interests, I can't tell you why I selected George Campbell, Richard Whately, and Kenneth Burke) but Arnold's marginalia (queers and other marginalized peoples know better than any that far from being non-essential, as the dictionary suggests, what happens on the borders and in the interstices matters). In his lovely hand, Arnold’s notations—crystalizing, clarifying, challenging: Arnold in dialogue with Campbell!—captivated me. Among the marginalia that Dick Gregg might have found of interest, for example, Arnold had offered on a loose sheet tucked into pages 50-51 an extended summary about the introduction to The Philosophy of Rhetoric: “Eloquence is an art having specially close connection with all the faculties and powers of mind. . . . Eloquence produces the situational adaptation which makes the production of logic negotiable in its place.” My thought at the time was that this marginalia evidenced an exchange one might have upon “arriving” as a rhetorical scholar. But there was something more important at work here.

As I reflect now on Dick Gregg’s influence on me, and no doubt for so many others as well, it was in fact precisely this mentorship process of intimate marginalia—in conversational asides, in facial expressions, in delicious seminar anecdotes, and especially in his notes on the essays you’d written for him—that constituted the eloquent inducements to a life as a rhetorical scholar, or simply to fulfillment as a human. Owing to my inclination to save everything (I prefer the term archivist rather than hoarder, thank you), I still possess Dick Gregg’s marginalia, in his own distinctive hand, which I read from time to time for ongoing inspiration. And I imagine him having done the same in his relationship with Arnold. In Arnold’s copy of Explorations in Rhetorical Criticism, inscribed, “To Carroll, With thanks for help along the way, Dick,” there can be found Arnold’s thoughtful, probing comments in the margins of Gregg’s phenomenological analysis of Foreign Relations Committee rhetoric on Vietnam, which they no doubt discussed (“The 1966 Senate”).

Over the course of four seminars with Dick Gregg, 1991-1994, I wrote essays on Peter Pan as a provocation to social change, Charles Lindbergh’s heroism, Kathleen Jamieson’s “effeminate style,” and Kenneth Burke’s conception of eloquence. Some of Gregg’s comments prompted self-reflection, for this young man with his hand on the door knob of the closet. In the Peter Pan essay I had written, “In the theatre, all that was required to resist the moving of the world was the enthusiastic affirmation of belief in fairies,” to which he responded, “Interesting observation. Perhaps it is ever thus, for some.” Other comments encouraged self-confidence through additional labor: “I am intrigued by your claim that a hero is more than a public construct. I’m also interested in the idea that if a genre is to be suggested, it will have to include message characteristics, qualities of enactment, and probably action itself. As you indicate, a longer, more in depth study along the lines you suggest could be very much worth doing. Are you thinking about it?” Sometimes he gently chided: “Don’t forget that in Burke’s terms, ‘perfection’ would not necessarily mean eloquence”; “But you are misrepresenting Jamieson’s intent.” And sometimes his confirmation gave soaring flight to the fledgling critic:

Your section arguing the radicalization involved in eloquence is exceptionally well presented. Earlier in your paper, I raised the question of whether the presentation of traditionally and conventionally held values and beliefs could not be eloquent. But
after finishing your essay I decided it could not. For to be eloquent, the traditional would have to be re-presented, and in a way that would always be radical. You have been following this business of eloquence assiduously—and thoroughly. You have ‘news’ here. Excellent work.

Eloquence too, I glean from Gregg’s marginalia, can be guileless in its radical inducement. Where others have eloquently demonstrated the holism in Gregg’s praxis as a rhetorical theorist and critic, and as a rhetorician situated in the world, I share fragments from my archive of him by way of suggesting that the same might be said of his cultivating the next generation of scholars in his care.

One final anecdote, from the last of our time together, nearing the end for both of us of our time at Penn State. The picture of Dick Gregg (his presidential campaign placard behind him), included both in this issue and as part of Tom Benson’s 2001 published tribute prompts this memory. He was just moving into his new office on the top floor of Sparks when this picture was taken. We were both in quite new stages of life and career, he transitioning out of his position as Director of Graduate Studies after many years; I now fully out and proud and vocal (in part because so many, notably including Dick and Dianne Gregg, had been so supportive of my coming out, of my burgeoning interest in queer scholarship, of my partner Scott), finishing my dissertation, on the job market. One afternoon he called me in my graduate office, asking me to come upstairs because he wanted my opinion. I had arrived! He wants my opinion! Two stairs at a time, I dashed to his office. Amid the disarray of the move, he was trying to create some order, to settle in, to make this his new academic home. And so he asked for my counsel about whether the rug—I think it was the rug—worked in the room. Instantaneously I shrieked, “Dr. Gregg! You didn’t just call me up here for DECORATING advice!?” And we looked at each other, and both burst into laughter as he apologized, and thoughtfully reconsidered, and I gave my fabulous advice anyway, and we laughed some more.

Such was this wonderful man and the relationship I cherish still—a relationship, a legacy, forged by eloquent inducements which, if I may paraphrase Dick Gregg, in its specific vagaries, proclivities, incremental building and joining of motive, purpose and reaction, has had life-making rhetorical impact and extends beyond those many moments of rhetorical acts to be manifested in other situations for a long time to come.
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